

THE

BEGINNINGS OF ETHICS.

BY

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

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PREFACE.

THIS book on Ethics has grown up slowly from studies carried on in connection with the instruction of college students. But what is here taught has never been to the author mere literary theory; it is not the result of reading alone and closet meditation; much of it has had its origin and taken its special shape from a considerable intercourse with men in business and social relations. The book was substantially written and put in use, in the form of lectures and dictations, sixteen years ago. This conception of Ethics and this way of presenting the subject have seemed so stimulating and helpful to many successive classes that it is thought possible a wider public might have some interest in it and gain some advantage from it, — not merely the public of college and professional students, but all who are interested in questions touching the moral and religious progress and welfare of men.

The title, "The Beginnings of Ethics," is intended to signify that the book treats rather of ethical origins

than of the details of ethical philosophy and practice; it is genetic rather than constructive in its method. The chief aim is to show how Ethics arises psychologically and logically out of the nature of the soul and the necessary assumptions of its thought and action. It is believed that morality seen in this light will be joyfully accepted and entered into as a high privilege, rather than wearily submitted to as a yoke of bondage.

The great activity in this branch of philosophy during the last fifteen years is a striking and significant fact. It is due doubtless to a great many causes, philosophic, scientific, political, and religious, to the deeper studies of history, the more fruitful investigations in every department of knowledge under better methods, to the deeper agitations and discontents which spreading knowledge has created among all classes of people in presence of the hardships, wrongs, and inequalities of the world. This speculative and practical ethical activity marks in a peculiar manner the thought and the tendency of the times. It shows with new and increased force how wide and deep and real the ethical is in human nature and human life. The English language has not seen such a series of thorough, fresh, and independent discussions before, since the publication of Butler's "Analogy." Their titles and the names of their authors will occur to every reader.

This book has not failed to receive some color from all these many recent treatises; although it is

not dependent upon any of them for its special doctrines or its conception of the subject as a whole. Readers will readily detect the influences which have been most prevalent with the author, and recognize their sources. Butler will be given the first place, though the most central and shaping thought of all came from the late President Walker, of Harvard College. It is impossible to specify and acknowledge the obligations owed to other authors, unless it be those to Aristotle and Dugald Stewart; but these will be readily seen.

Judging from the course of many writers of text-books on Ethics, the references here found in foot-notes may be deemed either pedantic or useless, or both. But this is not intended merely as a text-book for classes in institutions of learning. It hopes to do something to direct and stimulate thought upon ethical questions in the wider world of thinking and practical men. And surely it ought not to be useless to refer college students and all intelligent readers to other accessible and interesting discussions of the same subject, if they are likely to be helpful or confirmatory or suggestive in any way. It is not expected in these days that college students or other readers will confine themselves doggedly to some one text, and not wish to look beyond it.

The field of Ethics is a very wide one; it covers all the actions and relations of our lives as personal beings. This book aims only to make clear ethical principles in general, the purpose for which we should

live, and the law by which we should guide our conduct. The details of application may be carried out in many subordinate departments, and every one must at last apply the principles for himself to his own personal life. This requires only an honest purpose and good temper. Theory and discussion cannot produce these; but every moral creature must here be left to himself to stand or fall according to his own personal choice and pleasure. That the book may help the cause of philosophic truth and that of practical righteousness is the wish of the author.

C. C.

January, 1889.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE AND FIELD OF THE SCIENCE.

SECTION 1. The subject which we are now to study and expound is called *Moral Science*, *Moral Philosophy*, or *Ethics*. These terms have often been used in a much wider sense than that in which we here employ them. *Moral Science* is often used, in contrast with Physical Science, to include all those branches of knowledge which pertain to beings possessed of desires and will. It thus covers the field of Psychology, Natural Theology, the Science of Morals in the narrow sense, Economics, Politics, and the Elements of Law. This is the common signification of the phrase "Moral Philosophy" in the Scotch universities until a very recent period. Hume calls Moral Philosophy the science of human nature. This wide sense of the phrase is easily appreciated when we consider that the moral in man is the culmination of all his endowments, and is that which gives special and highest significance to all these branches of knowledge. The term "Ethics" is used by Spinoza to cover the whole field of metaphysics and psychology. We do not here employ these terms in so wide a meaning.

The Germans call this branch of knowledge *Ethik* and *Sittenlehre*. The word "moral" is derived from the Latin *mos, mores*. Cicero coined the word *moralem* as a name for the science *de moribus*.[1] The word *mos, mores*, means "custom," "manners," "conduct." The word "ethics" (*Ethik*) is from the Greek ἔθος, ἦθος, ἠθικά, which also means "custom," "habit," "usage."[2] *Sitte* in German has the same meaning.

Some writers would draw a distinction between Ethics and Morality. Thus Pollock makes the former signify "the scientific analysis and exposition of conduct, — . . . a scientific hypothesis for the explanation of existing facts;" and the latter, "the region of precept and command."[3] The one is therefore scientific; the other, practical. But this distinction is entirely arbitrary, and might just as well be reversed. It is reversed by Porter,[4] who calls "Moral Science proper the scientific treatment of duty," and "Ethics a system of rules of human conduct." Both the etymological signification of the words and the usage of writers makes them synonymous.

SECT. 2. All the names of this science indicate that it has primary reference *to conduct as its subject-matter*. It does not, however, view conduct in all its aspects, but only in a certain special aspect. Perhaps we might better say that it does not take notice of all the accessories or outward expressions of conduct. By "conduct" we mean the actions of moral beings or persons as such, — actions intelligently directed to ends. Wherever there are persons intelligently

[1] De Fato, chap. i.
[2] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book ii. chap. i.
[3] Frederick Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, p. 294.
[4] Elements of Moral Science, introductory chapter.

acting, there is conduct and the field of Ethics,—*ubi homines, ibi mores*. We do not mean merely those actions which appear in the visible, material world. Conduct may be wholly within the soul, and entirely beyond the inspection and cognizance of our fellow-men. In its proper essence it is always within and invisible. Outward acts considered by themselves alone are not conduct, though they are sometimes treated as though they were the whole of conduct.[1] They are really such, not in themselves, but only so far as they express or embody the inward and unseen acts of the moral person. Conduct is the product of the nature and relations of moral beings or persons. The science which treats of conduct, therefore, presupposes that moral beings have certain endowments and are placed in certain relations, and that out of this nature in these relations arises a certain peculiar product which we call the "ethical" or the "moral."

SECT. 3. It is desirable, therefore, at the outset to determine *whether there is any ethical or moral, and what it is*. The full answer to these questions will be the general result of the entire treatise; but we may give a brief answer at the beginning. The question really is, whether there is any such thing as conduct; whether the subject-matter of Ethics is real.

All men obviously take it for granted in various ways, in theory and in action, that there is an ethical, that there is such a thing as conduct, however widely they may differ as to what is the proper conduct, as to the origin, nature, place, and end of man in this world; whatever speculative views they may hold on the question whether there is a God,

[1] Cf. Bible, Matt. v. 22–28; Rom. iv. 3. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 22–25.

or a future life, or as to what the results of conduct may be. Even those who deny in words the reality of duty and right, yet believe that there is such a thing as conduct in some sense controllable by the man, of which the man is the author, in which he may be influenced by objective motives, and for which he may be rewarded or punished.

But discussions upon the nature and definition of the "ethical" have been chiefly carried on under the form of the questions, "What is the nature of virtue?" "What is the ground of moral obligation?" (meaning the ground of the obligation to virtue.) The effort has generally been to show that all virtue has its ground and whole nature in some one thing or conception, such as utility, benevolence, justice, or fitness. The question concerning the ethical has also been partially or impliedly raised in another form in the contest concerning *the freedom of the will.* Those who contend for this freedom usually maintain that without it there could be no ethical, or none of any importance; while their opponents have admitted so-called ethical facts as a special class of phenomena. Thus J. S. Mill declares that "the reality of moral distinctions and the freedom of our volitions are questions independent of one another;" and Bishop Butler,[1] Leslie Stephen,[2] and Sidgwick[3] argue that no question of morals or religion is practically affected by any theory concerning freedom.

We may say that the question, "What is the nature of virtue, — the ground of moral obligation?" is narrower than the inquiry, "What is the ethical?" and if taken as the prime question, is likely to lead to a too narrow view. It asks,

[1] Butler's Analogy, part i. chap. vi.

[2] Science of Ethics, pp. 9, 278 *et seq.*

[3] Methods of Ethics, 1st ed. p 45; 3d ed. pp. 56 and 70.

what is the general characteristic or constituting principle of the *ethically required*, and seeks the answer in some mental abstraction or some intellectually justifying principle. We might just as well begin the discussion by asking, "What is the nature of vice?"[1] Both these questions presuppose the ethical as something more general. They seem to imply that some one of several possible derived elements in the thought and feeling of the man constitutes the virtue or the vice of the man and the virtuousness or viciousness of his acts; that is to say, covers a part of the ethical sphere. The elements selected are always of a secondary and composite nature, like those above mentioned. However valuable these discussions, the question concerning the nature of virtue is not the first question. Besides, amid the thorough-going scepticisms of the present day the reality of the ethical, whether as respects virtue or vice, is by some denied; and even where it is not denied in form, it is sometimes reduced to so low terms that it can have no inherent authority or importance.

SECT. 4. *What, then, is the ethical?* We answer, It is the whole field of the obligatory, both positive and negative. It is that in reference to which I can say, as an intelligent, self-consciously acting being or person: "I ought;" "I ought not;" "I am bound, or under law, in respect to my choices and acts;" "There is something higher than my impulses and choices even, — an imperative authority which I cannot shake off, an ideal, controlling principle above me and independent of me;" "It is that which the sense and thought of duty, obligation, right, good, have reference to, and enjoin or forbid." This sense is a spontaneous and

[1] But compare Dorner, System of Christian Ethics, Mead's translation, p. 13.

ever-active principle in the human soul, and we find no sufficient evidence of its existence in any beings below the grade of the human. We find the most various and strange views of what in particular we ought to do and avoid, the most marvellous contradictions; but this strangeness and variety of views does not diminish the proof that this sense is an essential element of the human nature. They rather increase the proof, since they show that the ethical is deep enough and strong enough to break through every crust of ignorance, error, and wickedness, and to assert itself in the most diverse circumstances and against the greatest and most varied obstacles. When the moral nature is cultivated and developed, this moral sense lays hold of every controllable action of the man. The *conception of duty* is an *à priori* principle of the mind, matching, in the intellectual sphere, the practical sense of duty in the sphere of the sensibility.

Wherever there is this sense and conception of duty, *the ethical* exists, and is constituted by it. Primarily, therefore, the ethical exists and is constituted by the nature of the ethical being in relation with ethical beings. "Whatever the ultimate source of morality may be, to us, at all events, it can only be known as revealed or reflected in ourselves." It can be predicated of the outer material world and of the world of non-moral creatures only in a secondary sense, as these furnish a field for the ethical exercise and training of moral beings, and as they are disposed for ethical ends in ethical beings. The outer world is not an ethical world for unethical beings.

Duty or the ethical has reference to character and acts, to rights and goods.[1] Whatever conceptions the ethical

[1] Cf. Lotze, Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie, p. 28; Hopkins, Lectures on Moral Science, p. 43.

being may frame concerning these in any of their general or particular forms are ethical conceptions and subordinate to the general ethical. As the language implies, they are abstractions or mental constructions within the ethical sphere, and their necessary logical antecedent is the *à priori* idea of duty; the practical or chronological antecedent is the sense or feeling of duty spontaneously pressing itself upon the soul. These mental constructions, whether as maxims or ideals, whether good or bad, form the guiding principles of the moral life. They may be changed in many ways, may be elevated or degraded, but they cannot be eradicated. Some moral maxims and ideals every human being will have.

SECT. 5. *The importance of the ethical* is usually conceived as turning on its power and office in social life. It is something that can be appealed to to keep order, peace, and harmony amid the conflicting interests of men, to help forward social welfare, and in this way reacting to the benefit of the individual. It is thus a sort of police ordinance written originally in the soul, or impressed thereon by society itself, because experience had shown the necessity of it. But the ethical is something far deeper and more essential. It is the central, organizing, and unifying element in the human soul. A man is a *person* pre-eminently not through the controlling will merely as a force, but through the intelligent and free subjection of the will to *one law*, by which it becomes a steady, regular, and orderly force, by the fact that the thought, the feeling, the law, of duty presides within him. It is this which reduces all his powers and impulses to one personality. He might perhaps be reduced to one *agent* by the will acting as a force, but not to one *person*. However much a man may pervert, falsify,

or discard duty in any true and intelligent view of it, he is still controlled and his action is shaped by it. As a conception it is one of the primordial axioms of the mind, a law of thought; as a sense or practical principle it is ever present to the consciousness in our action, and we cannot attempt to set it aside without assuming it and proceeding upon it as the very basis of our action.

It is not strange, therefore, that men have always found the world in which they live a moral world, with a moral Governor and moral ends, and themselves enveloped by a moral law. "Everything in life is moral" to us, because man himself is ever moral; so long as he retains his powers in due balance he cannot act at all except in this moral character, whatever may be the ends or relations or objects upon which he acts. But the world is moral to no being who is not himself moral, as it is not an intellectual or intelligible world to any being who does not bring an intelligence to it. It is evident also that it is this ethical which gives to man his special dignity and elevation in the world of creatures. There is no other moral creature on this earth so far as we know.

But the philosophical value of the ethical as a conception has a still wider reach. It is an important element in the proof that there is a God, and in showing what sort of a being God is; in giving reality and present practical force to the doctrine of theism; in showing what human life is in its unity, and what the purpose of life in this world is. It is this ethical which makes human life, which is the distinctively human element in it, which alone gives it a real interest and significance. This ethical is also an important element in showing what this world is in its structure, its laws, its order and beauty, as a theatre for man, and in

showing more specifically man's relations to God, and what religion and a religious life must be.

Moral science is the science of man as a whole, as one person, self-acting and self-controlled. It is also the science of men as a whole, of society as an organism in which alone man as an individual finds the proper sphere of his activity and development. Every principle and element in man's nature finds its ultimate end in moral character and action, as they all combine to form one moral nature; and the moral is the constituting principle alike of the individual and of society, the active force in forming and controlling them. We need not think it strange, therefore, that the title, "Moral Science," has been employed in the wide sense mentioned above (Sect. 1).

We see, furthermore, that the question need not be raised whether Ethics is merely social or merely individual in its origin and scope. Society, or social life, could never develope it, if it were not implanted as a vigorous germ or native principle in the individual; and it would be of little value and come to little in the individual, if he were not placed in society for training and action. Every gift or endowment of human nature works itself out into its human character in and through social relations.

SECT. 6. *The ethical in its general nature* must be the same for all ethical beings, — just as *the intellectual* or the elementary principles of reason are the same for all rational beings. So the general maxims of ethical right and wrong will be the same for all. If the universe is a moral universe, the general laws or principles of action must be the same everywhere. But the knowledge and the relations of ethical beings may vary widely. If there be not various kinds of ethics in principle, there may be various applications of the same principles.

That branch of general Ethics with which we have most acquaintance and of which we can speak with most certainty is *human Ethics*. Whatever we may affirm with reference to other moral beings must be chiefly from our knowledge of human Ethics, and on the assumption that ethical principles must be permanent and uniform throughout the universe. This assumption seems warranted by the general unity of the world, so far as we know it and can judge of it, and because we cannot proceed to know at all otherwise. If we accept the doctrine that God is an infinite being, perfectly holy and omniscient, our best ideals of duty and moral goodness will doubtless fall far short of his law as it exists in his thought and controls all his actions. Superhuman beings (if there are such), with larger knowledge and quicker and purer sensibility, may have higher standards than ours, if they are good, and worse ones, if they are wicked. But every grade of beings ethically good and bad, however varying in degree, will alike fall within the sphere of the same general ethical and be judged by it.

Within the sphere of human ethics it is common to distinguish *natural Ethics* and *Christian Ethics*. The former means duty as found and guided by the light of Nature merely; the latter means duty as determined by the authority of the Christian Scriptures. Every profession and every branch of business or occupation has its professional or class ethics, its accepted principles of action as determined by the special relations into which it brings men. Thus we hear of medical ethics, legal ethics, political ethics, trades-union ethics, and the like. These various branches of ethics are also called "codes of honor," "rules of the trade," "etiquette of the profession." The subject is often divided also on various other principles, as into theoretical

and practical, or according to the mode of treating the subject, or according to the philosophical standpoint of the author.

SECT. 7. *We are to consider here general human Ethics*, chiefly on a natural basis; but we are not designedly to ignore or reject any Christian or religious truth, nor any other kind of truth which will help us in finding duty in any of its forms. This would be impossible for any one who has had his training amid a living Christian civilization and in an age of active thought and inquiry.

Our moral philosophy, assuming the reality and importance of the ethical, begins by showing what is the moral nature of man. It is thus far psychological. We do not need to consider the physical constitution of man, although defects or malformations in this may cause serious difficulty to individuals, and special excellencies may be of great advantage to their possessors. Practically we must allow for special disease and defect in our treatment of men; but we do not on this account change our views of the nature and principles of Ethics. But we must go beyond mere psychology, to the real relations of men in life, in order to determine from this nature and these relations what are the true ends, the best rules and motives of conduct in our individual, social, civil, and religious life.

Ethics may be properly called a science, since it aims to exhibit the facts of the moral nature and the principles of conduct systematically. It may be called a philosophy, since it aims to set forth the ultimate assumptions in which all these facts and principles have their ground. It is a moral science, because its subject-matter is the moral nature and conduct. Human nature and conduct, when partially considered, have other aspects; but these are passed by except as they indicate something in regard to the moral.

As the ethical or moral has to do only with duty or obligation, this branch of knowledge may be called "the science of duty." But the words "duty" and "obligation" are here used in the widest sense, including rights and goods, because duty is always present in these, — they have their nature and character from the ethical.

SECT. 8. *Wherever obligation is found, wherever the word "ought" goes,* there is duty and the field of this science. The word "ought" is, however, sometimes used, in a lower and non-moral sense,[1] to signify the conformity to a rule, or to the nature or design of an unintelligent, unethical being or thing. It means what we should think reasonable, or what would correspond to our idea of perfection or to our ideal of the thing. We say, "The experiment ought to give such and such results; a tool, a machine, an animal, ought to do this or that." How closely this is parallel with *the ethical ought* is obvious from the fact that the latter also has reference to a law, or rule, and end, to something which might be expected from the ethical being in his ethical relations. It is what might be reasonably expected from a free, rational being, or a person who consciously and voluntarily seeks some perceived end. But the difference between this and the action of material things which are passively borne to their ends by unintelligent causes is world-wide. This "ought" of irrational, unpersonal beings cannot be ethical in itself, because not in itself intelligent, self-conscious, and conscious of a law to bind it, which yet can be obeyed or disobeyed. It is a metaphor drawn from the ethical sphere.

"Obligation" is the binding of a man as a self-conscious, self-controlling, personal, or moral being, or it is that which

[1] Cf. Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics (3d ed.), part i. chap iii. sect. 3.

is binding upon a man; "ought" is something owed; "duty" is something due. The three words have essentially the same meaning. The binding power, the debt, arises spontaneously out of the moral nature of the man in the circumstances in which he is placed. Such is the very sense and meaning of the words "moral nature," — that is, a nature out of which such an obligation arises. It does not arise out of an intellectual conception, nor wait for a previous intellectual construction and justification, though it is spontaneous only in intellectual beings of a high order. It does not, so far as we know, rest upon or spring up in the souls of beings with endowments lower than the human, and it cannot be introduced into any such inferior beings by action upon them from without. As this *sense* or *feeling of obligation* is an original gift, so it is matched in the intellectual sphere by *an intuitive notion of duty*, which cannot be analyzed, derived, or defined. When asked what the notion of duty is, we can only refer each one to his own consciousness, aiding him by synonyms and by such illustrations from the facts of life and the judgments of men as will stir a keener sense of duty in his own soul. The real knowledge of the meaning of it must come from the real experience, and not from the intellectual definition. A being which never felt the impulse and restraint of duty in some degree cannot be made to know what duty is. In the sense of our science, such a being is not capable of conduct or behavior.

SECT. 9. *The ends to be sought in life* may be learned in general by a study of the nature of man as related to the sphere in which he is to live, — just as we learn the ends of other things by studying the structure as related to their sphere. The adaptations show the end. The rule of life

we learn in like manner from the nature and the relations. The rule is the guide in gaining the ends. But we cannot wait for a completed science of human nature, its ends and relations, before forming any rules for life. We have not yet a complete science of human nature and relations, and shall not soon have. Rules of life are rather, thus far, subjects for the exercise of good judgment and common-sense than for strict scientific definition and determination.

Looking at Ethics practically, that is, so far as the end is not knowledge, but conduct (and this is really the prime interest), to determine the rules for right living, we should not suffer our minds to be bound and limited by any ethical theory yet propounded, but should consult human experience in all its forms, and whatever God has taught us in any way of the laws and issues of his government. We need all the instruction and guidance we can get from every source.

SECT. 10. The science of human duty must evidently cover *a part, at least, of the same ground as religion.* Religion, practically considered, is the proper attitude of a man towards God in respect to the purposes, feelings, and actions which his relations to God require. Or we may say that religion is morality towards God, or duty towards God recognized and performed, — any duties done with special reference to God, as required by God, as pleasing to him, or for his honor. But no duty towards God or towards any other being is discharged by mere outward acts. Obligation rests primarily on the inward man to think, feel, and choose properly towards the beings to which duties are due. The performance of the proper outward acts follows naturally from the inward states. Religion is therefore moral, and the duty of all men; it is a part of morality.

On the other hand, as God has given us our nature, put us in our relations, and made himself known as our author, governor, and judge; as he has given us the means and the impulse to find the rule of life which he has fixed for us, — all our duties may be done with reference to God, and thus become really exercises of religion. Viewed in this light, we may say that all religion is duty, and all duty is religion.

There will always be a real and vital connection between ethics and religion both as philosophy and as practice, though it may not always be properly conceived. We might lay down the principle that an ethical being is necessarily a religious being; that ethics and religion are subjectively in their ground and exercise the same, and only different in respect to the objects towards which they are directed.

Putting the subject in another light, we might say that so far as duty and responsibility are regarded as on account of man's nature and relations merely, or as towards man, ourselves, or others, either individually or socially, so far we are in the region of morality; but so far as our duty and responsibility are regarded as on account of God, or as towards God, we are in the region of religion. But if we accept theism, we see that the human duty and responsibility, while very near and real in all the acts and relations of life, are, in fact, of divine origin, and are thus included in the duty and responsibility to God and subordinate to it. Theism must carry everything ultimately back to God. Any one, therefore, who had deeply ingrained the theistic conception of the world and of life, would be primarily religious, and would be only the more strenuously moral by reason of that. But if our relations with our neighbors are thus brought under religious sanctions, this makes it all the more necessary that these relations should be wisely and

kindly judged, lest the religious consecration thus imparted to them should serve to confirm inferior or evil practices.

SECT. 11. We might begin *the development of this science in either of two ways.*

(1) We might begin with our knowledge of God and our relations to him, and unfold first our duties to him, — that is, our religious duties in the narrow sense, — treating all other duties as subordinate to these, or viewing them as divinely commanded. Thus we should make the Divine Being and the fact of his authority the chief element. This is beginning with the divine side. In this view the cause of virtue is involved in religion; morality depends on or grows out of religion. There is no doubt that "religious conceptions have been historically the centre of all authority, and have given their strength to all ideas of moral obligation." Morality has never had a wide-spread purifying power over the hearts and lives of men except where it has appeared in a religious form, and with religious motives to give it force and reality. But there is an earnest effort now on the part of many to dissociate morality and religion. While we feel certain that this effort is only a passing phase of thought, growing out of the special and various agitations of a restless time, and cannot succeed, we are yet not compelled on this account to adopt this order in the mode of presenting the subject. Morals and religion may certainly be studied and constructed, after a fashion, apart from each other; but neither will thus be seen in its wholeness or its proper relations. Both will be distorted, and deprived of some of their most important foundations and applications.

(2) We may begin with the human side, that is, with our knowledge of human nature, our relations to men and to the world, and proceed from human nature and recip-

rocal duties among men, that is, from morals in the narrow sense to religion, that is, to the wider sphere of ethical relations. In this way the near and clear facts of human nature and human life are the central element. But it would not, therefore, be necessary to deny or conceal the truth of God's existence, that he made us, placed us in this world, planted his law in our souls, and that we are his subjects in all things.

If we made use of our relations to God, which we could not avoid, except by shutting our eyes to obvious truths and necessary principles, the second method would not differ in its results from the first. But we should thus begin with what is nearest and best known, and thence ascend to what is higher; we should begin with the human and natural, and ascend to the divine and the spiritual. In this view the cause of religion is involved in morality, — that is, religion depends on and grows out of morals; or, as is shown, religion is morality towards God.

The second method is preferable, because our moral nature is the best natural source of our knowledge of God. If we shall first unfold this, and look at duty and morals in their human aspect, we shall find that they necessarily presuppose and lead to God and religion; and we shall lose none of the force which theism is supposed to give to morals. We shall thus approach the subject more naturally, beginning with the real, near, and obvious facts and relations of our own consciousness and experience, and shall excite fewer objections.

SECT. 12. There are *two main purposes for which we study Ethics*: —

(1) That we may gain a knowledge of human nature in its ethical constitution and action. This is also the study of

man as a religious being, because ethics necessarily ascends into religion. There is no science so important as the science of man. But the science of the body and that of the intellect, noble as they are, are fractional and inferior in dignity and practical importance to ethical science. They receive their chief importance from the ethical character of the nature which they go to constitute. They are like the study of the various parts of a piece of complicated mechanism separately, while disregarding the whole as a whole, and the ends for which the whole is intended. The parts may be curious and interesting as parts, but they cannot be understood except through the action and purpose of the structure as a whole. There are sufficient signs that action is the grand and comprehensive end and purpose of man rather than speculation, that thought and knowledge themselves are for the sake of action, and not for the sake of the speculative solution of the problems of the world and of life.

(2) We study Ethics in order that we may know how to conduct ourselves properly in all the relations of life; in order that we may act intelligently, and not blindly, according to our nature, and in our place; that we may make sure of being inwardly virtuous and outwardly moral in all our action; that we may be harmonious in thought and purpose with the constitution of our own nature and with our relations in the world. It is true that one may attain these ends to a considerable extent without studying Ethics as a science, just as one may live in the world and perform the ordinary work of life, or even acquire riches and honors, without scholastic education in any direction. But still the study of the sciences, history, literature, philosophy, and the arts is good, and the means by which men, as individuals and as societies, are elevated and their welfare

advanced. There is a natural impulse towards knowledge, an inbred desire to seek a rational account for things. Ethics seeks to give this rational account of the morality which we find everywhere prevailing in some form, to correct and improve it when it comes short of our ideal, and even to raise and purify our moral ideals.

SECT. 13 *The importance of the study of Ethics* is seen —

(1) From the fact that questions of duty everywhere arise, and cannot be shunned. They create universal discussion, and are generally felt to be the most serious and highest questions. They are often hard to settle satisfactorily, and men have many minds concerning them. We are constantly deciding on duty wisely or unwisely, and acting according to our decisions. We may dull the moral sensibility more or less, as we may any other power; but we cannot altogether escape the thought and feeling of our accountability for these decisions and actions, at the bar of conscience, to other men in their social and civil capacity, and to God. Everything which can be called conduct is moral, and for it we are accountable.

(2) Every man and every society has general principles and a standard of duty, which may vary widely, and which may be elevated or depressed. A careful study of the science of duty will enable us to discover shortcomings, errors, and evils in our principles and practices, teach us how to remove them, and to raise the standard. It will also cause us to act more constantly with careful thought and under the sense of duty, and less from the mere impulse of the time.

(3) The importance of this study is seen from the fact that moral actions, even when thoughtlessly or inconsiderately performed, create character through our faculty of

forming habits and strengthening impulses and principles by use. One acts more easily and forcibly as he has acted, until set forms and modes of action become fixed and permanent. This is true not of outward acts merely, but equally of inward acts, of thoughts, feelings, and choices. The entire impulse, force, and tendency of the whole nature may at length be brought to act in one direction, and so confirmed in it that no change can be easily effected. Then all subsequent action regularly takes that form and color. But as we seek to learn in the study of Ethics the true end of each part of our nature and of the whole, their mutual relations to each other, the proper ends, rules, and motives of life, we are enabled to shape and guide ourselves and others aright, to avoid error and loss, and to form that character which best fulfils the end of our being.

(4) The fact that we have a divine revelation does not do away with the necessity of studying Ethics. On the contrary, it increases this necessity, because the knowledge which it brings of moral and religious things widens the sphere of duty and deepens its import. The Bible teaches the great duty of life, and perhaps all the duties, in some way or other, either directly or by implication; but it does not give us any system of practical or theoretical Ethics. "It rather portrays ideal types of moral excellence and lays down broad principles for our guidance, than assigns rules immediately applicable to the varied exigencies of practical life." It makes men reflective and morally thoughtful by its exhibition of the greatness of human nature in itself and in its relations, of God's present government over men, of his law and its awful sanctions, of his love and the exalted privilege of sharing it and living in the light of it. The Bible thus raises the ethical aspect of the world and of

human life in all its forms to that position which makes its study and observance the most important of all things.

Besides, a divine revelation has to be interpreted and applied by thinking and acting men. Their moral position, moral ideals and aspirations may change the whole aspect of the supposed divine teachings for them. It is a familiar truth that the moral status of the interpreter affects the interpretation of all things which have a moral bearing. History abundantly shows that great care and consideration are needed in things of such infinite moment as those of religion, lest we be carried away into fanaticism and intolerance, into private and personal assumptions and interested interpretations. The honest study of strictly human Ethics applied to the customary relations of life will help to keep us on the solid ground of the facts amid which moral and religious ends alike are to be wrought out.

SECT. 14. *That moral philosophy is a real science*, in the sense that it has a distinct field and subject-matter, is shown by all those facts which prove that we have a moral nature, or that there is an ethical for us. By a *moral nature* we mean that nature by virtue of which we feel obligation and accountability, know duty, and are enabled and impelled to choose and do duty.

That we have such a nature we know[1] (1) by our own consciousness of ourselves, our own approval and disapproval of ourselves and others, without regard to material interests or consequences. (2) We recognize such a nature in all other men. We see it in their incessant criticism of each other. We think of them and deal with them, as they do with us, on the assumption that they are ethical beings.

[1] See Bishop Butler's Essay on the Nature of Virtue (at the beginning).

Even the Nihilists, whose first principle is that God and duty are great bugbears to be abolished, assume that God and duty exist, and they are impelled by a sense of duty to abolish them. (3) It is involved in our language, in all our judgments, and is the central element of interest in all literature and life. (4) Society and the State in all their forms, with laws and punishments, stand on the sense and notion of duty. (5) All men have sentiments and judgments of moral right and wrong, of good and ill desert, moral standards by which they judge their own actions and those of others, and a sense of accountability for what they do and leave undone. These judgments and standards may vary indefinitely, and this sense may sink to the rank of a vague fear, or be raised to the dignity of an all-controlling principle.

We distinguish the actions of moral beings in this view, that is, as conduct, from the same actions in every other view, and from the actions of all other beings. Men differ from all other beings on the face of the earth in this respect. We do not judge or treat the animals as responsible. We do not find in them the notion of duty, nor the sense of obligation and rights, nor the power of deliberate preference or thoughtful self-guidance, as these exist in men. The power of instinct is of an entirely different order. We may say of the brute that "he ought;" "the dog ought to point the game," or "tend the flock." But we say the same of inanimate objects; as, "the tree ought to bear fruit," "the axe ought to cut." But these are metaphors (Sect. 7). *The true original ought is the ethical ought*, which is a stress or constraint growing out of and resting in the nature of a free, rational, personal being, and peculiar to such a being. Even materialists and those who deny all freedom and responsibility distinguish that kind of action which we call

moral from all other kinds, though they should in consistency deny the reality of its ethical character.

SECT. 15. *A complete presentation of ethical science would include three parts.* The first part would be psychological, exhibiting the elements of that nature by virtue of which we are moral beings, — an analysis of the moral constitution. The second part would treat of speculative or theoretical Ethics, showing, in the light of our moral constitution, what duty, virtue and vice, right and wrong, good and evil in general are, and intellectually justifying them. This would furnish a theory of morals, and would naturally include a comparison and criticism of the various theories which have been held. The third part would treat of practical Ethics, showing (1) what are our specific *duties*, as growing out of our nature and the relations in which we are placed; (2) what are our *rights*, as corresponding to our duties, and as guarding our moral personality; (3) what are our *goods*, as corresponding to the various grades of our susceptibility and our powers, and as essential to the healthful development and maintenance of our life. This part might also treat of character and the cultivation of character, or moral education.

It should not be thought necessary to deduce all duties in a logical way from an abstract theory of duty or of the nature of virtue. So far as this could be fairly done, it would confirm the theory, and be a philosophical justification of the duty or precept. But so far as practical Ethics has other than scientific purposes, it may appeal to other reasons and urge other motives. Moral conduct and moral rules long preceded moral theory, and no moral theory has yet so comprehended the whole of life as to be able to set up one principle from which all right action could be deduced.

SECT. 16. *In a practical point of view, three things are important in Ethics,* — (1) a proper disposition or temper of mind in regard to duty; (2) a correct apprehension of the relations in which we stand to the various sensitive and moral beings in the world about us. The proper disposition or temper of mind is often best produced, in people who are not devoted to philosophy, by views of truth which are not philosophical. A correct understanding of our relations results rather from general moral thoughtfulness amid the experiences of life. But temper and knowledge have a decided effect on each other. (3) A selection of the proper ends of life and action. "The most compendious and summary means, and again the most noble and effectual, to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate, is the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends; and again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them, it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once."[1]

[1] Bacon, Advancement of Learning, book ii.

CHAPTER II.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTLINE.

SECTION 17. *The first question we have to answer is, What is the moral nature of man as we find it? What are those elements by virtue of which we become moral beings; that is, have the feeling of obligation, the conception of duty, right, and good, the impulse and ability to choose and act according to duty?*

We take human nature as we now find it, without inquiring through what processes, if any, prior to authentic history, the being we now call man has passed in coming to be that moral creature which he now is. This human nature has no doubt been much influenced and modified by circumstances and environment, and may be still farther modified. But environment cannot create new generic endowments. It can, at most, modify and color original gifts. Human nature has been what it is now for three thousand years at least. It is generically the same now, wherever we find it, at whatever stage of advancement. There is no reason to think that it will not remain for many generations as it is now. It is reasonable, therefore, for us at present to omit all consideration or conjectures as to how it came to its present shape.

The question, What are the simple elements of the soul? is a difficult one, for many reasons. We have no means to

investigate the soul in its original, undeveloped state, nor can we observe its first inward workings except by looking on from without. So soon as it opens itself to our study it has begun already to take biasses from other minds, to form complex habits, to exhibit a variety of activities and receptivities, so interlaced with each other that it is hard to analyze them and tell what are the simple powers and activities. Theory and assumption have been too prominent, and observation has been too little directed to the actual facts in the natural history of a soul. When we come to look into our own consciousness for the purpose of analyzing its states, we find there the very complex products of a long experience, and we are pretty sure to come to the investigation with theories and prejudices which interfere with scientific impartiality. There has come to be a tolerable agreement concerning the intellect and will; but the great variety of views concerning the classification of what are called the "active powers" shows how difficult the subject is, and how uncertain any report of them must be. We must, however, proceed and set forth our "moral psychology" in what seems the most reasonable form, hoping that some time the real, simple, and original elements may at length be agreed upon.

SECT. 18. At the outset we must *emphasize the fact that the soul is one.* We speak of various faculties; but these are not parts, and are only called organs analogically. They are not separate, and cannot act separately. *The whole soul acts in every faculty, in every activity.* But every activity has various aspects, a subjective and an objective side, a spontaneous and a voluntary element. We may say it has various modes. A faculty is only a mode in which the soul acts, or a mode of the soul's action. When psy-

chologists analyze the soul, and speak of its mental, moral, and voluntary elements, we should remember that the moral pervades all our actions and faculties; or rather, that the moral is the organizing, unifying principle of the whole nature; that no one part or element is any more moral than another. It is the man that is moral by virtue of his composite nature; but no faculty is moral. We say, therefore, that the moral nature is our complex psychical nature in all its elements as one whole, as a personality. All the powers, activities, and receptivities are essential parts of the moral constitution, as will appear in the sequel.

We say in general that the soul has three kinds of powers, or three general modes of acting, — the power to know, to feel, and to will; the Intellect, the Sensibility, and the Will. This division is not altogether clear, since the *sensibility* is commonly supposed to be synonymous with the *feelings*, and these are regarded merely as passivities or receptivities. But the "sensibility," as the term is here employed, has both an active and a passive side, certain spontaneous impulses, strivings, or tendencies of the soul which are pre-eminently activities, and a receptivity or capacity to be affected in various ways. There is no objection to including these under the one head of the Sensibility. Another mode of dividing the powers is into *the Intellect, the Feelings or Susceptibility*, and *the Conative Powers*. This simply classes the active side of the sensibility with will, and calls them both together "striving powers," leaving the passive side in a division by itself. We will make use of the former division for reasons which will appear in the first chapter on the Will.

We do not propose to enter here on any discussion of the intellectual powers, because these are usually subjects of examination before the study of Ethics is begun, and because

there is a sufficient practical agreement in general concerning these powers and their products. The contention which appears in this field is rather concerning the philosophy or metaphysics of knowledge than concerning the reality and the modes of knowing.

SECT. 19. *No being can be moral which is not a knowing being;* and so far as our knowledge and experience go, there are no moral beings which do not have all the following kinds of knowing, — to wit, presentative, representative, and thought. Their presentative knowing is of two kinds, — consciousness, by which they know themselves and their own inner acts and states; and sense-perception, by which they know the outer world of material things and their changes. Their representative knowing is of two kinds, — memory, by which they retain and renew in their minds the knowledge of the past; and imagination, by which they rearrange or reconstruct the elements of this renewed knowledge according to plans and purposes of their own. Thought is also of two kinds, — reflective, by which they form general and abstract conceptions or concepts, and apply them in judgments and reasonings; and intuitive, in which they bring forth certain fixed principles upon which all knowing is based, and according to which it proceeds.

All these kinds of knowing are essential elements of a moral nature as we find it. If there are moral beings which do not employ all these, they are so different from us that we cannot well conceive what their moral nature is; they are out of our category, and we could have no intellectual or moral fellowship with them. The recent contention that the brutes are moral, or at least have the partially developed elements of a moral nature, we need not now consider. The exercises of the intellectual powers in regard to what are

called moral things are in kind just like those concerning all other things. We shall therefore leave this part of the moral nature with the very obvious remark that we have but one intellect, which acts in various ways and upon various kinds of object-matter.

We shall proceed to a somewhat particular consideration of the Sensibility and the Will, because these have not so generally been included heretofore in the course of studies which precede Ethics, and because in the common apprehension Ethics has seemed to turn more on the views adopted concerning this part of psychology. These are often called "the moral powers," or "the active powers," or "the moral and active powers," as by Reid and Stewart. These names could not be intended to signify that the intellect was not an "active power," or that it was no part of the moral nature. The view seems rather to have been that the sphere of morality was outward action which took its form and direction especially from the impulse of these powers; and therefore the science which treats of duty or of conduct needs specially to consider these. Perhaps also the intellect was regarded so much as a fixed, acknowledged, and unvarying element that it needed no particular consideration. We ought not, however, to name these as "active and moral powers" in any such sense as really to exclude the intellect from its essential position as part of the moral nature. Reaffirming, then, the statement that the moral nature is the whole psychical nature of man, with all its various activities and receptivities as essential elements and of equal importance, we proceed to consider the Sensibility.

CHAPTER III.

THE SENSIBILITY.

SECTION 20. *We analyze this power into three parts*, omiting all criticism of the various other views which have been presented. We have, *first, certain implanted principles of action* which go out spontaneously, that is, without previous thought or volition, towards certain external objects in which they rest. They are thus not conscious desires for pleasure, but a pursuit of objects or ends to which they are originally fitted and prompted by nature, and which are fitted to them. That pleasure will result from the gaining of these objects is only learned after experience, and attracts attention later, and in a secondary way. Pleasure is a side result, necessary indeed in general, but not necessary to be thought of or consciously made an end. It is brought into prominence as an end rather on account of a morbid condition and a turning of the mind to unnatural and unhealthy considerations.[1]

Second, the *susceptibility to pleasure and pain*, which Hamilton calls the "feelings," — a capacity for various conscious affections. *Third, the sense of duty* or *obligation*, often called the "moral sense," "moral sensibility," or

[1] Prof. T. Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. p. 270; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 126; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (3d ed.), book i. chap. iv.

"conscience." It is the first and third of these divisions, which are often thrown together with the will under the head of the *Conative Powers*.

These three divisions are brought together under the one head of the Sensibility for the negative reason that they are all clearly distinguished in consciousness from the intellect and will, and positively because a peculiar feeling or state of being affected is characteristic of them all. They are analyzed into these three classes because the feeling is different in each and because they issue differently.

SECT. 21. *The implanted principles of action* are of three kinds, — (1) *appetites*, which are tendencies towards things needful for bodily life and continuance; (2) *desires*, which are tendencies towards things necessary for mental life and development; (3) *affections*, which are tendencies towards things necessary to social life and well-being. We are seeking here to enumerate those original and simple elements of our nature from which all others are derived or compounded, and not those late composite growths which we call by the general name of *passions*. The term "passion" is used in many senses, — sometimes to signify generally all the propensions or spontaneous principles; sometimes for irascibility, or tendency to the various forms of resentment; sometimes for sensuality; sometimes for ardent love; sometimes for strong desire. Of those so-called composite passions there are many, which are variously named and variously compounded. They cannot well be classified according to any clear principle, though they can be individually named and analyzed. But such a mere catalogue of composite impulses may be left to the dictionary. It is not intended here to arrange these implanted principles in any order of worth, moral or otherwise, but in the order of their necessary growth,

or of their coming into consciousness, and of their necessity for our life and development.

SECT. 22. "*The appetites are the cravings* produced by the recurring wants and necessities of our bodily and organic life." [1] They are seven in number; namely, the appetites of hunger, thirst, and sex; and those for sleep, rest, exercise, and air. They have three characteristics, — (1) they all take their rise from the body, are necessary for our animal existence, and are common to us with the brutes; (2) they are occasional, not constant: when they have their objects, they are sated for a time, and only return after a season; (3) they are attended by an uneasy sensation, varying in strength, which sharpens the impulse to action. "The appetite has two aspects; namely, an uneasy sensation, and a tendency towards something to remove it. Both manifest themselves in the first instance antecedent to all experience." [2]

(1) That the appetites are of bodily origin is obvious. We do not apply the name "appetite" to the spiritual cravings or tendencies, except by a metaphor. We call them "desires" or "affections," although they are in many respects analogous to the appetites. They are to the mind what the appetites are to the body.

All the appetites, except that of sex, are necessary for our animal existence and well-being in the world. Reason could never convince us in the first instance of the necessity that we should have their objects, any more than without the senses it could give us a knowledge of the outer world. Even after the development of reason, and after long

[1] Bain, The Senses and the Intellect (2d ed.), p. 255.

[2] Student's Moral Philosophy (by Flemming), p. 27; Ulrici, Gott und der Mensch, i. 593.

experience under the guidance of the appetites, we could not be safely intrusted to the care of reason without them. Even with the appetites actively warning and urging us to seek the needed objects, we are sometimes so absorbed in the pursuit of intellectual ends as not to notice these "calls of nature."

SECT. 23. *The appetite of sex has the same relation to the continuance of the species* that the other appetites have to the well-being of the individual. It has besides a deep and wide-reaching influence in controlling the lives and actions of men which is ordinarily little suspected. It co-operates powerfully with the desire of society and with the affections, and is often the ruling principle in actions where it is not thought to be present at all.

Some would regard this as an appetite of a higher rank, or would even remove it altogether from the class of appetites. Ulrici says that it is in man not a mere organic, but also a psychical impulse, which greatly increases its importance. It involves taste in choosing a partner, he says, and taste is psychical. It is the first sensible expression of the impulse towards permanent association in life as an expression of sexual love, which rests only on the inner union of two individualities. The family, based first on sexual love, is essential to the existence, development, and culture of the man; afterwards paternal and maternal love come to its support. Then come all the wider affections towards relatives, — parental, filial, fraternal; those of kindred, friend, and general human sympathy. These loves are all needs of the human soul, and they are based in this impulse, which has therefore been called the "social impulse." It is a strong, impulsive outpushing of the being towards others.[1]

[1] Ulrici, Gott und der Mensch, ii. 18.

According to Littré, all morality is summed up in egoism or self-love, and altruism or love of others. The former, he maintains, is only a development of hunger and thirst, needful for nutrition; and the latter is a development from sexuality, needful for the continuance of the species.[1]

Grote says there is little significance in classing this among appetites and putting it with hunger and thirst. "When the tendency to society and sympathy and the imagination are active and as they should be, they will absorb the passion into themselves without allowing it to degenerate into appetite. . . . Three parts out of four of elegant literature and of art are concerned, in one way or another, with imagination as connected directly or indirectly with this passion. It is at the age when character is being fixed, when purposes are being formed, and when the intellectual powers are, taking one thing with another, at their strongest, that the inflaming of the imagination from this cause usually takes place. And the steps, whatever they may be, to which it leads are generally such as are felt through life."[2] Grote treats of this passion under the head of "benevolent impulse in its relation to virtue."

SECT. 24. We have said that *the appetites are of bodily origin;* but it is never claimed that they remain always merely bodily in their nature and influence. This could not be true of any gift or endowment of man which we distinguish from others by calling it bodily. Our human nature is one, and not many. It has its physical side and its psychical side; but these are only considered apart by abstraction, they do not now exist apart, and this nature cannot really act or be affected in the one apart from the other.

[1] La Philosophie Positive Revue, Jan.-Feb., 1870.

[2] John Grote, A Treatise on the Moral Ideals, pp. 128–9.

As we say that the whole soul acts in every faculty and in every activity, so we may equally say that the whole man, as body and soul, acts in every activity. The appetites play a very great part even in all our most elevated and refined social and moral life, and as they may be thus lifted up into the highest regions of our spiritual life and action, so, on the other hand, we unhappily often see that the highest spiritual faculties may be drawn down into the service of these as mere animal impulses.

By courses of reasoning similar to those of Grote and Ulrici we might lift ourselves wholly out of the earthly and bodily into a higher sphere. But because every bodily feeling and propensity is modified and moralized by its alliance with the higher elements of our nature, it does not thereby lose wholly its original character; our life could not be preserved if it did. Even in our highest moral and religious attainments and aspirations, our feet must still remain planted upon the solid earth. These aspirations would lose their character and cease to be, if they were not simply up-stretchings from that material basis. "The eagle can never outsoar the atmosphere." [1]

SECT. 25. (2) *The periodic character* is marked in all the appetites. It may be illustrated in the case of sleep. "After a certain period of waking activity there supervenes a powerful sensation of repose. If we give way to it at once, the state of sleep creeps over us, and we pass through a few moments of agreeable repose into unconsciousness. If we are prevented from yielding to the sleepy orgasm, its character as an appetite is brought out into strong relief. The voluminous uneasiness that possesses all the muscles and organs of sense stimulates a strong resistance to the power

[1] Sir Henry Holland, Chapters on Mental Physiology (2d ed.), p. 231.

that keeps us awake, the uneasiness and the resistance increasing with the continued refusal of the permission to sleep, until the condition becomes intolerable, or a reaction ensues which drives off the drowsiness for some time longer. The overpowering influence of drowsiness is best seen in infants, there being scarcely anything that will effectually appease the mental disturbance caused by it. The strong expressions that extreme pain sets loose — tears and rage — are never more closely at hand than in the sleepy condition." [1]

Similar illustrations might be given in regard to each of the appetites. Mr. Bain extends the same remark to the mental powers, though he correctly says that here it is less distinctly marked. This character is of the very nature of appetite, as physical and organic. A physical organ in the nature of the case must be exhausted by a certain amount of action. Time must then be given it to gather up a new store of force.

(3) It is unnecessary to illustrate separately the fact that the appetites are attended with an uneasy sensation which impels to action.

SECT. 26. There is no moral quality in the appetites in themselves considered, as we see in the case of the brutes, of whose endowments they form so large a part. But in man, through their connection with his higher gifts, they become most important elements of the moral constitution, both as impelling to action and as needing government, and also because they bring him into manifold connections with the material world and with his fellow-men. But they are neither virtuous nor vicious in themselves, nor are we virtuous or vicious for having them.[2] The same is evidently true of all our natural endowments. Whatever constitutes a

[1] Bain, The Senses and the Intellect (2d ed.), pp. 255–6.

[2] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book ii. chap. v.

part of our original nature is by that very fact non-moral, in the sense that it is without merit or demerit. The same is equally true of any special inherited characteristics. These may help or hinder us in gaining the end of our being, or they may lead us far away from it and be positively destructive, or bring great suffering, and so bear a most important relation to the ethical; but we cannot be personally blameworthy for possessing them. All these are "only antecedent conditions of the moral; . . . the basis on which morality is to develop itself."[1] We may even say that the great fact of life is that we moralize them for good or evil by our action and our use of them.

The appetites are not usually considered as of a noble or dignified character, since they are in themselves unintellectual, and are simply physical necessities. But this low esteem has doubtless come out of that old asceticism by which the body was regarded as mere cumbering matter, and was despised and mortified in the supposed interest of the spiritual, — as though there were a necessary hostility between the two. But we know now that the highest spiritual attainments rest in and rise out of this corporeal nature, and that the intellectual and moral superstructure can be no firmer or fairer than the foundations will allow. Through the higher principles of the soul we may elevate the appetites and employ them for noble purposes; we may make them instruments for the highest ends. Every gift and endowment of body and soul can be moralized for good.

SECT. 27. *Besides these original or natural appetites there are also acquired ones*, which grow up from habit formed

[1] Wuttke, Christian Ethics, translated by Prof. John P. Lacroix, ii. 72; Grote, Treatise on the Moral Ideals, pp. 438–9; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 31–2.

under the impulse of a desire for sensual pleasure, or from a diseased action of the system. It is the thought of the sensual pleasure to be gained which enables one to persevere in those unnatural courses by which the appetite is established. The fact that these are formed by habit from such a desire shows at once that they are of late growth and are in the strict sense unnatural, that is, non-natural. It is natural to form habits; but habits are artificial formations, and not gifts of nature. The desire for pleasure grows up after experience, and is not an original gift.

Acquired appetites in their origin are akin to secondary desires, especially to the desire for pleasure; but in their action, when fully formed, they are just like the original appetites. Many persons acquire an artificial craving for intoxicating drinks and other stimulants, especially for tobacco, opium, tea, coffee, and spices. These have all the characteristics of the natural appetites except the first; namely, that of origin, which is intellectual rather than bodily. They are not necessary to our animal life, but generally injurious to it; though by long indulgence or a diseased condition they may perhaps become a partial necessity, — for a time, at least.

Artificial appetites may be inherited. There are many marked instances of this in the children of drunkards and opium-takers, and in those of chewers and smokers of tobacco. It is probable that all indulgences of this kind, so far as they affect the nervous system (and it is for the effect upon the nervous system that these things are taken), bring evil upon succeeding generations.

If these appetites are acquired from a desire for sensual pleasure, they have a moral character, or rather those who acquire them act morally in making the acquisition.

SECT. 28. The final cause of the appetites is obviously the maintenance of the animal life and health, and the continuance of the species. But being thus fundamental in the nature, they do not attain these ends without a deep and constant influence on all parts of our nature. This end is evidently a subordinate one, and preparatory to the development and activity of higher powers and capacities.

It would seem obvious that the law for the government of the appetites must be derived from their end and the place which they hold in the scale of our nature, and the power which governs them must be found above them in the constitution. They are to be restrained and used within those bounds which will make them most conducive to our well-being as animal creatures endowed with an intellectual and moral nature which is supreme. If this end is well attained, the best foundation is laid for the action of the higher powers and the pursuit of superior ends.

The pleasure connected with the appetites is lawful and useful in its proper measure. It constitutes a necessary good, necessary for our life and being in the world; but it constitutes also a temptation to neglect the higher powers and pleasures, and to make this our only good. We need therefore to exercise a constant control in this regard with strict reference to the end. This is a case where that which is an end in one point of view is also a means for gaining another end above it. In any nature which stretches through so wide a scale "most ends are merely means for the accomplishment of other ends, and all ends but one may be regarded as merely means for the accomplishment of that end; namely, the ultimate aim and object of the individual."

While the appetites are thus non-moral themselves, or as

endowments, our action in using them to gain their end and in keeping them within their proper bounds is moral action; that is to say, the ethical, which is the product of the composite nature as a whole, flows down through every lowest conscious feeling and activity, and all are moralized for good or ill. The chief immoralities of some men lie in the abuse of the appetites and in those actions which grow out of this abuse. By such vices men lose their manhood, or only retain enough of it to make their degradation deeper and more obvious. Virtue in this sphere consists not in eradicating the appetites nor in putting contempt upon them, but in conquering the excessive and perverted impulse and in keeping them in complete subjection to their proper ends. These ends we ought to gain.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DESIRES.

SECTION 29. *The second class of implanted principles of action is the desires.* The word "desire" is often used in another sense. Dr. Carpenter[1] uses it to signify the outgoing of the soul towards any object which seems likely to give pleasure. Porter says: "The law is universal; every feeling, whether pleasurable or painful, is no sooner experienced than it awakens a desire that the pleasure may be continued or the pain may terminate."[2] So Dr. Thomas Brown divides what he calls our "prospective emotions" into desires and fears or aversions; "the former being the outgoings towards any object which appears to us as good."[3] We cannot refuse or avoid such a sense and use of the term "desire;" but that is not the kind of principles of which we are here speaking. We are seeking now the original, spontaneous impulses of the soul which go out towards objects prior to experience and self-consciousness, and which are the means of bringing us into relations with the world, and creating experience. It is proper in itself, and in accord with good usage, to employ the term "desire" to signify one class of these original impulses.

[1] Mental Physiology, sect. 261 (1st ed).
[2] Elements of Moral Science, p. 25, sect. 9.
[3] Lecture lxv.

We say, therefore, that the desires are the natural cravings and tendencies of the mind, which comes forth spontaneously into action under these regular forms. They are in many respects analogous to the appetites, so that the terms for the one are readily used by a metaphor for the other. "The desires of the flesh and of the mind" are spoken of, and we hunger and thirst for knowledge or power. Perhaps the analysis is not altogether clear, and different classifications might be made; but we prefer to say that there are six original desires: namely, the desire *for knowledge, for society, for being loved and esteemed, for power, for superiority*, and *for property*, or *possession*. As distinguished from the appetites, the desires are said to have two characteristics, — (1) they are mental, and not bodily, in their origin, and are necessary for our intellectual life and growth. Some of them, at least, the brutes have in common with us. (2) They are not of that periodic character, but are more steady and constant. We will comment briefly on these several desires in their order.

SECT. 30. (1) *The desire of knowledge* is obviously intellectual in its origin, and is a natural and necessary principle of the mind; that is to say, the faculty of knowledge must have a spontaneous tendency to action, or be forever dormant. It appears very early, and probably is never wholly lost. It is very various in its forms. There is no field of possible knowledge which some mind is not impelled to explore by a spontaneous impulse. This principle is sometimes called "curiosity," and sometimes "wonder" (though an attempt has been made to draw a distinction between the two terms), and has by some been regarded as the principal cause of philosophy, as by Plato and Aristotle.[1] It is the basis of

[1] Cf. Sir Wm. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, lecture iv.

that enthusiasm which carries the race on in improvement. The more large, generous, and strong is the native interest in things in any mind, the more is its possessor a power in the uplifting and on-carrying of the community in the path of all progress. It is the basis of all intellectual force, and "as much born with man as the desire of food. . . . Of its origin we can give no other account than that there exists in man an indefinite power of knowing, in contact with an equally indefinite number of things which are to him unknown. Between these two facts, the connecting link is the wish to know. . . . The correspondence between the powers of the human mind and the ideas which they are fitted to entertain would be wanting if these powers were not incited by an appetite of inquiry." [1]

This original desire of knowledge is supported by all the other desires; that is to say, we are urged to gain knowledge by these other impulses also, as means to their ends. But the desire of knowledge for these other ends is not the original desire, but is secondary or artificial; that is, knowledge is sought consciously as a means to something beyond itself. All the proper desires end in their own proper object, and seek nothing beyond. Many secondary desires also co-operate with this primary desire. We may seek knowledge out of vanity, for the end of display, or as a means to wealth and happiness, which are secondary desires. Where the primary desire of knowledge is unsupported by these other impulses, it is often overcome by indolence, and we need to be led on to seek the knowledge which is good in itself, and is necessary for our good, by other motives; as, for example, by prizes and honors. All such secondary motives are lower, and in themselves undesirable; they do

[1] Duke of Argyll, The Unity of Nature, chap. viii.

not need to be employed with minds of the highest order, unless erroneous methods of training have injured the native tone of the mind. But through these artificial means the simple desire for knowledge may be aroused at length, and assume its proper place, even in minds which are far below the highest order.[1]

Some brutes have a kind of curiosity, as shown by Darwin in his "Descent of Man," and by Romanes in his "Animal Intelligence." But this brute curiosity has no reference to the discovery of causes and laws, nor to the gaining of abstract and general conceptions, nor to the development of art or animal improvement; it seems rather to be closely connected with "the impulse to seek for food, or to avoid that which may be harmful." The wonder and curiosity of brutes may be expected to be as much below that of man as the results of it are below.

SECT. 31. (2) *The desire of society* is common to men, and to very many, if not all, brutes. It appears very early, and is permanent. Species naturally hostile will lay aside their enmity and associate kindly together when cut off from their proper society. Men will even make loved, if not loving, companions of brutes and of insects, when shut off from the society of men by circumstances or by solitary confinement. Society is the chief sphere of our activity and improvement, of duty and interest, without which, even if physical life were possible, we could scarcely develop at all the rational and moral nature. It is peculiarly suitable, and even essential, therefore, that there should be a special, primitive desire for society. By virtue of this desire we are carried into society and kept there. It seems to be the

[1] Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 222–3; Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. p. 44.

counterpart in this region of the appetite of sex and of the affection of sympathy; but it is not, therefore, to be derived from the former, nor resolved into the latter. Perhaps we might rather say that these are different facets of the one social nature which is given us as a whole, and which we thus analyze that we may better understand and appreciate it. "Our sociality, that is, our living in the society of fellow moral beings, is not only an occasion for benevolence, but it is a most powerful stimulant to action; the thought of companions in the same endeavor communicates courage, animates enterprise, and makes moral action quite a different thing from what it would be if we were solitary actors."[1]

Hobbes maintains that we seek society wholly from selfish motives, "that we may receive some honor or profit from it," and not from any original impulse; the natural state is that of war of all against all. But seeing that this perpetual strife interferes with the gaining of our selfish or private ends, and fearing for our own safety, we seek the aid and protection of others. Men therefore form the social compact and set up an organized state.

But Hobbes does not overlook or deny the fact that "man is born in society, and there he remains;" "that to man by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as he is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live well. Wherefore I deny not that men (even Nature compelling) desire to come together." Those speculations, therefore, aim not to show the un-social, but rather the un-civil, character of the untrained man. Hobbes's opinions are doubtless extravagant, even in this view of them. Man has a civil as well as a social tendency; but it is a later,

[1] Grote's Moral Ideals, p. 152.

complex principle, and one more easily overcome temporarily by outbursts of passion and selfishness. The primitive desire of society cannot be overcome by any passion; but a well-ordered civil constitution of society is a late product, and is always subject to disturbance by unruly passion and self-will.

This desire, like that for knowledge, is supported by all the others. Society is the sphere where we gain and use our power, knowledge, esteem, and superiority; it is therefore sought as a means to these ends. But the desire of society as a means to farther ends is secondary, and not that original principle of our nature of which we are here speaking.

SECT. 32. (3) *The desire to be loved and esteemed* appears very early in children, and never leaves us. It is seen in very many brutes, and may be developed in them to a high degree. It is justly regarded as a mark of a bad character to be careless of the opinions of others concerning us, unless one is made so by a strong sense of duty which compels him to go forward in his course of action in spite of the narrow and mistaken views of ill-informed and ill-judging men. It was a wise moralist who said, "A young man is not far from ruin when he can say without blushing, 'I don't care what others think of me.'" But the world moves forward in its moral standards. Some men, therefore, must break away from old conservative views at the expense of incurring the distrust or hatred of all holders of the dead and dying opinions. Reformers, who think they have the clear light of truth, gather the courage for new movements by looking to a higher approval, and to the better opinion of the more enlightened coming time; they are able to despise the shame through their confidence in

right and truth and in view of the great good to be gained, looking beyond the transient to the permanent.

The desire of esteem is so strong as to lead men to endure all sorts of hardships, and even death, for the sake of gratifying it. It leads sometimes to long courses of hypocrisy and deception. It acts independently of all thought of material advantage, — as when men labor and suffer that they may be esteemed after death, and by those who are far removed from all power over them or relation to them.[1] Such facts show the far reach of human nature even on this its impulsive or subconscious side; and we must consider this outlook into the future, and this solicitude how we shall be regarded, as a distinct hint at immortality and at an ethical constitution of the world.

The desire of glory is a form of this desire. It commonly appears only in men who are conscious of great powers and broad views, who see and are able to seize the opportunity of making themselves greatly and widely useful. If it takes possession of those who have neither the opportunity nor the ability to gain a just renown by great acts of beneficence, it brings only the misery of disappointment, and is likely to lead to vicious and criminal methods of gaining notoriety when just fame is unattainable. We might perhaps call this rather the counterfeit of the true desire for glory. There have been many examples of this counterfeit in history, and in these more excited newspaper times it crops out everywhere, and often in the most whimsical or wicked ways.

This desire is also supported by the others; that is, we may seek esteem for the sake of the further ends of knowledge, power, superiority, possession, and society. But this is thus a secondary desire.

[1] Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 220 *et seq.*

SECT. 33. (4) *The desire of power* is closely allied with the appetite for exercise, and with spontaneous nervous force or the reflex activity of the nerves. It is the mental counterpart of this appetitive and physical endowment. It takes various directions and uses various means, according to the special gifts or direction of the mind. It creates many secondary desires for all those things which are supposed to give us power; as for wealth, office, knowledge, social position, and the like. It accounts for many of the vices and crimes of men. They pursue the object of this desire, thoughtless of duty and of the rights of others. But the desire of power is not for this reason to be accounted as evil. Like all other natural endowments, it may be used for bad ends, and it is perhaps specially liable to be abused on account of thoughtlessness and the excitements of passion. We may be hurried away to commit high-handed wrong, deaf to the voices of reason and conscience. But this desire may be used for good also, and without it we should lack impulse and aspiration for action and achievement.

This desire may become secondary, like the others; that is, we may desire power as a means to knowledge, esteem, superiority, society, and possession. It may therefore be said to be supported by these desires, and we are thus held up to energy and force in our life by the combined action of all these desires.

SECT. 34. (5) *The desire of superiority* some have denied to be an original principle of action. Reid classes it among the affections instead of the desires, and under the name of "emulation" calls it one of the malevolent affections. But he defines emulation as "the desire of superiority to our rivals in any pursuit." He calls it a malevolent affection on account of the envy which is so likely to be associated with it;

or, in other words, because it is so likely to be abused. But this is to miss the point, and classify by reference to secondary and accessory circumstances. We should look at the desire itself, and not at its abuses or accessories.[1]

Hopkins denies that this emulation is an original desire, but makes it a form of the desire of power and esteem.[2] No doubt it leads one to seek superiority in power and esteem, but also in all other things which we desire either originally or secondarily. But this does not make it a form of these desires. We might just as well resolve all the desires into some one, when we see how they co-operate and combine with each other.

There is nothing evil in this more than in any other of our original principles. It does not necessarily imply vying with others, certainly not vying in evil, nor vying by the use of bad means, nor with hard and hostile feelings. "It may be a desire of superiority without reference to any other person as surpassed; praiseworthiness or admirableness without reference to actual admiration. Almost every one, from the highest to the lowest, forms some sort of ideal of this kind" superior to his present attainment, which he seeks as an uplifting of himself above himself. This desire is not necessarily attended with envy, even when we are in conscious rivalry with others. It is compatible with the strongest friendship between the parties. We often see most honorable and kindly rivals. It is true that men may seek superiority in bad things and by bad means; but every principle of our nature may be perverted and used for bad ends.

SECT. 35. (6) *The desire of possession* appears very early

[1] Reid, Essays on the Active Powers, essay iii. chap. v. (Hamilton's ed.), p. 566.

[2] Lectures on Moral Science, pp. 117-20.

in children. It points to and demands private ownership, which is one grand distinction of men from the lower animals. It is intimately connected with the desire of power and superiority, with foresight, and a long train of our most important derived principles. Possession gives a very deep satisfaction to all men.

The great value of this desire appears in that it stimulates to activity, industry, and frugality, restrains from folly and extravagance, and thus cultivates self-control and concentration of purpose. The institution of private property, to which it leads, has hitherto been the basis on which our civilization has been built up; and it is scarcely credible that a new foundation can now be laid, and a new order be built up, in contravention of so deep, true, and beneficent a principle of human nature. No doubt it often gains a most unreasonable power over men, especially in their mature years. Out of it grow the vices of covetousness, avarice, miserliness, and that hardness which grinds the poor and makes one turn a deaf ear to the calls of humanity and charity. The explanation of these vices is that in seeking possessions men overlook the fact that these are not the ultimate end of our being, but an end only in a low and subordinate sense, and are chiefly to be regarded as a means for gaining the higher ends of our nature. The same is true of the ends gained by all the desires.

The desire of possession, like all the other desires, may become secondary; that is, we may desire possessions as a means of gaining the ends of the other primary desires.

SECT. 36. *The final cause of the desires* is to develop the individual in all his powers, both bodily and mental, to lead him forth into his proper sphere of life and action, and to impel him in that sphere. It is these native principles

which give energy and force to the mind. They combine to create that forth-putting vigor and ambition which may go out in evil directions, but which are also the chief instruments for good in every direction. They imply or lead to an eager, active, forceful character. The desires of power, esteem, superiority, and possession tend directly to the development of the bodily powers, as they set us on vigorous work to gain their objects. All these, as well as the desire of knowledge, tend directly to the cultivation of the mind as the means of gaining their objects. The desire of society leads us directly into and keeps us in the proper sphere of life and moral action. All the other desires lead indirectly to society as the only sphere in which they may gain their objects.

These statements, as well as some others already made, indicate the intimate relation and alliance of all these principles, and they naturally suggest the question whether the desires are not all really one at root. No doubt they are so far one that they are all alike desires; that is, spontaneous outgoings of the soul towards things needful for mental life and development, shaping and distinguishing characters by their varying force and by their proportion to each other. But they are so truly diverse from each other, while yet so like and so easily co-operating and flowing together, that we cannot say they are reducible to one single desire. We must regard them as the specific forms of this sort of spontaneous activity, as different and as justly distinguished from one another as are the several appetites. A kind of treatment which would reduce them all to one desire would not be likely to stop until appetites, desires, and affections were all reduced to one principle, and that one transformed into some form of nervous force.

We can no more doubt of the final cause here than in the case of the appetites; nor can we any more doubt that this end is not for its own sake, or, in other words, that it is not ultimate, when we view the whole nature of man. This end, valuable as it is, must be subordinate and a stepping-stone to another end above it. As the appetites, which are bodily, secure for us good physical health and vigor when their end is wisely and proportionately gained, and thus fit us for something beyond the physical and animal, so the desires, which are mental, develop us as intellectual and social beings, bring us into our proper sphere of action, and quicken us to vigorous life in that sphere. But this cannot be the ultimate end if man is a moral being, nor if society itself is to be peaceful and pleasant. It is only a preparation for something higher.

SECT. 37. *The law for the government of the desires* must be derived from their end and their place in the constitution. This law cannot be laid down nor enforced by the desires themselves, because these are impulsive and without that comprehensive view of their place and end which legislation and the exercise of government require. All impulsive principles must be governed by that part of our nature which is above them and to which they are ultimately subservient, that is, they must be governed by the ethical person. They are to be so restrained and guided as best to prepare the man for his higher ends and to carry him on to gain these. This would constitute virtue in the sphere of the desires.

The desires, like the appetites, are non-moral. Our action in using them for their proper ends, or in failing to use and govern them aright, is moral action. In other words, the man is moral in his actions, but none of his

faculties or endowments as such are moral, that is, worthy of praise or blame; they are only a foundation or preparation for the moral. The chief immoralities of some men lie in the abuse of the desires and in those actions which flow from this abuse.

SECT. 38. *There are very many secondary or artificial desires.* The desire of any end leads us to desire also the means for its attainment, when we come to discern them. We have shown in the preceding sections how each one of the primary desires may become secondary to the others, when its end is consciously sought, not for itself, but as a means to those other ends. These secondary desires are not original gifts, but acquisitions; though the power and tendency to acquire them, in the circumstances, is original. These desires may become so strong as to cause the mind to rest in these means, forgetful of that proper end. For example, we have a natural desire of knowledge. Books are a means to this end. But we find men who have become so absorbed in collecting books as to forget or neglect their proper use, to limit all their thoughts to the mere possession of the means of knowledge. We often see a whole life spent in the fierce pursuit of that which is nothing in itself, — a mere instrument to gain some real end. Thus wealth is a means by which we may acquire knowledge, esteem, power, superiority, — almost all the ends, natural or artificial, which men ever set before themselves. It is therefore properly sought as a means. But how numerous are the cases in which men have come to pursue wealth as though it were an end itself, or even the only end worth pursuing, quite forgetful of all its uses! They become slaves to the desire of acquiring.

Such perversions of nature depend largely upon the par-

ticular stage of the society in civilization, and the special tendency of the times. The circumstances of our own time and country tend strongly to produce in many minds that exaggerated love of wealth which perverts nature and disturbs the social balance. The miser and the avaricious man are the most familiar illustrations of such perverted desire, although similar examples in all the other desires are not far to seek.[1]

SECT. 39. *The desire of happiness* is a secondary desire of a peculiar kind, and is often called "self-love." Happiness is not the end of any special original principle of the soul, but is rather a by-result or attendant on the action of our powers for the several ends which they are adapted to gain; that is, upon the pursuit of the various proper ends of life, whatever these may be. After the several spontaneous impulses — appetites, desires, and affections — have come into action, and we have experienced the gratification which comes from the activity itself and from the possession of their various objects, this gratification — this pleased, gratified, or satisfied state of the passive feelings — may itself be sought as an end. We call it by the vague name of "happiness," or by some similar or partially synonymous term. It is for this self-conscious pursuit of pleasure, gratification, felicity, happiness, — whatever appellation we may give it, — that the name of "desire" has been reserved by many writers. This object is sought by the man, the self-conscious person, reflectively, intentionally, and not under the spontaneous impulse of an original, active principle.

Happiness is an agreeable state of our passive sensitive nature, bodily or psychical, resulting from our powers having

[1] Hopkins, Lectures on Moral Science, p. 105; Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. pp. 17–22 and 47–59.

their proper objects and being in their proper, healthful action. When after experience we have formed a notion of this agreeable state as such, we cannot fail to desire and seek it, to hold it before the mind as an end to be rationally pursued. Some measure of it is absolutely necessary to our life. In this view it is what has been called "the instinct of self-preservation;" though it is by no means an instinct, but a rational impulse, a deep and speedy natural purpose to maintain our life. In abnormal conditions it may give way, and a despairing man may take his own life; and, on the other hand, for worthy ends life in the most attractive conditions may be freely sacrificed by a high, courageous soul, not because it is pleasureless or hopeless, or considered not worth living, but because there are gradations of pleasures, and the noble mind scorns the low and sensual when brought into competition with the moral and religious.

Happiness can be wisely sought only by making the proper use of all our powers in due subordination and with the due regard to all our relations in life. It is then the natural fruit resultant or attendant on the discharge of every duty, the ordered and appointed consequence of a rational and moral life; or we may say it comes in its noblest and most abiding forms from living in accordance with reason and conscience, — the highest powers, — from entering into the work and service of life with high and pure moral purpose. But if happiness is sought, as it is so likely to be, not in the proper use of all our powers in due subordination and with right regard to all our relations in life, we shall certainly act in some way erroneously and viciously; we shall pervert and corrupt the nature by misdirection, and by continued wrong action we fasten the error upon us, and deepen it by habit.

SECT. 40. *This desire is especially liable to become perverted* from our excessive haste or want of sufficient thoughtfulness in action, which results from that diseased, unbalanced, and perverted state of the sensibility which we seem by some means to inherit. In its perversion and disorder the desire of happiness becomes selfishness. *Selfishness is the pursuit of one's own good to the neglect or exclusion of the good of others;* that is, in disregard of our relations. In such a case the powers are not properly subordinated and restrained within their natural and proper limits; the highest principles do not rule; the best ends are not selected. Selfishness has very many forms, and is the chief enemy of human happiness. It is sometimes considered the chief source of every kind of vice.

The desire of happiness is natural in the sense that there is a provision for it in our nature and circumstances, and it certainly arises in every mind. Butler makes the sweeping statements that "every man, in everything he does, naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good;"[1] and "that when we sit down in a cool hour, we cannot justify to ourselves any pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."[2] It is certainly true that every man must form the idea of his own good, and must care for it and seek it, in order to maintain his life and play his part in the world. In this aspect we are committed to ourselves, and not to others, to care for, to act, and to answer for. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that it should be otherwise, and no moral or religious principles of kindness, charity, or mutual helpfulness can in the least modify or change the

[1] Analogy, part i. chap. ii.

[2] Sermon xi.; also Sigwart, Vorfragen der Ethik, sect. 3.

necessity and the obligation of this. But this desire of happiness must on no account be ranked with those original implanted principles which we are here studying, because of its late origin, being dependent on the previous activity of those spontaneous impulses and of self-consciousness; because of its composite nature and its internal instead of external object. It is not secondary in the proper sense, namely, as being the desire of something as a means instead of as an end, but as springing up after and in consequence of the development, activity, and gratification of the primary or implanted principles, and through the action of the intellect in self-consciousness.

This desire will come into view again when we are considering the susceptibility (Chapter. VI.), and also when we consider the relation of the intellect to morality (Chapter XVIII.).

SECT. 41. *The objects of the various desires* have been stated in abstract terms; namely, knowledge, esteem, society, power, superiority, and possession. Whewell says that the objects of the mental desires are certain abstractions.[1] But this is wholly an appearance, resulting from the necessities of philosophy, which always uses general terms. An implanted principle could not go out towards an abstraction, for abstractions are purely mental products, and do not exist in the real world. A desire, like an appetite, is always a craving for and tendency towards some concrete, real thing in which it rests, and which is naturally fitted to satisfy the craving. This is an instance of the harmony of the subjective and objective worlds, each leaping spontaneously to the embrace of the other and resting there.

[1] Elements of Morality, i. 40.

CHAPTER V.

THE AFFECTIONS.

SECTION 42. *The third class of implanted principles is the affections.* They are always spoken of as of two general kinds, commonly called the "benevolent" and the "malevolent." The former class includes the general forms of gratitude, generosity, love, and sympathy. Sympathy is of three kinds, — pity or compassion, congratulation, and general tendency to harmonize our thoughts, feelings, and conduct with those of others. Of the latter class there is properly only one affection; namely, resentment.

The words "benevolent" and "malevolent" are, strictly speaking, improper appellations for these principles. Etymologically they imply an exercise of will or choice, whereas the entire series of principles now under consideration is professedly prior to all will and choice. The former class are called benevolent because they in fact tend to promote the happiness or well-being of other sensitive creatures towards whom they go out. They are (though involuntarily) helpful, beneficent, kindly, in their result, and seem to be placed in our nature with that purpose by our Author. They are as though well-willing or good-willing towards those to whom they are directed; but they may result in evil or harm to their objects. The second class is called malevolent simply for the sake of a word, to make a strong con-

trast with the so-called benevolent affections. But the name is false and injurious. This affection is not in any respect ill-willing or a willing of ill, but its result often is, or tends to be, harmful or maleficent towards its object; and it seems to be placed in our nature with that purpose by our Author. The proper and accurate name is "the defensive and punitive affection." While it is primarily regarded as maleficent, it is, in fact and ethically considered, indispensable, and often most beneficent in all its results.

SECT. 43. *The characteristic of the affections*, as distinguished from the appetites and desires, is that they go out towards other sensitive beings, and issue, as has been shown, in beneficent and maleficent results for them. They are thus eminently social principles, and seem designed primarily, not for the private good of the person exercising them, but for the good of society, and through this for the good of the individual. This does not prevent them, however, from bringing immediate good, that is, giving gratification or happiness, to him who exercises them. In this respect they are precisely like the appetites and desires; that is, they are the soul's own spontaneous activities, and the attendant results in passive feeling are necessarily also the soul's own.[1] It has been well said that "the highest of our joys are found in the affections." But the more obvious tendency, which first attracts the attention, is such that the appetites and desires are called egoistic, and the affections altruistic. But because the appetites and desires are self-appropriating or egoistic, and seem primarily intended for this end in the economy of our nature, it does not follow that they are selfish. Because the affections primarily regard others or are altruistic, it does not follow

[1] Butler, Sermon xi.

that they are benevolent. Their presence as spontaneous impulses in the soul proves "that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures," just as the presence of appetites and desires proves "that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good." [1]

We could never know that we needed to take food, drink, or sleep, if we had not implanted appetites. We could never know that we needed to seek knowledge, esteem, or society, if we had not implanted desires. We could never be led to exercise love or sympathy, if we had not implanted affections. In other words, our being could never be started in its active career, if it were not self-motive or spontaneously active. And this is equally true of the bodily and of the psychical nature.

We have the desire of society; but this does not make the affections unnecessary, for this desire, like all the others, is self-regarding. Men associated solely by virtue of this desire, without affection, would not form that peaceful and helpful society in which we live, nor could the union be preserved; for the whole aim of each would be to appropriate to himself, to use his fellows simply for his own good, without care for their good. They would not necessarily be selfish in that case, because they would not form the idea of others' good, and therefore would not consciously reject or neglect it; but they would be wholly self-seeking or egoistic.

The Kindly Affections.

SECT. 44. *The benevolent or kindly affections obviously seek the good of their object*, and the exercise of them is pleasant. We remark upon them briefly in order.

[1] Butler, Sermon i., on Human Nature.

(1) *Gratitude is the responsive feeling of kindness* or beneficence towards a benefactor. It seeks to promote the good of the benefactor, and ends in that. If gratitude is absent or very deficient, we regard it as a sure mark of a mean and depraved nature. When it arises full and strong, in quick response to benefits bestowed or kindness shown, we regard it as a mark of a noble nature. It does not imply a return of benefits in kind, or any attempt at this; but it does imply that recognition of benefit, and that personal feeling towards the benefactor, which would return the benefit if ability and occasion permitted, or which would dispense like benefits to others when opportunity offered.

The expectation of gratitude incites men to do good, and the responses of kindness and beneficence which beneficence calls forth are among the strongest bonds of sympathetic union in society. Ingratitude often deters men from doing the good which they otherwise would do. It requires a very high purpose and firm principle, or a naturally lofty nature, to go steadily forward in beneficent action amid the ingratitude or indifference either of those whom we seek to benefit, or of the public who observe our efforts. But it is to the credit of human nature that there are men and women whose goodness is equal to the task of spending their lives, and even of laying down life, for the good of degraded people who only answer their efforts with hatred and abuse. It is not the spontaneous impulse alone which constitutes the substance of this high character, but no such character could be built up if there were not this natural basis and material for it in the original endowments of man. It is worthy of remark also that the very doing of those acts of kindness which ought to call out the gratitude of the recipients itself often stimulates the natural feeling of kindness

and love in the mind of the benefactor towards even the evil and unthankful. Such benefactors look to a higher than human example, and another than human judgment.

SECT. 45. (2) *Generosity is the natural impulse to aid* and to impart to all our associates, without reference to their particular condition as needing assistance, the disposition freely and promptly to give and to forgive. It is a liberal, helpful, and unexacting spirit, which contributes much to the well-being of society. It tends to put others' interests, needs, and claims above our own. It may be overcome by a contracted view of one's own interest. Selfishness does in fact largely prevail over it, as well as over all the other natural affections; but selfishness is an acquisition, not an original gift. Generosity is more observable in the young before the nature has been hardened by the competitions of interest and by evil examples.

SECT. 46. (3) *Love is the warmth of kindly feeling* going out towards other sensitive beings. It is often divided into various kinds, according to its object. Thus we speak of parental and filial love, friendship, patriotism, and philanthropy, and that love between the sexes which leads on to marriage.[1] The benevolent affection is the same in kind in all these. Of course there is some intellectual preparation, however small, for the affection, and we may say an intellectual side to the affection itself. In the case of love in the narrow sense, in parental and filial love, the emotional element prevails so largely as often to sink the intellectual to a very low point. So it is correctly said that "love is blind, and lovers cannot see." Parents and children, in whom the affectional nature is strong, often cannot see each others' faults. In friendship, which is "a consciously

[1] Grote's Moral Ideals, chap. viii.

reciprocated affection between equals," the two elements are about evenly balanced. In patriotism and philanthropy the emotional element is usually undemonstrative; and yet there is a true and strong affection, as we see in times of national trial, or when national comparisons come before the mind, or when there is great and wide-spread suffering or injustice. Love and loyalty to the State and country sometimes burst forth as an overmastering passion in a whole people, "inspiring deeds of heroism and devotion which no other sentiment" is equal to. The term "humanity" is sometimes employed to signify an affection wider even in its range than that of philanthropy, extending to the brute creation.

When the relations in which we stand to the objects of our affections are simple, clear, and ever before us, the feeling flows full and strong, sometimes even to the blinding or perverting of the thought. When more consideration and wider knowledge are necessary for the apprehension and appreciation of the relations, there is in ordinary circumstances less room for emotion, and the feeling will be less marked. This is true equally of the natural kindly affections and of the evil feelings of jealousy, envy, and hatred.

This affection of love is pleasurable to the one who exercises it, and it aims to give pleasure to its object. He is not a true friend who seeks his own advantage in friendship, though friendship may yield advantage. That which is sought as a means to something beyond is not loved, is not the object of any of our primary active principles. These rest in their immediate objects, and seek nothing beyond.

Love has its counterpart in the region both of the desires and the appetites, — in the desire to be loved and esteemed, and in the sexual appetite. The three co-operating, con-

stitute a powerful social principle, capable of sad perversion and evil, but also the source of unspeakable good.

SECT. 47. (4) *The fourth benevolent affection to be mentioned is sympathy*, using the term in its etymological sense of fellow-feeling, community of feeling. This is strictly and properly the tendency we have to conform our own feelings in kind to those of others. The power of this principle is very great, and it is certainly an original and simple principle of our nature, if there be any such. This truth is so deeply felt that sympathy is sometimes regarded as the original form of all the affections, and Adam Smith has even made it the root of all the moral sentiments.

This affection might perhaps be thought to be later in time than the others, as requiring more precedent knowledge and experience as a condition. But even if this were admitted, it would not follow that it was any the less an original, simple, and spontaneous principle. It springs up of itself when the occasion is present, and is not a product of our choice or volition. It pertains to the whole field of knowing, feeling, willing, and bodily action; that is to say, there is a native tendency to act or harmonize with our fellows in all these kinds of action.

"In a complete act of sympathy," says Fowler, "there are three stages, — the mental representation of the circumstances; the emotional act of fellow-feeling or sympathy, properly so called, attended with the consciousness that the joy or suffering is not our own; and lastly, the disposition to render assistance, if possible, to the object sympathized with. The term 'sympathy' is sometimes applied to the second act only of this series, frequently to the combination of the first two, and sometimes to the entire series."[1]

[1] Principles of Morals, part ii. p. 80.

SECT. 48. *We may clearly distinguish three kinds of sympathy,* according to the objects towards which it is directed.

(1) The first kind is *pity* or *compassion;* that is, a fellow-feeling with those who are in suffering. But the feeling often outstrips the etymology, and we pity those who have no sense of their ill-condition, who may even rejoice in that which we pity them for. We pity men who boast of their perverse and wicked conduct. This is a true sympathy with what it is supposed they will feel when they rightly appreciate their conduct, or when they reap the natural consequences of it, — sympathy by anticipation.

The final causes of pity, as set forth by Butler,[1] are two, — (1) to prevent misery; (2) to relieve misery. Pity prevents misery by operating as "a restraint upon resentment, envy, unreasonable self-love; that is, upon all the principles from which men do evil to one another. Let us instance only in resentment. It seldom happens in regulated societies that men have an enemy so entirely in their power as to be able to satiate their resentment with safety. But if we were to put this case, it is plainly supposable that a person might bring his enemy into such a condition as, from being the object of anger and rage, to become an object of compassion, even to himself, though the most malicious man in the world; and in this case compassion would stop him, if he could stop with safety, from pursuing his revenge any farther."

But "the final cause of compassion is much more to relieve misery. Since in many cases it is very much in our power to alleviate the miseries of each other: and benevolence, though natural in man to man, yet is in a very low

[1] Sermons v. and vi.

degree kept down by interest and competitions; and men are, for the most part, so engaged in the business and pleasures of the world as to overlook and turn away from objects of misery, which are plainly considered as interruptions to them in their way, as intruders upon their business, their gayety and mirth; compassion is an advocate within us in their behalf, to gain the unhappy admittance and access, to make their case attended to. . . . And if men would only resolve to allow thus much to it, — let it bring before their view, the view of their mind, the miseries of their fellow-creatures; let it gain for them that their case be considered, — I am persuaded it would not fail of gaining more, and that very few real objects of charity would pass unrelieved. Pain and misery have a right to our assistance; compassion puts us in mind of the debt, and that we owe it to ourselves as well as to the distressed. . . . Compassion is a call, a demand of nature, to relieve the unhappy, as hunger is a natural call for food. This affection plainly gives the objects of it an additional claim to relief and mercy, over and above what our fellow-creatures in common have to our good-will."

This provision of compassion in the human soul, Butler treats as a special instance of the more general fact that nature abounds in alleviations of misery.

SECT. 49. (2) *The second kind of sympathy is congratulation,* or sympathetic pleasure with others in view of their success or happiness. Butler thinks that the end to be accomplished by congratulation is so little distinct and peculiar that this should not be regarded as a special principle, but rather as "a consequence of the general affection of love and good-will. The reason and account of which matter is this: when a man has attained any

particular advantage or felicity, his end is gained, and he does not in that particular want the assistance of another. There was therefore no need of a distinct affection towards that felicity of another already obtained; neither would such affection directly carry him on to do good to that person: whereas men in distress want assistance, and compassion leads us directly to assist them. The object of the former is the present felicity of another, the object of the latter is the present misery of another. It is easy to see that the latter wants a particular affection for its relief, and that the former does not want one, because it does not want assistance. And upon supposition of a distinct affection in both cases, the one must rest in the exercise of itself, having no further end to gain; the other does not rest in itself, but carries us on to assist the distressed." [1]

We submit that this is too narrow a view of the purport of the affections. Butler admits that we have the word "congratulation," corresponding with condolence, but he regards both as forms of civility rather than as having any reality of feeling behind them. But it is evident that hypocrisy may equally prevail in the region of pity also, and of every other natural affection. Every part of our nature may be perverted. Congratulation does differ from compassion in respect to the distinctness and individuality of its end as it first catches our attention. But in all the affections there is a higher and broader end than the specific good or ill of the person directly affected. The latter is important, and without it the broader end perhaps could not be gained. Accordingly, congratulation, or "congaudence" (to use the word coined by Grote [2]), confirms the successful person in the reality and value of his success,

[1] Sermon v. [2] The Moral Ideals, chap. viii. p. 111.

and by relieving him from apprehension of jealousy and envy, gives confidence, freedom, and fulness to his enjoyment. Most people have a doubt or suspicion of the reality and distinct value of their achievements until they are recognized by others; and if all the world should stand mute and indifferent by, no success would have any value or give any satisfaction to us. Thus to deny the importance of this form of sympathy is to overestimate the individualism and the separate strength of our nature, and to underestimate our mutual dependence and sociality.

There is no stronger bond of union among men than this sympathy in the successes and the happiness of others. If sympathy with those in misfortune "halves their sorrows," sympathy with those in good fortune more than "doubles their joys." Thus men are bound together and made fellow-helpers in all aspects of life. To cheer and encourage is as natural and as needful as to comfort and relieve; and there is no clearer mark of an elevated mind and a noble native disposition than the full, free, and spontaneous sympathy with those who succeed in any good work, or who are happy in any proper and natural enjoyment.

SECT. 50. (3) *The third kind of sympathy* is the tendency to harmonize our thoughts, feelings, and conduct in general with those of other people. We might have placed this first, and treated pity and congratulation as subordinate to it; but so much more has been made of pity in literature and in ethics that we have chosen to leave it in its accustomed place.

This is substantially the tendency to imitate. "Sympathy and imitation both mean the tendency of one individual to fall in with the emotional or active states of others, these

states being made known through a certain medium of expression. To rejoice with them that rejoice, and weep with them that weep, to be carried away by the enthusiasm of a throng, to conform to the society that we live among, and to imbibe the beliefs of our generation, are a part of the human constitution capable of being generalized under one commanding principle. The foundation of sympathy and imitation is the same; but the one applies itself more to our feelings, the other to our actions." [1] "When we see a stroke aimed, and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer. The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies as they see him do, and as they feel that they themselves must do if in his situation." [2] We yawn, laugh, and clear our throats in sympathy with others. Public opinion, which is often so unanimous, is partly owing to this tendency. "Hence the conservation of traditional modes of thinking and feeling, and the difficulty there is in attaining a point of view repugnant to the atmosphere we live in. The tenacity of inherited notions and sentiments in a family or a people proves the strength of the sympathetic disposition." [1]

This tendency often gives ridiculous and vicious results. People admire what they are told is beautiful; they see what they are told to see; and "when they are in Rome, they do what the Romans do," even to the neglect of common-sense and common morality.

[1] Bain, The Emotions and the Will, chap. xii.

[2] Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, part i. sect. i. chap. i.

"*Hamlet.* Do you see yonder cloud, that's almost in shape like a camel?

Polonius. By the Mass, and 't is like a camel, indeed.

Ham. Methinks, it is like a weasel.

Pol. It is backed like a weasel.

Ham. Or, like a whale?

Pol. Very like a whale."

This yielding, consenting tendency is more marked in some than in others, and there are a few persons who seem all antagonism, independence, and self-assertion. The readiness with which we are carried away sympathetically depends partly on the native strength and tone of the mind, partly on other individual peculiarities, and partly on the degree of preoccupation in other directions. But some degree of sympathy is necessary for the unity and peace of society.

SECT. 51. *There are certain abuses of sympathy* which moralists have taken little notice of, but which may obviously become of importance in character and in their practical results. Those which appear in the region of pity or compassion are most noticeable and most need to be checked. There may be extravagant or hypocritical congratulation; but this will hardly lead away even the simple into any great evil, unless they are thus encouraged by wicked men in wickedness. There may be a mute indifference to all the prosperity and happiness of others; but this is a social shortcoming which does not immediately threaten calamity, but only diminishes the happiness and good-fellowship of society.

The abuses of pity are analogous to those of resentment, — to be treated of hereafter (Sect. 55); they stand over against the latter as injuring the moral tone of individuals,

and as working out serious results in the civil life of the public.

These abuses appear on the side of excess, (1) when "by means of pity carried too far, a man throughout his life becomes subject to much more uneasiness than belongs to his share, and in particular instances it may be in such a degree as to incapacitate him from assisting the very person who is the object of it;"[1] (2) when we respond immediately to every appeal for aid, without inquiring into the reality, the cause, and extent of the need; (3) when we freely give and help, without considering the ultimate effect on the spirit of those aided, or on others who may be influenced by the idea that it is easy to obtain help from soft-hearted people; (4) when we fail to hold those aided to a strict accountability for the use made of what we give; (5) when through pity for wrong-doers we seek to relieve them from punishment and from the natural consequences of their wrong, and when we think or speak of them, or treat them in any way, as martyrs, or do anything which tends to impair the authority of law and justice in the minds of the tempted, the weak, and excitable. These abuses of pity tend strongly to cultivate poverty, dependence, and crime, to weaken the spirit of independence and self-help, of reverence for law, and respect for the rights of life and property.

Abuses of pity on the side of defect appear (1) when it "makes men industriously turn away from the miserable, that they may get rid of the sorrow of compassion;" (2) when through selfishness we put away pity, lest we may have to give of our property, our time, and labor to examine the cases of those who ask our aid, and to furnish relief when it is really needed by worthy persons.

[1] Butler, Sermon vi.

Resentment.

SECT. 52. *In the class of defensive or punitive affections* we find only one which we can consider original and simple; namely, resentment. Some writers have added *hatred*, *jealousy*, and *envy;* but we cannot regard these as original principles: they are not natural, but are composite passions of late growth. They grow out of resentment, and are sometimes distinctly named among its abuses.[1]

Resentment is a spontaneous uprising of our nature against harm and injury. Its purpose is evidently the self-defence of the individual and of the society against hostile attacks. Butler divides it into two kinds: (1) *sudden* or *hasty*, which is the spontaneous flashing forth of the soul in resistance to violence or hurt, without regard to the source of it, though it might proceed from a brute or an inanimate object. It meets impending danger on the instant, and is often the only security for our lives.

(2) The second kind of resentment is *deliberate*. This is just as spontaneous and just as prompt as the former when the occasion is present, but the occasion is different. It springs up not in the presence of violence or harm, considered merely as such, but in view of intended wrong or injury or injustice, considered as such. Some thought must, therefore, precede in which we apprehend and represent to ourselves the evil intention. The soul then spontaneously rises up against the wrong, to beat it down and punish it as it deserves.

Sudden resentment is more of a physical nature, and disappears as speedily as it arises. It does not enter into the

[1] Butler, Sermon viii., and Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. pp. 116–21.

thought to abide there as a moral resentment; though the event may give rise to a general precaution for the future. When wrong is discerned, resentment immediately arises, and remains in the mind as a more or less fixed feeling, urging us on to right the wrong and to punish the offender. It is therefore called *deliberate* or *settled anger* or *resentment.*

Sudden resentment relates chiefly to our own personal harm, though it might perhaps arise in view of an attack upon the safety of another present with us whom we considered as ourselves; as, for example, in case of a parent repelling harm from a child. But deliberate or settled resentment arises in view of wrong as such, whether offered to ourselves or to our friends, or to any other human being, or even to any sensitive being. It arises in our minds when we read the history of the wrongs of past ages, even though we learn that they were then duly punished; or when we read what we know to be "a feigned story of baseness and villany, properly worked up to move our passions."

"This indignation excited by cruelty and injustice, and the desire of having it punished, which persons unconcerned would feel, is by no means malice. No, it is resentment against vice and wickedness; it is one of the common bonds by which society is held together, — a fellow-feeling which each individual has in behalf of the whole species as well as of himself. And it does not appear that this, generally speaking, is at all too high amongst mankind." Indeed, it has been pointed out as a token of the moral degeneracy of our own times that "there is a paralysis of indignation."

SECT. 53. *The name, "deliberate resentment,"* might suggest the objection that this could not be one of those original implanted principles of which we are here treating, but that it must be a later, acquired, and therefore a rational or

moral principle. The fact that it arises at a later date in the development of the soul, and on occasion of the perception of wrong or injustice, does not deprive it of its spontaneous character. It is a spontaneous and not a voluntary principle; though, like all the other impulses, it may afterwards be chosen and moralized, and may form an element in many compound moral states.

The necessity that resentment should be implanted as a spontaneous principle in the soul is obvious. We should not be prepared promptly to meet and repel the evil and wrong of the world without it. The calculations of prudence and views of the general good are often too slow and doubtful. A quick and lively impulse is needed here specially for three reasons: (1) To overcome our natural inertia, which is very great when wrong does not touch us immediately in our own person or property.

(2) To overcome the softening and restraining influence of compassion. We feel pity not only for those who suffer from the attacks of evil-doers, but for the evil-doers themselves, who often injure themselves by their wrong-doing more than they injure others. The outward or inward hurt of a wrong inflicted on me must many times be less than the inward hurt to the wrong-doer himself, if he is not altogether hardened in iniquity. The punishment also which the most humane laws inflict on wrong-doers is sure to excite our pity. It is sometimes hard to uphold the most just laws against pity. An immoral sentimentalism is now growing in many quarters such as calls for an assertion of the nobleness of moral indignation and for the encouragement and cultivation of it.

(3) A spontaneous resentment is needed in order quickly and strongly to unite good men against wrong in the

very moment of its committal or of its suggestion. The persons directly injured, if they had no resentment, would in fact not be likely to pursue the wrong-doers. If they should pursue them in the face of an indifferent public, it would require a very firm and steady view of their own injury and loss to carry them on against all difficulties to the end of executing justice. If they should get their case against the wrong-doers before a jury of indifferent or morally fibreless and bloodless men, they would find it a vain appeal; they could arouse no response to their claim of wrong.

This resentment against wrong and injury is a sort of natural or implanted moral tone on the side of justice, which constitutes a basis on which the voluntary or rational ethical (which alone is the true ethical) is built up. And when resentment is moralized into justice, and the kindly affections are moralized into benevolence, it is often thought that the whole field of the ethical is covered. This does indeed provide for a large part of social Ethics; but our social life with other men is not the entire ethical field.

SECT. 54. *It is said by Reid and Stewart*[1] *that the exercise of resentment is disagreeable*, and a final cause of this is pointed out; namely, to prevent us from freely exercising it. But as men are now constituted or disposed, society could not exist without the impulse to defend from harm and to punish wrong. If this were disagreeable, the final cause of the affection itself would be thwarted, and there would thus be a contradiction in our original constitution.

But in a case of injury or wrong it is not disagreeable to resent it. It is agreeable to have punishment visited on the

[1] Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, essay iii. part ii. chap. vi.; Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, book i. chap. iii. sect. vi.

guilty. Every person of pure and upright mind must be indignant at vice and crime, even after all allowances are made for ignorance, weakness, and temptation. This is a part of uprightness and purity, a necessary outflow of it; and it must be as agreeable as goodness itself in "a naughty world." It is that wrong which makes resentment necessary which is disagreeable, not the resentment itself. That disagreeableness of wrong is in fact itself resentment.

There are certain other feelings which may be unduly cultivated, so as to produce a disordered and sickly mind, or a mere soft and sentimental goodness, which will make resentment and punishment disagreeable. Pity, while the thoughts are turned away from the wrong and directed to the sufferings of the guilty, makes the thought and sight of punishment disagreeable. The after reflection that one has gone to excess in resentment, or has been led on to mere revenge, or to any other abuse, will cause regret. But the exercise of every original principle in due measure and in the cases for which it was given, is both essential as a basis for our proper moral activity and development, and must be agreeable. If it were not so, we should strive to eradicate it, and thus be laboring to defeat the ends of our nature.

The agreeableness of resentment in itself is fully asserted by many writers. Thus Bain says: "Although the exercise of resentment is beset with numerous incidental pains, the one feeling of gratified vengeance is a pleasure as real and indisputable as any form of human delight."[1] Chalmers takes the same ground: "There is a certain species of enjoyment common to all our affections. It were a contradiction in terms to affirm otherwise; for it were tantamount to saying that an affection can be gratified without the actual

[1] The Emotions and the Will, chap. ix. p. 142.

experience of a gratification."[1] This he considers as true of resentment as of the kindly affections, only in the former "it is not unmixed enjoyment." But no enjoyment is unmixed, and "there are times when the exercise of [kindly] affections is exceedingly painful," as Bain shows. Bentham speaks of the "pleasure of vengeance for the party injured. . . . This pleasure is a gain; it recalls the riddle of Samson: it is the sweet which comes out of the strong; it is the honey gathered from the carcass of the lion. Useful to the individual, this motive is also useful to the public, or, to speak more correctly, necessary. It is this vindictive satisfaction which often unties the tongue of the witnesses; it is this which generally animates the breast of the accuser and engages him in the service of justice, notwithstanding the trouble, the expenses, the enmities, to which it exposes him; it is this which overcomes the public pity in the punishment of the guilty."[2]

We cite these authors merely for the sake of psychological truth in this respect, which needs now more than ever to be insisted on, lest our morality lose its natural strength and firmness, and liquefy more and more into mere sentimentalism.

Resentment does prove disagreeable to the wrong-doer towards whom it is exercised, if it leads only to the most reasonable and proper punishment. Even if it does not proceed to the infliction of any material loss or bodily harm, it gives pain to the wrong-doer, because his desire of esteem is ungratified, and he has the opposite of esteem instead. This is the evident purpose of the affection, that it may thus act as a check on wrong and vice of every degree, whether in thought and purpose or in outward act. No doubt all men

[1] Natural Theology, book iii. chap. iii.

[2] Principles of Penal Law, part i. chap. xvi.

feel the influence of it, and are restrained from wrong by the knowledge that others will resent it.

SECT. 55. *All our implanted principles are liable to abuse,* either from excess or from defect. Excess more readily attracts attention and censure, but defect is no less harmful; the rounded and balanced character is equally marred by it. Excess in one direction implies defect in another. The abuses of resentment on the side of excess have been often set forth. Butler enumerates them, very briefly, as follows:

The abuses of sudden resentment are: (1) passion, or passionateness, — a "distemper of the mind which seizes some men on the least occasion in the world, and perpetually without any real reason at all; and by means of it they are plainly, every day, every waking hour of their lives, liable and in danger of running into the most extravagant outrages;" and (2) peevishness, which is found "in a more feeble temper, and languidly discharges itself upon everything which comes in its way. . . .

"With respect to deliberate resentment, the chief instances of abuse are: (1) when from partiality to ourselves we imagine an injury done us when there is none; (2) when this partiality represents it to us greater than it really is; (3) when we fall into that extravagant and monstrous kind of resentment towards one who has innocently been the occasion of evil to us: that is, resentment upon account of pain or inconvenience, without injury, — which is the same absurdity as settled anger at a thing that is inanimate; (4) when the indignation against injury and injustice rises too high, and is beyond proportion to the particular ill action it is exercised upon; (5) when pain or harm of any kind is inflicted merely in consequence of, and to gratify, that resentment, though naturally raised. . . .

"There is one thing which so generally belongs to and accompanies all excess and abuse of it, as to require being mentioned, — a certain determination and resolute bent of mind not to be convinced or set right, though it be ever so plain that there is no reason for the displeasure, that it was raised merely by error or misunderstanding. In this there is doubtless a great mixture of pride; but there is somewhat more, which I cannot otherwise express than by saying that resentment has taken possession of the temper and of the mind, and will not quit its hold. It would be too minute to inquire whether this be anything more than bare obstinacy; it is sufficient to observe that it, in a very particular manner and degree, belongs to the abuses of this passion." [1]

SECT. 56. *Abuses of deliberate resentment on the side of defect* will always characterize a period of moral decay, and they need to be guarded against at all times as much as abuses on the side of excess. They appear (1) when through selfishness we turn away in indifference from wrong because it does not directly affect us; (2) when through fear of the malice of wrong-doers we suppress and hide our sense of outrage; (3) when through desire to win the favor or votes of the vicious for ourselves or our party we abstain from hostility to wrong, or speak lightly of it, or even pander to it; (4) when, through social or business connections, we are bribed to overlook wrong or apologize for it; (5) when we suppress indignation because we desire to escape the trouble and responsibility, which strong feelings would bring upon us, of helping to pursue and punish it; (6) when, through a trifling or jocose disposition,

[1] Sermon viii. For farther discussion of these abuses, see Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. chap. iii., especially pp. 113–21.

we minify wickedness by giving it sportive or euphemistic names.

This class of abuses is a marked feature of our people at the present time. The causes of it need not now be stated; the consequences are evident in such a lowering of the public moral tone in the ordinary matters of life as may well be the subject of serious consideration. We cannot "call evil good, and good evil," even in jest or in secret, without affecting our own moral sentiment and that of all whom we influence. It has been well said: "Of the things necessary to be done to save our civilization, the first and most important is to cause a complete change of attitude on the part of society towards wrong-doing. What is now the attitude maintained? It is one either of indifference, tolerance, or connivance, or one suggestive of paralysis of the power of indignation and of every faculty needed for the repression of crime. Towards the criminal the attitude of the public is that of weak pity, not unmingled with admiration. The criminal is an unfortunate man, to save whom from punishment seems to be the chief end of the law. . . . Weak sentimentalism of the public in reference to its criminals, and fear of the political influence wielded by them and their abettors, have so far pervaded our system that government by the people is fast losing the excellencies that were thought to characterize it." [1]

We have taken notice of these abuses of resentment, and also of those of sympathy (Sect. 51), because a proper balance of the implanted principles among themselves, as well as with the other elements of our nature, is of the highest importance both in reference to right natural character and as a basis and preparation for right moral, or

[1] J. A. Jameson, in North American Review, 1884, p. 340.

acquired character.[1] All these natural principles can be cultivated and moulded, — that is, they can be moralized; and this is the task appointed for every one of us individually, and for society as a whole.[2]

SECT. 57. *The affections thus far considered are most, if not all of them, in their impulsive form common to us with the brutes;* or perhaps we should rather say that the lower animals exhibit traits which so resemble our affections that we conceive of them and represent them under the image of the affections as we ourselves exercise these. These are called the "natural affections," to distinguish them from another class, or from these in another aspect, called the "moral affections." The latter have a sort of secondary character. They spring up after the development of intellect, will, and moral sense, when we have formed the notion of what is good on the whole, of what is virtuous and vicious, and have set these things before us as ends to be rationally pursued. The moral affections are these natural impulses, chosen and adopted, in themselves and in their ends, by the will, cherished in thought and treated as obligatory; that is, they are the natural affections moralized. They thus become virtues and vices, and give the most prompt and full exhibition of the moral character.

The good man controls his affections or impulses by reason, and directs them rationally towards that which is good as good, towards that which he has considered and chosen as his good and his end. Thus he is said to have

[1] See Butler's Analogy, part i. chap. v., — the passage where he shows "how it comes to pass that creatures made upright fall," etc.

[2] See Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. chap. iii., specially pp. 121–62.

moral impulses and desires arising on every apprehension of the right, the virtuous, and the vicious. He comes to love the virtuous, the honorable, the good action as such; he performs it with an ardor and devotion or enthusiasm; he rises above the cool thought or calculation of duty, and acts with affection. This is what some writers have called religion, as when they say: "Religion is Ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up, by emotion." Others would consider this as the aid which religion contributes to morals, as when they say: "Religion brings emotion to bear on our rules of conduct, and makes us to care for them so much, and consider them so reverentially, that we surmount the great practical difficulty of acting in obedience to them, and follow them heartily and easily."

Some men love justice, mercy, kindness, and enter into all the duties of life with a heart formed to them to such an extent that they seem not to need to reflect on what is duty in each case, but they have an intuition of it and a fervor in it, an enthusiasm of goodness. This state we ought to seek, and we have it in proportion to the perfectness of our virtue. This explains the paradox ascribed to Aristotle, that where there is self-denial there is no virtue. Virtue is complete only in proportion as the whole soul spontaneously flows out to it, without calculation or opposition. If virtue involves self-denial, that proves it incomplete. "We all feel," says Darwin, "that an act cannot be considered as perfect, or as performed in the most noble manner, unless it be done impulsively, without deliberation or effort, in the same manner as by a man in whom the requisite qualities are innate."[1]

SECT. 58. *The final cause of the affections* is to secure

[1] The Descent of Man, chap. iv.

the possibility and the welfare of society. This they do because they aim at and terminate in the good and harm of other sensitive beings, and because of their relation to the social virtues. They bind men directly into a social union, both in their natural character and in their moralized form. The desire of society is not sufficient to accomplish this, because it is egoistic, or self-regarding.

Thus the life and welfare of the individual and of the species have been provided for by the appetites and desires implanted in the very framework of our nature; and the life and welfare of society have been secured in like manner by the affections, anterior to reflection, and independently of our choice.

The affections are commonly thought to be higher, or more dignified and honorable, than the appetites and desires, because they are primarily altruistic, or regardful of others, instead of self-regarding. But they are not the highest part of our nature. They are no more fit to bear rule in the moral constitution than any other impulses, but are to be ruled. The law for their government must come from a source above them, and be determined by their end in its relation to other higher and lower ends. They are to be so restrained and guided as best to accomplish their end as a preparation for higher ends. Reason without them would not be able to discover, nor be prompted to pursue, the ends of our being, since it is not at all "a spring of action;" but the affections, like all the other impulses, need the supervision of reason, if man is to rise above the impulsive, non-moral character of the brutes.

SECT. 59. *All the implanted principles now spoken of* — appetites, desires, and affections — are necessary, according to our present constitution, to start us in our career of

activity and enable us to go on in it to the attainment of our destiny as individuals, to preserve the species, to secure the possibility and the good of society. It has been said (Sect. 20) that they all rest in their objects, and seek nothing beyond. This is the same thing as saying that they are "disinterested;" that is, they are not, in their original and proper character, a seeking for pleasure.[1] The possession of them involves neither merit nor demerit, but they are the foundation on which the fabric of merit and demerit is to be built up. Those principles which are egoistic are not on that account selfish, nor are those which are altruistic on that account morally good; they are endowments of Nature, and not the results of choice nor the products of conduct.

These implanted principles are very much the same, in themselves considered, in man and in the other animals. But in man the higher powers of conscience, thought, and volition, so soon as they are developed, lay hold of them, lift them up from their low, animal level, and give them a new and higher character. As mere impulses they remain ever present with us, and are essential elements so long as we live in the world. But as impulses which reason discovers, comprehends in their nature and ends, and which the man takes up into his personality and controls and uses for their ends under the sense of duty, not for themselves, but to carry out the higher ends of our rational and moral constitution, they are so transformed that in their new character we cannot say that the brutes have them at all. They are moralized, which no endowments of the lower animals can ever be.[2]

[1] Butler, Sermon xi. Also Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (3d ed.), p. 54: "*Disinterested; that is, disregardful of foreseen balance of pleasure to ourselves.*"

[2] Caird's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 270–71.

SECT. 60. It is possible for these impulsive principles to overmaster those higher powers and bring them into their own service. Then the man is degraded. But they may be entirely controlled by the higher powers, and made subservient to their proper ends, with a view to attaining the ultimate end of our being, and doing our proper work in the world. Then they become sources of power and of proper enjoyment; they contribute to elevation, and add variety and richness to our life. These natural ends of our implanted principles are proper and necessary objects for our moral choice; it would be immoral to reject or disregard them. But they may blind or confuse the mind, and lead us away into error, unless we use calm thought and discretion in determining our course.

The desires of esteem, power, and superiority, and the affection of resentment are perhaps especially liable to mislead us when their ends are chosen; but they have their place, and must not be entirely suppressed and condemned, but only moderated and governed. The desire of knowledge and the benevolent affections are very likely to ennoble one who chooses their ends; but even these may, and often do, mislead. Many persons suppose that all virtue consists in the choice of the ends of the benevolent affections, — that is, in altruism; but the facts of human nature and of human life will not warrant this view.[1]

SECT. 61. While the appetites and desires are said to be egoistic, and the affections altruistic, it is to be noted that this is their primary and original tendency and character only. But the egoistic impulses may work out altruistic results, and the altruistic impulses may work out egoistic

[1] Butler, Essay on the Nature of Virtue; Analogy, part i. chapters ii. and iii.

results;[1] and this they in fact do respectively in a large degree. One part of our nature is not in conflict with another in its general natural tendencies and results, but conflict in tendency and in result comes only from error and perversion.[2] For example, the appetite of sex is markedly altruistic in its results. The desire of society and the desire of esteem are ultimately altruistic in a great degree. The desires of society and esteem, the appetite of sex, and the affections may unite as impulses to form a powerful force impelling a man towards other men. If the will chooses the same end, the man becomes strongly social and public-spirited, and he may do great direct good or harm in a public way to others.

There are other natural lines of relation among the various implanted principles. Thus the appetites of hunger and thirst, the desire of possession and the affection of resentment naturally unite to give an egoistic direction to action. The secondary desire of self-love is commonly so perverted as to enter strongly into this egoistic combination. In like manner all the proper secondary desires, ending as they do in means to farther ends, are likely to cause us to forget or misplace our natural ends, and thus to become intensely egoistic. But these impulses may unite in other than what seem at first sight natural lines. They may combine in very strange ways, so as to form fantastic characters. From these combinations also many secondary and compound passions arise, which are hard to interpret, and cannot be classified to any purpose, except in a general way.

Very much in character depends on how we train and discipline these impulses, — whether we hold them in proper subjection for our use as rational beings, and direct and

[1] Butler, Sermon i. [2] Butler, Sermon xi.

limit them to their proper ends, or whether we allow them to run wild, to bring down the higher powers into their service, and to enter into false and dangerous conspiracies with each other for their own low and carnal ends.

All these implanted impulses are essential elements of our moral nature, or rather of that nature which it is our task to moralize; but they are such gifts as demand circumspection and vigilance on our part as rational beings for their successful management. "I do not know any one inborn propensity which may not be moralized into good or turned into bad. Take the virtues or vices of any man, and we can see that the natural basis of any virtue might under certain conditions have been developed into a vice, and the basis of every vice into a virtue; for virtues and vices have common roots."[1] Every endowment we have must be moralized by our own action either for good or for evil.

[1] Bradley's Ethical Studies, p. 249.

CHAPTER VI.

THE SUSCEPTIBILITY.

SECTION 62. *The second part of the sensibility is the susceptibility to pleasure and pain.* This capacity of the soul is often called the feelings, and is commonly regarded as primarily and chiefly a passivity. But no state which is merely passive can be known in consciousness. Mere passivity is death; the living is ever active. But in those states which are included under the head of the susceptibility, or the feelings, the causation is viewed as originating without, and thence acting upon the sensitive being, who is in this point of view recipient of action. This sensitive being then reacts or responds to the impression, and thereby becomes apprehensive of its own state as helpful or quickening to life, or as depressing and checking the life and energy; that is to say, as agreeable or disagreeable. Feeling, therefore, is the sensitiveness of the soul in this reaction to impression, or it is the sensitive aspect of this reaction, or the consciousness of the kind of reaction which the soul makes to impression.

But not all impression is brought upon the soul literally from without; that is, from the body or through the body from the extra-corporeal world. All the soul's own activities, of whatever kind, make impression upon it, to which it

thus sensitively responds, and in which it is thus consciously affected in various ways. It is through these various states of being affected, or rather through the sensitive aspect of these various reactions on occasion of impression from without or within, that we come to consciousness and are conscious beings. It is by these sensitive reactions that a conscious being differs from a piece of mechanism. Matter and mechanism may react to action and impression, but they are not aware of it; that is, sensitive to it in any form. At a later period in development we come to self-consciousness by reflection; that is, by turning back our thought upon this acting and reacting being, and apprehending it objectively as permanent amid all its many changes of action and of state.

We may thus easily divide our feelings into two classes: (1) according as they are attendant on impression from without. In this case the soul is primarily passive, and only reactive on occasion of foreign action. This is the low region of passive satisfactions and dissatisfactions. (2) The second class of feelings are those attendant on impression from within; that is, on that self-activity to which the soul is consciously reactive. This latter class of feelings are higher, because they are more in the region of the spiritual; they speak a nobler, a self-active nature. The former class are a necessary basis and preparation for the latter. Development of conscious life begins there. The second class are also later in time, and in their full development they become the self-feelings; that is, the feelings of a self-conscious, purposing, acting being as such. They are attendant upon all our conscious action, supporting and stimulating it up to its healthful and proper degree, and thereafter tending to check and restrain it. They are the pleasures and pains

of doing our chosen work and using our chosen recreation in the whole course of our lives.

SECT. 63. *The passive feelings we can never dispense with;* they are essential to the regulation of our lives, however far we may advance in the line of intellectual and moral progress. Their relations to the feelings of the second class are in the emotive nature analogous to the relations which our implanted principles of action bear to our rational and voluntary principles. While we retain our powers in their normal and sane condition we never fall back under the control of the implanted principles; but we could not maintain life in a rational way, were not the implanted principles underneath us giving their effective though unobtrusive guidance to our rational action. So the pleasures and pains connected with our own activity must ever find a limit and a guide in those more passive ones attendant on outward impression.

There is a bodily feeling of pleasure and pain, and one which is psychical. The latter may be intellectual, moral, or æsthetic. We have besides feelings of pleasure and pain always connected with the action of the implanted principles. "Pleasure," says Aristotle, "is attendant upon every sense, and likewise upon every act of intellect and of contemplation." [1] This is the region of goods and evils.

The bodily pleasures and pains even the lowest men are conscious of, although the degree of susceptibility varies widely, depending on the natural or acquired fineness or coarseness of the fibre. These feelings are common to us with the brutes. They are called "sensations," and are states of being consciously affected in our bodies, as the result of

[1] Nicomachean Ethics, book x. chap. iv.

their own action or of their being acted on by outside causes.

The psychical feelings we are familiar with in remorse, regret, sorrow, joy, admiration, and the like. There is a bodily sensation in connection with each appetite, a psychical sensitiveness in the desires and affections. We are intellectually sensitive. Feeling is essential to knowing of every kind and degree, as knowing is essential to feeling. Feeling is the subjective or subjectifying side, and knowing is the objective or objectifying side, of one and the same state. It is the feeling connected with the knowing which makes the knowing our own; without the feeling we should be non-existent to ourselves. A conscious being is one that exists for itself, that is, to its own apprehension (*ein für-sich-seiendes Wesen*); and this we become through feeling. All the interest which the mind takes in its knowing is its sensitive reaction to the action of knowing. When the mind is cognizant of objects, it is responsive with feeling. We may illustrate by memory. When the mind wants some fact or thought of past knowledge which it cannot now recover, there is a pain in the want, which may last for a long time, the mind constantly recurring with an intellectual unhappiness to the subject. It is a keen pleasure to recover the truant fact. There is great delight in intellectual activity of every kind, and pain or dissatisfaction in intellectual sluggishness and inefficiency.

When we perceive beauty, ugliness, harmony, discord, propriety, or impropriety in art, life, nature, or conduct, we have an æsthetic pleasure or pain. We have the moral sensitiveness in approbation and disapprobation of our own conduct and that of others.

SECT. 64. *We cannot define pleasure and pain,* but can

only refer each one to his own consciousness for a knowledge of what they are. Hamilton says that "Pleasure is the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energy we are conscious; and pain is the reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power."[1] We may describe pleasure by calling it happiness, a state of agreeable feeling or emotion resulting from the sentient nature having its proper object; and pain is the opposite of pleasure. Bain says that "States of pleasure are connected with an increase, states of pain with an abatement, of some or all of the vital functions. . . . To stimulate or excite the nerves, with a due regard to their condition, is pleasurable; to pass this limit, painful."[2] Zeller says that "Everything in general gives us pleasure which preserves or heightens the life-feeling; everything gives us pain which checks and hinders it."[3] But these are in no respect definitions of pleasure and pain; they are only statements of their causes.

SECT. 65. *It is unnecessary to discuss the susceptibilities in detail,* since they are familiar to all, and they give rise to little difference of opinion. Language is moreover very defective on this subject, so that we have no distinct names for most of our feelings. We can only call them pleasures or pains of this or that part of the body or the soul. They may be in general classified as follows: —

[1] Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 577.
[2] Mind and Body, pp. 59 and 70.
[3] Ueber Begriff und Begründung der sittlichen Gesetze, p. 28.


The susceptibilities, apart from those in connection with the implanted principles of action, are
Physical; i. e., Sensations.
Agreeable; i. e., Pleasures.
Disagreeable; i. e., Pains.
Both are by words undistinguished except by naming the part affected, or by the names which medical science gives.
Psychical; i. e., Emotions.
Intellectual, which are undesignated by names except by the faculty concerned; e. g., the pleasures or pains of memory, etc.
Agreeable; i. e., Pleasures.
Disagreeable; i. e., Pains.
Moral.
Agreeable.
Approbation of ourselves.
Approbation of others.
Disagreeable.
Disapprobation of ourselves,
Shame,
Regret or sorrow,
Remorse.
Æsthetic.
Agreeable.
Sense of beauty and sublimity
in Nature.
in Art.
in Conduct.
Disagreeable.
Sense of ugliness and deformity
in Nature.
in Art.
in Conduct.

SECT. 66. *The susceptibilities are an essential condition of the moral nature* as we find it; because (1) without them we could never arrive at self-hood. "It is in feelings of pleasure and of pain that the ego is first conscious that all its individual states belong to it, and that its whole nature is affected; whatever proceeds from pleasure or pain appears to us as a reaction of our whole nature."[1] (2) Without the feelings we could not form the idea of good or happiness for ourselves or others, and all interested as well as all benevolent motives of action would be wanting, except so far as they were merely implanted

[1] Lotze, Microcosmus, translated by Miss Elizabeth Hamilton and Miss E. E. Constance Jones, vol. i. p. 688.

impulses. These motives could not then be moral, but only natural, or gifts of nature. (3) We could not without the feelings be subjects of law except in the sense in which the things and forces of the material world are. Moral law would be impossible. "To a man who was insensible to the prospect of pain or privations the law would speak in vain." [1] Rewards and punishments would be precluded, as they would appeal to nothing in us. We should then seek the end of our being, if at all, only as a physical force does, or in a purely dry, intellectual light; duty, if the thought could occur to the mind, would oblige us only from an intellectual perception of fitness, or rather, by the very supposition, nothing could persuade or oblige. Non-obedience to duty could be observed as a fact merely, not rejected as an evil. Such is not our nature and our world.

SECT. 67. *It is in connection with the susceptibilities that self-love or the desire of happiness arises* (Sect. 39). Self-love is not an affection, as the name would seem to indicate, but a desire. It is not a primary desire, as we prefer to use the term "desire," because it does not go out towards an external object in which it rests, but it seeks an internal object; namely, a state of the sensibility. Nor is it a proper secondary desire (as has been shown); that is, the desire of a means for gaining the end of an original desire. It is rather a desire in the sense first mentioned in Sect. 29; namely, "The outgoing of the soul towards any object which seems likely to give pleasure." It is a general desire for a certain state of the sensibility, or for the gaining of the ends which our nature and relations suggest as containing our good. We use the word "sensibility" here in

[1] Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. p. 261; also p. 144.

the widest possible meaning, remembering that our nature is sensitive throughout all its elements, — body and soul, intellect, impulsive principles, and will. It is the desire of self-preservation and self-furtherance.

Self-love can arise only after experience of sensitive gratification, and it is the result of memory of that experience, and reflection upon it. We cannot, therefore, properly speak of "instinctive self-love," as many have done, except in the sense that it is natural that self-love should arise in a rational being constituted as we are. Brutes may have an instinctive principle which answers for self-preservation; but that is not the self-love of which we are here speaking. Self-love is what has been properly called a *rational* principle of action, as contrasted with the implanted or impulsive principles. This rational character of the principle makes it plain that the implanted principles and conscience cannot be resolved into self-love, since this is a late and complex principle, while they are early and simple, and are essential conditions of the rise of self-love, and also of the attainment of its object; namely, of pleasure, gratification, satisfaction, or happiness. "Happiness consists in the gratification of certain affections, appetites, passions, with objects which are by nature adapted to them. Self-love may indeed set us on work to gratify these; but happiness or enjoyment has no immediate connection with self-love, but arises from such gratification alone." [1] "As has often been pointed out, if there were not desires for particular objects other than the desire for happiness, there could be no such thing as the desire for happiness, for there would be nothing to constitute the happiness desired." [2]

[1] Butler, Sermon xi.

[2] Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 132.

SECT. 68. It is evident that *this desire of pleasure, of happiness, or of good, may be of various grades;* that is to say, we may seek our pleasure, happiness, or good in any of the various ends or objects to which our nature is fitted and spontaneously goes out. We have seen that the implanted principles are spontaneous outgoings of our nature towards various objects in which it rests. When these objects are obtained, a satisfaction or pleasure is experienced; and the object may be deliberately sought again for the sake of the pleasure. If one seeks his pleasure chiefly in the appetites, such action is degrading, corrupting, and destructive to the whole nature. If pleasure be sought chiefly in any one of the minor ends of our nature, in anything below the supreme and comprehensive end of our being as one whole rational and moral, evil, error, and failure are sure to follow at the last. We inevitably "decline on a range of lower feelings" and lower living than our constitution appoints for us.

And we must now add that pleasure cannot in any form be made the primary, conscious, and chosen end of the action and work of life without taking the nerve and force out of the action itself and turning our whole being towards that which is inherently false and delusive. Pleasure or gratification, as we have seen, is merely an attendant or resultant of action which is directed towards some positive, real, and objective end. Purposely to seek and pursue that which can only come to us as an attendant or by-result of some direct pursuit must be vain and injurious; it cannot be long continued without filling the soul with *ennui* and making the whole life vapid. The proper and real happiness of life can only be gained by doing wisely and well the duties of life towards all those with whom we are in any way

related, for their sakes and because these duties have been wisely appointed for us.

This desire of pleasure in its lower and more obvious grades, especially that of the appetites and implanted desires, may become so strong as to bring the whole man into subjection to it. All action is then calculated with reference to present pleasure alone, and of this more sensuous kind. Such self-love or desire for pleasure, takes a narrow view of our own good; it excludes and contradicts the good of others; it becomes selfishness, and is always folly. This always implies a contraction and perversion of our nature, as well as a disregard of and trampling on the rights of others. Such self-love is always vicious.

That self-love which seeks what is good for one's self on the whole and during his entire existence, which regards chiefly the highest part of the nature as social, rational, and moral, is proper and noble as a guiding principle, though not to be held before us as the motive of action and end of pursuit. Such a self-lover does not reject the pleasure or good of the appetites and desires, but simply keeps it in its due subordination with reference to the ends of these implanted principles, and goes on rationally and wisely to seek these ends. That lower good is proper and even necessary to our life in the world. This kind of self-love can never contradict or exclude the good of others, but must contribute to it; because in that kind of rationally governed life all the altruistic principles will have their proper place and force in suggesting ends and furnishing guidance, as well as the egoistic or self-regarding principles. This high self-love is simply a provision for self-care, which is as necessary for the good of others as for our own good. This is evidently a bounden duty, and the attainment of this degree of good

is a necessary basis for all other duties. It must harmonize with the dictates of conscience and with the rational pursuit of the true end of life. This is the meaning of Aristotle when he says that "the good man must necessarily be a lover of himself." [1]

SECT. 69. *The susceptibilities should be regarded and cultivated,* in order that life may be filled with its natural and proper enjoyment. There is no reason to think that Heaven looks with an envious eye upon the enjoyment of any sensitive creature. The feelings of every kind may be refined and elevated, and their range may be enlarged by education. Enjoyment is as natural and as proper as action; it is the inevitable attendant upon proper and healthy action; it is necessary to prolonged and steady action. Upon it depends the rebound of our stretched energies, the recuperation of our exhausted powers; it is the perpetual nutrition and reinforcement of our powers. In the words of Aristotle, "Pleasure perfects the energies and the life also which men desire. It is with reason therefore that they also desire pleasure; for it makes life, which is eligible, perfect for each one." [2]

But the office of pain is no less important in the economy of our nature. Pain balances pleasure, and protects our life by bringing to our notice the fact that action is diseased or abnormal or overstrained, and so warning us to desist before we suffer fatal harm; by prompting to action often in cases where inaction would bring calamity upon us; and by driving us from harmful situations and exposures. When the power of enjoyment is gone, action wanes, and we are in danger. Painful action is feeble, and increasingly so, until through

[1] Nicomachean Ethics, book ix. chap. viii.
[2] Ibid., book x. chap. iv.

wise foresight or exhaustion, rest is enforced. We have shown how pain is a condition of moral law (Sect. 66). It also teaches the lesson of pity and helpfulness towards the poor and suffering. It binds men together generally in all the sweet charities of life, by bringing to us the sense of a common lot of weakness and frailty. It is thus indirectly the source of many of the highest and purest pleasures of life, through its refining and softening effect on character and by opening the soul to every good and elevating influence.

CHAPTER VII.

THE MORAL SENSE, OR MORAL SENSIBILITY: ITS NATURE AND REALITY.

SECTION 70. We have now considered the first two elements of the sensibility; namely, (1) The implanted principles of action, which come into exercise prior to thought and volition, and go out towards external objects in which they rest. We have treated these as forming three groups: (*a*) The Appetites, which are tendencies towards things necessary for bodily life and continuance. These are evidently fundamental; that end must be accomplished before anything higher can be attained. (*b*) The Desires, which are tendencies towards mental activity and development. (*c*) The Affections, which are tendencies towards other sensitive beings as necessary to social life and well-being. (2) The second element of the sensibility we have called the susceptibility or the feelings, which is our capacity for experiencing pleasure and pain. We have regarded these two elements in all their various aspects as simple and original gifts, and have shown in outline their place and office in the moral constitution.

There remains a third element in the sensibility, which we may call the moral sense, or moral sensibility, or conscience. The term "conscience" in its etymology seems to

refer to a faculty or activity of the intellect rather than of the sensibility. But we are to bear in mind that all emotion and all feeling involves knowing, and is impossible and inconceivable without knowing. We only consider apart elements which confessedly cannot exist apart; and we must not allow psychology to fall under bondage to the etymology of popular names. There is a knowing in the moral sensibility, as there is also a sensibility in all knowing.

This moral sense, or moral sensibility, or conscience, is *the sense of duty* or *obligation, — the feeling that I ought; I must; something is due from me; I am bound to something; I am under law; I may not follow caprice, but am under an authority which I must reverence and obey.* "Conscience is a continual inward voice to us, telling us that we are not free."[1]

SECT. 71. *This moral sense is nearly allied to the implanted principles of action,* and also to the susceptibilities. Like the former, it is a spontaneous tendency to action; like the latter, it is a feeling of pleasure and pain. It cannot be classed with the former because —

(1) It does not, like them, go out towards external objects and rest in them; its sphere of action is wholly within; it has reference to the choices and intentions of the mind, and aims to bring these into conformity with the law of duty.

(2) It is later than the implanted principles in coming into action. More development of intellect is necessary, and some experience in the susceptibilities.

(3) Hence it is not, like them, a blind, unreasoning impulse at first, but the impulse of a being of a developed intelligence. It has an intellectual counterpart in the *a priori* idea of duty, which we find, on analysis of our moral knowl-

[1] Grote, Moral Ideals, p. 175.

edge, to be the ever-present assumption in conduct and in the explanation of conduct.

This impulse and feeling of obligation in the sensibility combine with the intuitive idea of duty in the intellect to form the ethical element in the human soul. In the order of time the moral sensibility comes to our consciousness prior to the conception of duty, and practically it is the active and efficient element in all that is ever called conscience. But, as is true in regard to all the other elements of the sensibility, if it were not planted in an active intellectual nature, with its firm basis of rational principles, it would be of as little importance as the desires or affections are in the souls of brutes; it could never of itself lift us into the moral world in which we now live.

(4) It demands in its very nature a higher place than the implanted principles. These principles, which spontaneously move us and move us towards necessary ends, have also a kind of binding power. They give a kind of law to us; but they do not claim the control of the whole man and the whole life. They are in the lower part of the nature, and are not the peculiar and distinguishing elements of the man as such. Their office is not to govern, but rather to inform the man of his needs, and crave his attention to them for his benefit, not for their own. If they gain the control, it is an acknowledged usurpation and a degradation of the nature. "As in civil government the constitution is broken in upon and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority, so the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme over all." [1]

[1] Butler, Sermon iii., on Human Nature. See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book ix. chap. viii.

The moral sense, or conscience, utters itself as a supreme law, which will not be silenced by any clamor of strong impulses, but insists on authority over all else in the soul, — authority over the man, over his entire life and conduct.

In its very idea the ethical implies a law, a rule, and an end. The moral sense, therefore, will be found, or will be of real significance, only where there is intellect enough to discern, appreciate, and consciously obey or reject these.

SECT. 72. *It is not to be regarded as strange that there should be an innate or implanted moral sense*, a combined impulse and feeling of duty, in the soul, acting in its special sphere and to its special end. This is in perfect harmony with all else that we know about the soul in all its manifestations. Its powers are implanted; they all act spontaneously at first according to innate laws, and for ends not yet considered and chosen. If there is ever to be an apprehension of duty as the ever-present law of the whole being and the whole life, it must be planted deep down in the constitution, and must be a native, self-active, urgent principle.

This is that ethical element, the binding sense and idea of which holds steadily together in a moral unity or personality all the various powers, impulses, and activities of the soul. It is under this law that the will takes them in hand and directs them to the ends which the intellect discovers to be their proper and designed ends (Sect. 5). This moral sense is no doubt first brought out to consciousness by social causes, as the command or prohibition, the express or implied wish or will, of parents or associates. But this fact does not make it any the less an original gift. All our powers are brought into activity and into consciousness by means of the facts and relations of real life.

As the term "conscience" is here used as synonymous with

"moral sense," it is both an active and a passive feeling, — a spontaneous impulse to action in view of the capacities and relations of ourselves and other sensitive beings, and a peculiar feeling of pleasure and pain. The word is often used in other senses, especially in those suggested by its etymology; as (1) the judgment of what is right and wrong. Thus Dr. Robert South says: "'Conscience' is a Latin word, and according to the very notation of it, imports a double or joint knowledge; to wit, one of a divine law or rule, and the other of a man's own action; and so is properly the application of a general law to a particular instance of practice."[1] Locke says that "Conscience is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our actions."[2] Wolff says that "Conscience is the judgment of our actions, whether they are good or bad."

(2) The word "conscience" is used to signify the complete set of moral principles which one forms or accepts from others; that is, one's moral code. Thus Dr. Charles Hodge says: "Our moral judgments, or, in other words, the conscience, has an authority from which we cannot emancipate ourselves."[3] "Conscience, in the popular and theological sense, is simply the aggregate of governing ideas, and the precepts founded on them, with which the mind is furnished by tradition and education."[4]

(3) The word "conscience" is used to signify the power of judging or deciding what is right and wrong; that is, to signify the mind acting morally. "The moral judgments

[1] Sermon xxiv., On the Nature and Measures of Conscience.
[2] Essay concerning Human Understanding, book i. chap. iii. sect. 8.
[3] Systematic Theology, i. 238.
[4] Scotus Novanticus, Ethica, p. 148.

taken together are referred to a power called conscience." [1] "The conscience is nothing else than the mind directed to a particular class of objects, to voluntary acts." [2] "Conscience is the reason as that discovers to us absolute moral truth, having the authority of sovereign moral law. . . . In discovering to us truth, having the authority of moral law, it is seen to be a cognitive or intellectual power." [3] Bishop Sanderson says that "Conscience is a faculty or habit of the practical intellect by which the mind of man doth, by discourse of reason, apply the light which is in it to its own particular moral acts." [4]

SECT. 73. *The moral feeling is peculiar in kind;* and it is also the highest and most refined of all our feelings. It cannot be confounded with the sensations which have their seat in the body, although it is sometimes as impressive and overmastering as these. It is clearly distinct from the intellectual and æsthetic emotions, although it is often illustrated by the æsthetical. It is even said that "Virtue is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind that are of a moral nature;" and we freely speak of moral beauty, moral sublimity, and moral deformity or ugliness. An æsthetic conscience is sometimes spoken of, meaning an acquired moral taste. But however close the analogy may be between the ethical and the æsthetical feelings, moral approbation and disapprobation, shame and remorse, however much they may be misnamed, cannot be inwardly mistaken for any other feelings. The moral feeling may be misdirected; it may be mixed up with various other

[1] Professor John Dewey, Psychology, p. 344.
[2] McCosh, The Motive Powers, p. 211.
[3] Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, p. 77.
[4] De Obligatione Conscientiæ, prælectio prima, sect. xiii.

feelings and with personal sympathies; we may approve and disapprove the wrong things and on wrong grounds: but the moral, whenever it is disentangled, is ever moral, and cannot fail to be recognized as such. Language abounds in terms especially formed to express it.

It is plain that intellectual action must precede the feeling. We must know the capacities and relations of some sensitive being before the feeling, the impulse, or the thought, of duty towards it can come out to consciousness. But this kind of knowledge is not psychologically peculiar, it is peculiar only in its objects; while the feeling, as a psychological experience, is different from all other feelings in kind. This impulse to action also differs from all other impulses. It is like others in springing up spontaneously on occasion of the knowledge and the feeling, but unlike them in that it is not periodic nor variable, but is a permanent and fixed spring of action. It is the impulse of duty and obligation. It presses directly on the man as willing and choosing, or as rationally directing his own action. It urges him as a rational being with the sense that he ought, or restrains him with the sense that he ought not. It cannot be confounded with the implanted appetites, desires, or affections, nor with the rational motive of self-love, although it may urge us to the end which any one of these indicates, or may restrain us from pursuing it. It is an important fact that it is an original, natural, and ever-present impulse of a rational being as such, different from all other impulses as a psychological experience. The sense and impulse that I ought, I ought not, cannot be analyzed into anything else nor derived from anything else. It is a simple principle, the peculiar, central, and essential element in all that is ever called conscience. But as human nature is very complex,

and the circumstances in which we are placed are always full of varying suggestion, the sense of duty will always act amid a multitude of other impulses and objective motives, and it may be hard wholly to disentangle it so as to be quite sure in any case that the pure sense of duty is our guide.

SECT. 74. "*Conscience*," *as the term is here employed, cannot be logically defined;* we cannot convey the meaning of it to one who has never had the conscious experience of the feeling. The same may be said of the terms "ought," "right," "duty." "The notion is too elementary to admit of any formal definition. It can only be made clearer by determining its relation to other notions with which it is connected in ordinary thought, especially to those with which it is liable to be confounded."[1] We must refer each one to his own consciousness. Every one feels that he ought and ought not, that he has duties, that himself and all other men have rights. People may differ as to what in particular they ought to do and leave undone. They may differ as to their own rights and those of others. The diversity of moral judgments in minor particulars has ever been very great. But all agree practically that there are such things as rights and duties, whatever their origin and explanation may be. If only thus much be admitted, it follows that morality is real and universal.[2]

SECT. 75. *The opinions which have been held concerning the nature of conscience* are many, but they may be substantially reduced to two general classes: —

I. The so-called Intellectual Theory, — that conscience is a part, or a function, of the intellect.

[1] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (3d ed.), p. 33.

[2] See The Discourses of Epictetus, book i. chap. xxii., translation of T. W. Higginson.

II. The so-called Sentimental Theory, — that it is a part, or a function, of the sensibility. The theory above set forth evidently belongs to the second class.

The question is, What is the origin of morality? From what power or faculty of the soul in particular does it arise? What faculty or function takes the precedence in creating in the soul, and in bringing into the individual and social life, that element which we call the ethical? In raising this question, it is not, of course, denied that the soul is one and indivisible, nor that the whole soul is ethical, and the whole life also. But since we analyze and speak of faculties, or powers, or functions, of the soul, and cannot avoid doing so if we study psychology at all, we may properly ask, What is that last simplest element in the analysis which gives the ethical color and strength to this indivisible whole? Is it found in the intellect, in the sensibility, or in the will?

We speak of ideas, notions, conceptions, of morality, and of moral judgments and moral perceptions. These words themselves seem to settle the question beforehand; for they evidently stand for products of the intellect. But if this argument proves anything, it proves too much. It would equally prove that the soul was all intellect; since all the words we employ to signify our psychical acts and products are general terms, the products of thought. All language is an intellectual product, but not all the things which language designates are intellectual things.

Stewart puts the question in these words: "By what principle of our constitution are we led to form the notions of moral distinctions, — whether by that faculty which perceives the distinction betwen truth and falsehood in the other branches of human knowledge, or by a peculiar power of

perception (called by some the moral sense) which is pleased with one set of qualities, and displeased with another? "[1]

We prefer to put the question in another form; namely: Whence does the intellect derive this particular class of notions? What particular activities of the soul suggest them? Or in other words (since all abstracts and generals are formed by the mind from concretes), what are the concrete realities which are generalized into notions and signified by these terms?

Those who hold the first theory, it would seem, should say that "they are particular intellectual perceptions or cognitions of virtue and vice as objective and real things, or as qualities of concrete acts or of concrete beings. Abstraction and generalization follow, and the notions are formed. The whole activity of the soul in regard to morality is primarily an intellectual activity." It is not necessary, however, that the theory should take this shape.

Those who hold thus to the intellectual character of the moral faculty are divided into two classes according as they teach (1) that morality is a product of the intuitive intellect, or that conscience is an intuitive power of knowing moral things; or (2) that our ideas of right and wrong are not intuitions, but products of the discursive intellect, — that is, that we do not immediately perceive right and wrong *a priori*, but we find out by experience, by a process of reasoning, or by the association of ideas, that there is a right and a wrong, and what they are.

[1] Active and Moral Powers of Man, book ii. chap. iii.

CHAPTER VIII.

THEORIES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE.

I. *The Intellectual Theory.*

SECTION 76. Of those who hold the intellectual theory concerning the nature of conscience the most prominent names in the history of ethical discussion are Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), Samuel Clarke (1673–1729), Richard Price (1723–1791), Thomas Reid (1710–1795), and Dugald Stewart (1753–1828).

Cudworth distinctly rejects the sentimental theory, and maintains that the things of morality are not comprehended by a sense or feeling, but by an active energy of the intellect. They are *νοήματα*, pure conceptions of the mind, intelligible ideas, universal notions, exerted from the mind itself. He classes the moral ideas of good and evil, justice, equity, duty, obligation, with those of cause and effect, equality and triangularity, truth and falsity, and says that they are intelligible ideas or essences of things, and the forms by which we understand all things. They are not figments of the mind, but have an absolute, eternal, and immutable nature of their own. "They had a being before the material world and all particular intellects were created. . . . They are objective notions or knowledges, which are things which cannot exist alone, but together with that actual knowledge in which they are comprehended they are the modifications of some mind or

intellect," that is, of the Divine Mind, "who always actually comprehendeth himself, the essences of all things and their verities; or rather, which is the rationes, essences, and verities of all things. All particular created intellects are but derivative participations of the divine intellect, that are printed by it with the same ectypal signatures upon them." Thus our superior power of knowledge "reaches to the comprehension of that which really and absolutely is, whose objects are the eternal and immutable essences and natures of things and their unchangeable relations to one another." It is these, and not things existing without the mind, which are the immediate objects of knowledge. He accepts the saying of Plato that "mind and intellect, art and law, ethics and morality, are first in order of nature, and therefore more real and substantial things." Morality is eternal and immutable because these moral ideas have an eternal and necessary existence, — certain determinate and immutable natures of their own independent of the mind, — and are not arbitrarily formed by the mind.[1]

This is a purely intellectual theory of conscience.

SECT. 77. *Dr. Samuel Clarke* maintains that there are "eternal relations of things which involve a consequent eternal fitness or unfitness in the application of one to another; with a regard to which the will of God always chooses, and which ought likewise to determine the wills of all subordinate rational creatures. These eternal differences make it fit and reasonable for the creatures so to act; they cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation on them, so to do, separate from the will of God, and antecedent to any prospect of advantage or reward."[2]

[1] Treatise on Immutable Morality.

[2] Sir James Mackintosh, Progress of Ethical Philosophy, etc., p. 80.

"Originally and in reality, 't is as *natural* and (morally speaking) necessary, that the will should be determined in every action by the reason of the thing, and the right of the case; as 't is natural and (absolutely speaking) necessary, that the understanding should submit to a demonstrated truth. And 't is as absurd to mistake negligently plain right and wrong, that is, to understand the proportions of things in morality to be what they are not; or wilfully to act contrary to known justice and equity, that is, to will things to be what they are not and cannot be; as it would be absurd and ridiculous for a man in arithmetical matters, ignorantly to believe that twice two is not equal to four; or wilfully and obstinately to contend, against his own clear knowledge, that the whole is not equal to all its parts. . . . He that wilfully refuses to honor and obey God, from whom he received his being, and to whom he continually owes his preservation, is really guilty of an equal absurdity and inconsistency in practice, as he that in speculation denies the effect to owe anything to its cause, or the whole to be bigger than its part. He that refuses to deal with all men equitably, and with every man as he desires they should deal with him, is guilty of the very same unreasonableness and contradiction in one case, as he that in another case should affirm one number or quantity to be equal to another, and yet that other at the same time not to be equal to the first." [1]

Conscience, according to this view, is the same faculty which deals with all mathematical and metaphysical axioms or first truths.

SECT. 78. *Richard Price* held that moral ideas are of the same rank with those of causation, substance, time, space, equality, and are perceptions of the intuitive understanding.

[1] Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, prop. i.

He admits that "some impressions of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or disgust, generally attend our perceptions of virtue and vice. But these are merely their effects and concomitants, and not the perceptions themselves, which ought no more to be confounded with them than a particular truth (like that for which Pythagoras offered a hecatomb) ought to be confounded with the pleasure that may attend the discovery of it."[1] All our moral ideas "are derived from our intuition of truth, or the discernment of the natures of things by the understanding. . . . Right and wrong denote what we understand and know concerning certain objects, in like manner with proportion and disproportion, connection and repugnancy, contingency and necessity, and the other ideas before mentioned. I will add that nothing has been offered which has any tendency to prove the contrary. . . . As there are some ends whose natures are such that when perceived, all beings immediately and necessarily desire them, so it is very credible that, in like manner, there are some actions whose natures are such that when observed, all rational beings immediately and necessarily approve them."

SECT. 79. *Dr. Thomas Reid seems to aim more at a sort of middle ground.* He freely accepts from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson the phrase "moral sense" as a name for conscience. He likens it to the external senses, and its products to "judgments of the senses." But he says "that by an original power of the mind, which we call conscience, or the moral faculty, we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation, and our other moral conceptions; and that by the same faculty we perceive some things in human conduct

[1] Review of the Principal Questions of Morals, chap. i., specially sect. 3.

to be right, and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty; and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates as upon the determinations of our senses or of our other natural faculties. . . . Moral sense is the power of judging in morals."

Reid concedes that "our moral judgments are not like those we form in speculative matters, dry and unaffecting, but from their nature are necessarily accompanied with affections and feelings. . . . We approve of good actions and disapprove of bad; and this approbation and disapprobation, when we analyze it, appears to include not only a moral judgment of the action, but some affection, favorable or unfavorable, towards the agent, and some feeling in ourselves." But "the feeling is the consequence of the judgment, and is regulated by it."

Reid concludes, on the whole, "that the moral faculty or conscience is both an active and an intellectual power of the mind." But if it is an active principle, how does it act? It would seem that it must be with a special urging power, as "passion or appetite may urge to what we know to be wrong." But after all that may be said, conscience is primarily an intellectual power, "furnishing the human mind with many of its original conceptions or ideas, as well as with the first principles of many important branches of human knowledge. . . . These first principles of morals are not deductions. They are self-evident; and their truth, like that of other axioms, is perceived without reasoning or deduction."

Sir William Hamilton says of Reid's theory of the conscience: "This theory is virtually the same as that which founds morality on intelligence. The Practical Reason of Kant is not essentially different from the Moral Sense, the

Moral Faculty, of Reid and Stewart." But it is evident that while Reid clung to the intellectual theory, he felt strongly the influence of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, and felt compelled to give at least a secondary and not unimportant place to the emotional element as a part of conscience.[1]

SECT. 80. *Dugald Stewart followed Cudworth and Price* in making moral ideas the product of "our rational and intellectual nature," and in placing them in the same rank with the ideas of causation and equality. They are simple intuitive ideas, "of which no analysis can be given, and of which the origin must therefore be referred to reason. . . . The opinion we form, however, on this point is of little moment, provided it be granted that the words 'right' and 'wrong' express qualities of actions. When I say of an act of justice that it is right, do I mean merely that the act excites pleasure in my mind, as a particular color pleases my eye, in consequence of a relation it bears to my organ; or do I mean to assert a truth which is as independent of my constitution as the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles? Scepticism may be indulged in both cases, about mathematical and about moral truth; but in neither case does it admit of refutation by argument. . . .

"For my own part, I can as easily conceive of a rational being so formed as to believe the three angles of a triangle to be equal to one right angle, as to believe that, if he had it in his power, it would be right to sacrifice the happiness of other men to the gratification of his own animal appetites, or that there would be no injustice in depriving an industrious old man of the fruits of his own laborious acquisitions.

[1] Reid's Essays on the Active Powers, especially essay iii. part iii. chapters v. vi. vii. viii., and essay v. chap. vii.

The exercise of our reason in the two cases is very different; but in both cases we have a perception of truth, and are impressed with an irresistible conviction that the truth is immutable, and independent of the will of any being whatever." [1]

But Stewart, like Reid, and through the influence of the same authors, admits that "our moral perceptions and emotions are, in fact, the result of different principles combined together. They involve a judgment of the understanding, and they involve also a feeling of the heart; and it is only by attending to both that we can form a just notion of our moral constitution."

The fact that Price, Reid, and Stewart concede that feeling or emotion is present in our moral states, and forms a more or less important element in them, does not avail to remove them from the class of those who hold the theory of the intellectual character of the moral faculty. They consider the feeling as a secondary and subordinate element, which they had been forced by the progress of ethical discussion to concede the presence of. But with them the primary and principal thing is the element of intuitive knowledge.

SECT. 81. *There is another class of philosophers, who hold that the moral faculty belongs to the intellectual side of our nature,* but who refer it, not to the intuitive, but to the discursive intellect. "It is not by any agreement between actions and certain ideas in our mind that we pronounce them to be right or wrong, but by observing whether they are followed by consequences which are beneficial or hurtful. Such is the process in our moral determinations,

[1] Stewart, Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, book ii. chapters ii. and iii.

according to those philosophers who hold that utility is the foundation of virtue." Those acts are called wrong which are found by observation and experience to be harmful, while those are called right which are found to be useful, or which tend to happiness. Afterwards the ideas of rightness and wrongness are formed by abstraction and generalization. Feelings arise subsequently conformable to the character which experience gives to the actions, and become indissolubly associated with the actions.

The most distinguished names in this class are those of Bentham (1748–1832), Paley (1743–1805), James Mill (1773–1836), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), and John Austin (1790–1859). Those who hold thoroughly to the *a posteriori* scheme of philosophy seem naturally, if not necessarily, to accept this second form of the intellectual theory of the moral faculty; while those who hold the first form of it must belong to the school of the *a priori* philosophy.

CHAPTER IX.

THEORIES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE.

II. *The Sentimental Theory.*

SECTION 82. *The second general theory* which has been held concerning the nature of conscience or the moral faculty is that it is a part or a function of the sensibility. Those who hold this theory give the prominence or precedence in all that is called conscience to an original implanted ethical sensitiveness and an ethical impulsiveness. It is not claimed that this is of such a nature that it could exist or operate in an unintellectual being, or prior to the development of intellect, or apart from intellect, in man, but only that intellect as such does not originate or give us the ethical. It claims that the soul is ethically sensitive and active by an original endowment; that this element, if we may so express it, is deeper, larger, and more pervasive than the knowing power, which acts under its influence as a spontaneous principle. The ethical is to the cognitive element as the atmosphere is to the earth, it surrounds and pervades it, and goes with it in all its revolutions and movements of every kind.

The most prominent names among those who maintain this so-called sentimental theory are Lord Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Francis Hutcheson (1694–1747), David Hume (1711–1776), and Dr. Thomas Brown (1778–1820).

SECT. 83. *Shaftesbury speaks of "a liking or dislike of moral actions, and consequently a sense of right and wrong,* —. . . a natural and moral affection which relates to right and wrong." This sense is like the sense of beauty and harmony. "Is there then a natural beauty of figures, and is there not as natural a one of actions? No sooner the eye opens upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt), than straight an inward eye distinguishes and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable and admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, or the despicable."[1]

"It is impossible to conceive that a rational creature coming first to be tried by rational objects, and receiving into his mind the images or representations of justice, generosity, gratitude, or other virtue, should have no liking of these or dislike of their contraries, but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A soul indeed may as well be without sense as without admiration in the things of which it has any knowledge. Coming therefore to a capacity of seeing and admiring in this new way, it must needs find a beauty and a deformity as well in actions, minds, and tempers, as in figures, sounds, or colors. . . .

"Sense of right and wrong therefore being as natural to us as natural affection itself, and being a first principle in our constitution and make, there is no speculative opinion, persuasion, or belief which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it. . . . And this affection

[1] The Moralists, part iii. sect. 2.

being an original one of earliest rise in the soul or affectionate part, nothing beside contrary affection, by frequent check or control, can operate upon it so as either to diminish it in part, or destroy it in the whole."[1]

"The mind which is spectator or auditor of other minds cannot be without its eye and ear . . . so as to scan each sentiment and thought which comes before it. It feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and disagreeable, in the affections; and finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any musical numbers, or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things."[2]

SECT. 84. *Hutcheson doubtless takes his main view from Shaftesbury and develops it into the full theory of the moral sense.* He distinctly refutes the intellectual theory as set forth by Cudworth and Clarke, and defines with clearness what he means by the moral sense. He shows also how he came to fix upon the name "moral sense." "In reflecting on our external senses," he says, "we plainly see that our perceptions of pleasure and pain do not depend directly on our will. Objects do not please us according as we incline they should. The presence of some objects necessarily pleases us, and the presence of others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we by our will any otherwise procure pleasure or avoid pain than by procuring the former kind of objects and avoiding the latter. By the very frame of our nature the one is made the occasion of delight, and the other of dissatisfaction." In like manner "we find ourselves pleased with a regular form, a piece of architecture or painting, a composition of notes, a theorem, an action, an affection, a

[1] Inquiry concerning Virtue, book i. part iii. sect. 1.

[2] Ibid., part ii. sect. 3.

character. And we are conscious that this pleasure necessarily arises from the contemplation of the idea which is then present to our minds with all its circumstances; although some of these ideas have nothing of what we commonly call sensible perception in them, and in those which have, the pleasure arises from some uniformity, order, arrangement, imitation, and not from the simple ideas of color, or sound, or mode of extension, separately considered. . . .

"These determinations to be pleased with certain complex forms, the author chooses to call senses; distinguishing them from the powers which commonly go by that name, by calling our power of perceiving the beauty of regularity, order, harmony, an internal sense; and that determination to approve affections, actions, or characters, of rational agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the name of a moral sense."[1]

"We must certainly have other perceptions of moral actions than those of advantage; and that power of receiving these perceptions may be called a moral sense, since the definition agrees to it; namely, *a determination of the mind to receive any idea from the presence of an object which occurs to us independent on our will,* — . . . a constant, settled determination in the soul itself, as much as our powers of judging and reasoning." In another passage he asks: "Whence our love, compassion, indignation, hatred towards even feigned characters in the most distant ages and nations, according as they appear kind, faithful, compassionate, or of the opposite dispositions towards their imaginary contemporaries, if there is no moral sense which makes

[1] Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, preface, pp. xii and xiii.

benevolent actions appear beautiful, if all approbation be from the interest of the approver?" [1]

It is plain from these passages that Hutcheson means by the moral sense *a moral sensitiveness implanted in the soul*, by which it spontaneously answers and reacts ethically in the presence of moral characters and actions. By this ethical reaction of the ethical being, the characters and actions observed are known to be ethical, and become ethical to us. In other words, the moral sense is *the ethical sensitiveness and responsiveness of the ethical being to the ethical.* This sense or sensitiveness is like what we have called the implanted principles of action. It is not a rule of action, and does not give a rule; "yet by reflecting upon it our understanding may find out a rule. But what rule of actions can be formed without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain." [2] This moral sense is capable of culture and improvement, like the sense of beauty and harmony, and like the reason itself.

But Hutcheson does not overlook the office of reason in morals, or depreciate its value. He says: "No part of that reasoning which was ever used by moralists is superseded by supposing a moral sense. And yet without a moral sense there is no explication can be given of our ideas of morality, nor of that reasonableness supposed antecedent to all instincts, affections, or sense." [3]

SECT. 85. *Hume's general view scarcely differs from that of Hutcheson*, if we confine our attention strictly to the one

[1] Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 1. See also System of Moral Philosophy, book i., chap. iv., sections 4 and 5.

[2] Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, sect. iv., end. [3] Ibid.

point now in consideration. We shall state it chiefly in his own words, and mainly from his earlier work.

"Since morals have an influence on the actions and affections," he says, "it follows that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of reason." It makes no difference on what subject reason is employed, it is inactive, and "an active principle can never be founded on an inactive."

"Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. . . . It is impossible that passions, volitions, and actions can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. . . . Actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it. . . . As reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving it, it cannot be the source of moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence. . . . Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, and can never oppose passion in the direction of the will. . . . It is evident that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. . . . Reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: either when it excites a passion, by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connection of causes and effects, so as to afford us the means of exerting any passion. . . .

"Since virtue and vice are not discoverable merely by reason or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion that we are

able to mark the difference between them. . . . Of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us? Here we cannot remain long in suspense, but must pronounce the impression arising from virtue to be agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy. . . . An action or sentiment or character is virtuous or vicious. Why? Because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. . . . To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character." He recognizes that there are many kinds of pleasure and uneasiness arising in view of the things which pass before us, but he says that the ethical is of a particular kind. Under the influence of passion it may be confounded with others; "but this hinders not but that the sentiments are in themselves distinct, and a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself from these illusions."

Reason makes known the facts and circumstances of the case; it takes cognizance of that which is the ground or occasion of the ethical response of the soul. But "the final sentence of approbation or censure depends upon some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal to the whole species. . . . It is the work of the heart, and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment."[1]

SECT. 86. *Dr. Thomas Brown enters into a criticism of the name "moral sense"* as employed by Hutcheson, and of the errors and misconceptions which he imagines it to involve; but himself adopts the same doctrine of the nature of conscience in other words.

[1] Treatise of Human Nature, book iii. part i.; Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, sect. 1, and appendix i.

"All our moral sentiments of obligation, virtue, merit, are in themselves nothing more than one simple feeling, variously referred to actions as future, present, or past. With the loss of the susceptibility of this one peculiar species of emotion, all practical morality would instantly cease; for if the contemplation of actions excited in us no feeling of approval, no foresight that by omitting to perform them we should regard ourselves, and others would regard us, with abhorrence or contempt, or at least with disapprobation, it would be absurd to suppose that there could be any moral obligation to perform certain actions, and not to perform certain other actions, which seemed to us morally equal or indifferent. There could, in like manner, be no virtue nor vice in performing, and no merit nor demerit in having performed, an action the omission of which would have seemed to the agent as little proper, or as little improper, as the performance of it, — in that state of equal, indiscriminate regard or disregard, in which the plunderer and the plundered, the oppressor and the oppressed, were considered only as the physical producers of a different result of happiness or misery.

"It is by this one susceptibility, then, of certain vivid, distinctive emotions that we become truly moral beings."

Dr. Brown shows that the words "approbation" and "disapprobation" are used to signify both the intellectual apprehension or acceptance of facts or truths as known, and the moral emotion in view of them; but he discriminates between the two.

"The truth is," he says, "that moral approbation or disapprobation are terms that are very inadequate to express the liveliness of the moral feelings to which we give those names. The moral emotions are more akin to *love* or *hate*

than to *perception* or *judgment*. What we call our approbation of an action, inasmuch as the moral principle is concerned, is a sort of moral love when the action is the action of another, or moral complacency when the action is our own, and nothing more. It is no exercise of reason discovering congruities and determining one action to be better fitted than another for affording happiness or relieving misery. This logical or physical approbation may precede, indeed, the moral emotion, and may mingle with it and continue to render it more and more lively while we are under its influence; but even when such approbation precedes it, it is distinct from the emotion itself. . . .

"However our *judgment*, as mere judgment, may have been exercised before in discerning the various relations of actions to the happiness of the world, the *moral principle* is the source only of the emotion which follows the discovery of such fitness, and not in the slightest degree of the judgment which measures and calculates the fitness, any more than it is a source of the fitness itself. . . . The discovery of the fitness is a common exercise of judgment, that differs no more from the other exercises of it than these differ from each other. It is in the order of our emotions, accordingly, that I have assigned a place to our moral feelings, in my arrangement of the phenomena of the mind; because, though we are accustomed to speak of moral approbation, *moral judgments*, or moral estimates of actions, the feelings which we thus comprehend under a single term are not the simple, vivid feeling which is all that truly constitutes the moral emotion, but a combination of this vivid feeling with the judgment as to the fitness or tendency of the action which, as a mere judgment, preceded and gave rise to the emotion. What is strictly the *moral*

part of the compound is, however, as I have already said, the *emotion*, and the emotion only."[1]

SECT. 87. *There is another form of the sentimental theory of conscience, or the moral faculty.* There are several philosophers who regard it, not as an original and simple element of the sensibility, but as a compound sentiment or feeling, built up or acquired by experience and association; that is, as formed out of other endowments, which in their simple character had no such nature or office. "The chemistry of association" is appealed to and made much of by one school of philosophers in the whole field of psychology to account for all the mental, moral, and religious faculties and products. The principal authors who have advanced the theory that the moral faculty belongs to the sensibility, but is a derived, and not an original principle, are David Hartley (1705–1757), Adam Smith (1723–1790), and Sir James Mackintosh (1765–1832).

With Hartley sensation is the original source of everything. "The ideas of sensation are the elements of which all the rest are compounded. . . . Since the passions are states of considerable pleasure or pain, they must be aggregates of the ideas or traces of the sensible pleasures and pains which ideas make up, by their number and mutual influence upon one another, for the faintness and transitory nature of each singly taken. This may be called a proof *a priori*.

"As sensation is the common foundation of all these, so each in its turn, when sufficiently generated, contributes to generate and model all the rest. We may conceive this to be done in the following manner. Let sensation generate imagination; then will sensation and imagination together

[1] Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, lecture lxxxii.

generate ambition; sensation, imagination, and ambition, self-interest; sensation, imagination, ambition, and self-interest, sympathy; sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, and sympathy, theopathy; sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, and theopathy, the moral sense.[1]

"All the pleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, and theopathy, as far as they are consistent with one another, with the frame of our nature, and with the course of the world, beget in us a moral sense, and lead us to the love and approbation of virtue, and to the fear, hatred, and abhorrence of vice. This moral sense therefore carries its own authority with it, inasmuch as it is the sum total of all the rest, and the ultimate result of them; and it employs the force and authority of the whole nature against any particular part of it, that rebels against the determinations and commands of the conscience or moral judgment. . . .

"When the moral sense is advanced to considerable perfection, a person may be made to love and hate, merely because he ought; that is, the pleasures of moral beauty and rectitude, and the pains of moral deformity and unfitness, may be transferred, and made to coalesce almost instantaneously."[2]

SECT. 88. *Adam Smith derives the moral faculty from sympathy*, if we should not rather say that he makes sympathy itself to be the moral faculty. He refutes the theories of Cudworth and Hutcheson, and states his own doctrine as follows: "In order to account for the principle of approbation, there is no occasion for supposing any new power of

[1] Observations on Man, part i. chap. iii. sect. iii.
[2] Ibid., chap. iv. sect. vi.

perception which had never been heard of before: Nature acts here, as in all other cases, with the strictest economy, and produces a multitude of effects from one and the same cause; and sympathy — a power which has always been taken notice of, and with which the mind is manifestly endowed — is sufficient to account for all the effects ascribed to this peculiar faculty." [1]

He shows that all men have a natural tendency to harmonize their thoughts and feelings with those of others. The mutualness of sympathy greatly increases its power. Others are pleased by our sympathy, and hurt by the want of it; we are pleased when we can sympathize with them, and hurt when we cannot.

"When the original passions of the persons principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and on the contrary, when on bringing the case home to himself he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite them. To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such, is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them. . . . If my animosity goes beyond what the indignation of my friend corresponds to; if my grief exceeds what his most tender compassion can go along with; if my admiration is either too high or too low to tally with his own; if I laugh loud and heartily when he only smiles, or, on the contrary, only smile when he laughs loud and

[1] Theory of Moral Sentiments, part vii. sect. iii. chap. iii.

heartily, — in all these cases, as soon as he comes, from considering the object, to observe how I am affected by it, according as there is more or less disproportion between his sentiments and mine, I must incur a greater or less degree of his disapprobation; and upon all occasions his own sentiments are the standards and measures by which he judges of mine. . . .

"To approve or disapprove of the opinions of others is acknowledged by everybody to mean no more than to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with regard to our approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of others." [1]

If one's passion is too high to call forth an equal response from others, "he can only hope to obtain the harmony which he desires by lowering his passion to the pitch in which the spectators are capable of going along with him." If one's emotion is too low, he must try to raise it to the level of that exhibited by others. "As nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of the spectators. As they are continually placing themselves in his situation, and thence conceiving emotions similar to what he feels, so he is as constantly placing himself in theirs, and thence conceiving some degree of the coolness about his own fortune with which he is sensible that they will view it. As they are considering what they themselves would feel if they actually were the sufferers, so he is constantly led to imagine in what manner he would be affected if he was only one of the spectators of his own situation. As their sympathy makes them look at it in

[1] Theory of Moral Sentiments, part i. sect. i. chap. iii.

some measure with his eyes, so his sympathy makes him look at it in some measure with theirs." [1]

But with all his copious and beautiful illustrations of the power of sympathy, Smith cannot get along without assuming the presence and action of a moral sensibility which is something prior to sympathy and superior to it, and which he even personifies as "the little man within the breast," "an abstract man within the breast, the representative of mankind and substitute of the deity whom Nature has constituted the supreme judge of all our actions, . . . the man within the breast, to whose opinions and feelings we find it of more consequence to conform our conduct than to those of the whole world."

One obvious criticism is made upon this theory by Mackintosh, that "the sympathies have nothing more of an imperative character than any other emotions. They attract and repel like any other feelings, according to their intensity. If, then, the sympathies continue in mature minds to constitute the whole of conscience, it becomes utterly impossible to explain the character of command and supremacy, which is attested by the unanimous voice of mankind to belong to that faculty and to form its essential distinction."

SECT. 89. *Sir James Mackintosh supposes the moral faculty to be formed by the association* of all those desires and affections which have dispositions and volitions as their immediate objects. He explains association as consisting not merely in attaching thoughts and feelings to each other in such a manner that the presence of one brings another after it in time, but as producing such a union between them that

[1] Theory of Moral Sentiments, part i. sect. i. chap. iv. See also part iii. chapters i. and ii.

the result is a firm product, like a chemical compound, different from either of its elements.

"It is as common in mind," he says, "as in matter for a compound to have properties not to be found in any of its constituent parts. The truth of this proposition is as certain in the human feelings as in any material combination. It is therefore easily understood that originally separate feelings may be so perfectly blended by a process performed in every mind that they can no longer be disjoined from each other, but must always co-operate, and thus reach the only union which we can conceive. The sentiment of moral approbation formed by association out of antecedent affections may become so perfectly independent of them that we are no longer conscious of the means by which it was formed, and never can in practice repeat, though we may in theory perceive, the process by which it was generated. It is in that mature and sound state of our nature that our emotions at the view of right and wrong are ascribed to conscience. But why, it may be asked, do these feelings, rather than others, run into each other, and constitute conscience? The affinity between them consists in this, that while all other feelings relate to outward objects, they alone contemplate exclusively *the dispositions and actions of voluntary agents*. When they are completely transferred from objects and even persons to dispositions and actions, they are fitted, by the perfect coincidence of their *aim*, for combining to form that one faculty which is directed only to that *aim*." [1]

"The secondary desires, whether private or social," are formed by this sort of association. "When the social affections are thus formed, they are naturally followed in every

[1] Progress of Ethical Philosophy, sect. vi, David Hartley.

instance by the will to do whatever can promote their object. Compassion excites a voluntary determination to do whatever relieves the person pitied." So with gratitude, generosity, love. There is a close "mental contiguity of the affection to the volition. . . . No wonder then that the strongest association, the most active power of reciprocal suggestion, should subsist between them. As all the affections are delightful, so the volitions, voluntary acts which are the only means of their gratification, become agreeable objects of contemplation to the mind. The habitual disposition to perform them is felt in ourselves and observed in others with satisfaction. As these feelings become more lively, the absence of them may be viewed in ourselves as a pain, in others with an alienation capable of an indefinite increase. They become entirely independent sentiments, still, however, receiving constant supplies of nourishment from their parent affections, which in well-balanced minds reciprocally strengthen each other, unlike the unkind passions, which are constantly engaged in the most angry conflicts of civil war. In this state we desire to experience these beneficent volitions, to cultivate a disposition towards them, and to do every correspondent voluntary act. They are for their own sake the objects of desire. They thus constitute a large portion of those emotions, desires, and affections which regard certain dispositions of the mind and determinations of the will as their sole and ultimate end. These are what are called the moral sense, the moral sentiments, or best, though most simply, by the ancient name of conscience."[1]

Afterwards resentment, moderated and subdued to "a sense of justice, is so purified as to be fitted to be a new

[1] Progress of Ethical Philosophy, sect. vii.

element of conscience," to which "it lends new vigor." So "courage, energy, decision, when they are tamed by the society of the affections, and trained up in obedience to the moral faculty, . . . are associated with the other moral principles, and with them contribute to form conscience, which, as the master faculty of the soul, levies such large contributions on every province of human nature." In like manner, "those dispositions and actions of voluntary agents which terminate in their own satisfaction, security, and well-being," such as prudence, temperance, judiciousness, are brought in and combined with those public and disinterested sentiments. "All those sentiments of which the final object is a state of the will become thus intimately and inseparably blended; and of that perfect state of solution the result is conscience, — the judge and arbiter of human conduct, which, though it does not supersede *ordinary motives* of virtuous feelings and habits, which are the ordinary motives of good actions, yet exercises a lawful authority even over them, and ought to blend with them."[1]

SECT. 90. *If now we compare the views* of Hartley concerning the origin of the moral sense with those of Mackintosh, we shall see that "while Hartley regarded the moral faculty as much indebted for its development to the intellectual powers, Mackintosh has spoken of it as made up of desires and affections which are in contact with the will. So that, while the one may be considered as leaning rather to the intellectual origin of the moral faculty, the other leaned more to its sentimental origin. Both agreed in calling it a sense; and although they represented it as composite in its origin, and as acquiring unity and independence by degrees, they considered it, though not instinctive or im-

[1] Progress of Ethical Philosophy, sect. vii.

planted, to be natural; inasmuch as association and the other laws to which they ascribed its formation are laws to the influence of which all men are naturally subject." [1]

If in a similar manner we compare the views of Cudworth with those of Price and Reid, we find that the latter have felt the force of the truth urged by Hutcheson and Hume, and have recognized to some extent the importance of the sensibility as an element in conscience; while Cudworth makes no allusion to sensibility at all as having any place or office in regard to morals. The only place in which he seems to deviate from a pure intellectualism is when he speaks of "a certain inward determination in the soul itself, from whence the foundation of all this difference [between moral good and evil, just and unjust] must needs arise," and says "that the anticipations of morality spring not merely from intellectual forms and notional ideas of the mind, nor from certain rules or propositions arbitrarily printed upon the soul as upon a book, but from some other more inward and vital principle in intellectual beings as such, whereby they have a natural determination in them to do some things and avoid others, which could not be if they were mere naked passive things." [2]

SECT. 91. *The intellectual and emotional theories of conscience are not practically so far apart as might be supposed.* Both theories, as commonly held, admit the presence of intellectual action and of emotion; but they differ as to which is the foremost element, or which gives the special peculiarity to this class of psychical products. The question is, How

[1] Fleming, Student's Manual of Moral Philosophy.

[2] Eternal and Immutable Morality, book iv. chap. vi. sect. 4.

does the difference arise between these concepts, judgments, reasonings, and all others? Why do certain judgments become moral judgments, while others do not? It will be answered, Because they are judgments about conduct, that is, about moral things or subject-matter. But the question recurs, Why are certain matters about which we judge felt and apprehended as moral, while others are not? Is it because of some special new kind of thinking or judging, or because of a certain special sensitiveness which we have, whereby these objects are given to us in another and peculiar character? The answer is, Because our moral sense or sensitiveness or sensibility makes certain things moral to us, that is, makes them conduct, while to other beings which surround us and live with us, these things are not moral at all: they are neither capable of conduct nor sensitive to conduct as such; though they are abundantly sensitive to actions as motions and as directed to ends.

If the action of the intellect in forming and applying these concepts is just the same as when it deals with all other kinds of matter, but the emotion and the sensitiveness by which we become apprehensive of them as a special class of objects have a marked peculiarity, then we should give the special name to the special thing.

If we should adopt the view that conscience is the power of knowing or judging about moral things either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, or that it is the moral code, we should still be compelled to make *the sense of duty* the germ or ground of it as a special activity of practical importance. A dry, cold, judging or knowing power is never motive to action; still less, if possible, can a code of rules or principles be conceived to be motive. The impulses are the motive powers. It is true that this sense of duty can arise only on occasion

of knowledge; but it is this sense alone which first creates the moral for us, or opens it to our apprehension, and it is this alone which gives practical life, force, and reality to it. Therefore the primary and distinctive element in all that is ever properly called conscience is this special moral feeling or sensitiveness and this moral impulse, — the impulse of duty.

But this moral sense and impulse are not left alone and unsupported in the soul. The impulse of duty is not vague, unrelated, and hovering in the air. It moves the thoughts into moral activity about moral things, and the thoughts thus employed have a solid support, guide, and counterpart in the intuitive notion of duty which, as a metaphysical principle, underlies all such mental activity. What we call the intellect, like all other psychical activities, operates only in certain ways and according to certain guiding principles, which are the original or innate laws of the soul itself as an intellectual being. As a being capable of conduct, *duty is the innate law of the soul* and the guiding principle of all thought about conduct. We formulate this law into a general conception, — the conception of duty, — which is then treated as the intellectual assumption on which conduct as such proceeds, and by which it is judged and explained. Judgment and reason attend upon all our implanted impulses when the soul is once developed; but as we distinguish these impulses from the intellect, so we may well insist on the distinction between intellect and moral sense.

CHAPTER X.

THEORIES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE.

III. *The Evolution Theory.*

SECTION 92. *The question whether conscience, or moral sense, is an original endowment of the soul,* or has been derived or constructed out of other non-moral elements, is more important than the question whether, admitting it to be original, it belongs especially to the intellectual or the emotional nature.

The question whether the moral can be formed out of the non-moral, whether it appear in the form given it by Hartley, Adam Smith, and Mackintosh, or as it is presented by Darwin and Herbert Spencer, is analogous to the question whether the rational can be formed by some combination or arrangement of non-rational elements, or whether the living can be formed by some combination or arrangement of non-living elements, — the question of abiogenesis. It is the question whether the stream can rise higher than its source, whether the product can be more than its combined factors.

There must certainly be something original, or there can be nothing derived. Moral sense may just as well be assumed to be original as any other element, and must be, unless some method can be pointed out by which it was

formed out of non-moral elements, — some method by which the product has become more than its combined factors. We might better assume (following the analogy of Schopenhauer's doctrine of Will) that all which now appears to be non-moral is the product of the moral, and that it now seems to us non-moral because it has been arrested in the progress of its development towards consciousness of itself, — that the original creature, or stuff, out of which man came had only the one blind and vague impulse of duty, but knowing no duty, knowing nothing, simply struggling and floundering under the ceaseless impulse of this force, strenuous but unconscious. We might assume that in the course of ages this upward pushing force lifted certain chance masses on which it acted in a more favorable manner into the region of intellectual light and moral self-knowledge. And here man is at the top, self-conscious and ethical, domineering over the rest of the creation, which has been belated in its upward march, though moving in the same direction and by the same force.

But without entering into speculations of this sort we will notice briefly the more recent attempts to derive conscience, or moral sense, from non-moral elements. These take their special character from the form given to the doctrine of evolution by Darwin.

SECT. 93. *Since the theory of evolution came into vogue*, thorough-going evolutionists have seemed to think it essential to the proof or confirmation of their theory that it should be applied in every sphere, and should be shown capable of accounting for the origin of the intellectual, moral, and religious in man, that is, for his whole spiritual nature, as well as for his bodily form. But the attempt to derive the moral sense, or conscience, from other lower and non-moral elements

is confessedly a mere speculation, an attempt to imagine or construct a process or series of steps, the like of which has never been observed and which cannot be verified. The problem is not to show, as in the case of "the origin of species," how from lower ethical forms higher ones have been derived by natural selection, but to show how something new can be created, — how a moral sense or sensibility can be created out of elements which have nothing moral in them.[1] It is as though Darwin had attempted to show how, out of dead matter, living beings had been formed by variation and natural selection. "A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past actions and their motives, — of approving of some, and disapproving of others; and the fact that man is the one being who certainly deserves this designation is the greatest of all distinctions between him and the lower animals."[2] "A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of approving or disapproving of them. We have no reason to suppose that any of the lower animals have this capacity. . . . Man can alone with certainty be ranked as a moral being."[3]

Romanes is more courageous than his master, and claims that dogs, elephants, and monkeys have so much power of reflection that they may be said to have a low degree of conscience.[4] But this, even if true, would only remove the problem of the derivation of the moral one step farther back.

SECT. 94. *The consideration of the subject is rendered*

[1] See The Ethical Import of Darwinism, by J. G. Schurman, chap. v.

[2] The Descent of Man, chap. xxi. [3] Ibid., chap. iv.

[4] Popular Science Monthly, May, 1876, pp. 84–5.

difficult by the various senses in which the terms "moral sense" and "conscience" are employed by Darwin. The formal definition is: "Moral sense is that which tells us what we ought to do;" "Conscience is that which reproves us if we disobey the moral sense." But these meanings are not at all adhered to. Sometimes the terms are synonymous, sometimes not; they sometimes signify an element of feeling, sometimes an element of intellect, sometimes a combined state of feeling and will. In this variety of uses we will assume that the two terms should always mean the same thing, as they do in many passages, and we will put upon them the lowest meaning; namely, the sense or feeling of duty or obligation, as defined in Sect. 70 above. If evolution cannot account for the origin of moral sense or conscience in this signification, it will of course fail in the higher significations, as when they are used to mean the moral judging power and the reproving power. If it is granted that we have the moral sense in this lowest meaning, all the rest can be easily accounted for, and evolution may be freely permitted to play its part in all the progress beyond that stage.

Darwin regards the following proposition as "in a high degree probable; namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well, developed, as in man. For, *first*, the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform services for them. The services may be of a definite and evidently instinctive nature; or there may be only a wish and readi-

ness, as with most of the higher social animals, to aid their fellows in certain general ways. But these feelings and services are by no means extended to all the individuals of the same species, only to those of the same association. *Secondly*, as soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, images of all past actions and motives would be incessantly passing through the brain of each individual; and that feeling of dissatisfaction, or even misery, which invariably results, as we shall hereafter see, from any unsatisfied instinct, would arise as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always present social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time stronger, but neither enduring in its nature, nor leaving behind it a very vivid impression. It is clear that many instinctive desires, such as that of hunger, are in their nature of short duration; and after being satisfied, are not readily or vividly recalled. *Thirdly*, after the power of language had been acquired, and the wishes of the community could be expressed, the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good, would naturally become in a paramount degree the guide to action. But it should be borne in mind that however great weight we may attribute to public opinion, our regard for the approbation and disapprobation of our fellows depends on sympathy, which, as we shall see, forms an essential part of the social instinct, and is indeed its foundation-stone. *Lastly*, habit in the individual would ultimately play a very important part in guiding the conduct of each member; for the social instinct, together with sympathy, is, like any other instinct, greatly strengthened by habit, and so consequently would be obedience to the wishes and judgment of the community."[1]

[1] The Descent of Man, chap. iv.

SECT. 95. *It seems certain that the moral sense,* which Darwin is here seeking to show originated from a combination of other non-moral elements, is assumed as present and active in the whole process. This is especially obvious in "that feeling of dissatisfaction, and even misery, which invariably results from any unsatisfied instinct, as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always present social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time stronger, but neither enduring in its nature nor leaving behind it a very vivid impression." This "dissatisfaction," in other words, implies a sense of the comparative worth of the several impulses, and that the higher "ought" to prevail over the lower when the lower overreach their proper bounds; that all our impulses and endowments "ought" to be kept in their proper appointed place, and used only for their proper ends. "The common opinion how each member of the community *ought to act for the public good,*" clearly presupposes the presence of the moral sense. The phrase, "the wishes and judgment of the community," carries no meaning at all to us but a moral one. In fact it is scarcely possible to think or speak of men in any light without clothing them to the full with that quality "which is by far the most important of all the differences between man and the lower animals, — the moral sense, or conscience." In his entire discussion of the moral sense, Darwin is really showing, not how it originates, but how it acts and combines with the other powers, specially the implanted impulses and the intellect, to lift this moral creature above all other creatures.

SECT. 96. *But we need not rest all on the fact of these evident assumptions* of the ever-presence of the moral. Darwin proceeds to show that many animals are social;

that they seem happy in the society of their kind, or even in that of other kinds, and miserable when alone; that they often render services to each other, and instinctively co-operate in defence and in gaining other ends. He shows that some animals have love and sympathy. The various instincts and tendencies exist in various degrees of strength in the same animal, so that they sometimes conflict with each other, and there is often a struggle between them for the control of action.

He then shows that man also is social and sympathetic, and that he is often torn by the strife of conflicting impulses, but one of which he can follow, and which he must choose between. The argument seems to be that because man, the most highly developed of all animals, is both social and ethical, therefore the other animals, which are certainly social, are on the road to the ethical, and that all they need in order to become ethical is more power of memory and reflection. The problem is to bridge the chasm which lies between mere animal sociability and sympathy, and the ethical sociability and sympathy of man; that is, how to bring in or create this new ethical element out of elements which in the lower animals are confessedly in no respect ethical.

The solution of the problem offered is as follows: Some instincts and impulses are more permanent or enduring, though not stronger, than others. In the conflict and struggle of impulses the former will sometimes be overmastered by the latter; but as the latter are more permanent, when they resume their sway the man remembers that he obeyed the strong, transient impulse rather than the less clamorous, permanent one. Under the memory of this fact, and with reflection upon it, he regrets, "is bitterly regretful,

. . . even though trying to banish his regret," that he has yielded to the strong but transient impulse; he "feels that he ought to regret his conduct," that he ought always to obey the more permanent impulse. "He will consequently resolve more or less firmly to act differently for the future: and this is conscience; for conscience looks backwards, and serves as a guide for the future."

SECT. 97. *But this is not bridging the chasm.* The author is indeed now on the other side of it, and is telling us what he finds there. He finds the sense of moral obligation, because confessedly man has at the outset this sense of "*ought, so full of high significance.*" He has both a reflective and a foreseeing sense of the comparative worth of his motives, and so of duty in the case. This sense of duty is powerful, because man is a morally reflective being. It is for this reason that he can morally regret that he obeyed the less worthy motive. Being more intellectual than the lower animals, and *also moral,* man is not only thoughtful, but *morally thoughtful* in the presence of objects, and while feeling the stress of motives and impulses. He checks the rushing impulses by his ethical will and judges between them because he is essentially ethical, and this moral sensibility pervades his whole soul. Because he has such a strongly intellectual recollection and reflection, and is also moral, he looks back morally on his past conduct; he has a vivid and often a distressing sense of errors and moral wrongs in thought and act; he chastises himself for his shortcomings and wrong-doings, and resolves to be more thoughtful and conscientious in the future.

But the critical question is, How can the animal, which has no feeling that he ought in any sense, be made to feel that he ought? How can such reflection and memory as

he has, or even an increased degree of them, bring out the result of moral regret, since he has no sense or perception at all of the moral, any more than the blind man has of color, no apprehension of the comparative worth of motives, and of duty in regard to them? How can the one of two opposites, the non-moral feeling and thought, pass over into the other, the moral? The mere passing of thoughts through the mind does not bring forth the moral. They must be known and judged under the influence of a moral sense before the *ought* can be evolved. After we have the moral given, natural selection may perhaps develop it. Morality has had a history and a growth. It is at various stages now in the different tribes and nations of men. The standard is seen to rise and fall; we find the most marvellous variations in views and practices. But this does not account for the origin of the sense that there is such a thing as duty.

SECT. 98. *If other animals had the low beginnings* of the sense of moral satisfaction and dissatisfaction, natural selection might develop it, according to the Darwinian theory, and their moral nature would differ from ours only in the stage of advancement. The unbridged chasm would then lie farther down in the series. But wherever the question as to the origin of the moral is raised, the same difficulties will recur. It must be taken, as life is, to be something new and original wherever it comes in, — an element so simple and so radically different from all others that it cannot be formed from others, however it may appear in conjunction with them.

Reflection does bring the ethical element forth to prominence in consciousness as a feeling, an impulse, and a law, precisely as it does every other activity and product of the

soul; and we are carried upward in the scale, as individuals and as societies, by a growing moral thoughtfulness. But if "we have no reason to think that any of the lower animals have this capacity," we must admit that moral sense or conscience comes in, not as developed out of something else which has no kinship with it, but as given, though we find it to be given only where well-marked social instincts are joined with such intellectual powers and capacities as man possesses. Moral sense given to a creature with so little intellect as the swallow would be wasted. Such a creature cannot come to self-consciousness in anything. It acts only impulsively and instinctively, or within very narrow limits of intellectual attainment. If it had moral sense, it could be only a blind, dumb, unself-conscious impulse, like all the rest of its endowments; it could never construct moral principles or lay down general lines of duty. It would really be a contradiction to call such a gift in any sense moral.

If we were permitted by the evolutionist to assume the existence of the moral sense as a real element in the human soul, however low and dim in its character and in our appreciation of it, just as he begins his whole process of the development of species with certain original living beings, confessing himself unable to show how they originated, we could be satisfied to have the processes of moral progress pointed out and illustrated in accordance with the theory of development. The analysis which Darwin gives in the third and fourth chapters of the "Descent of Man" of the "mental powers of man and the lower animals," presents the subject in an interesting and instructive light; but all the moral which we find at the end of the process of development was happily inserted at the beginning.

SECT. 99. *Herbert Spencer, "our great philosopher" of evolution,* derives conscience also from non-moral elements, but in a different manner, following his general principles of philosophizing. His theory is set forth first in his oft-quoted letter to Mr. J. S. Mill, and later in his "Data of Ethics." In the letter to Mr. Mill he says: —

"Corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed moral science, there have been, and still are, developing in the race certain fundamental moral intuitions; and though these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of utility, gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience. Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals, who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organizations; just as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has practically become a form of thought, apparently quite independent of experience, — so do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility."[1]

SECT. 100. *It would seem that the intuitions and emotions* which would arise from such a series of experiences would have reference to utility only, and not at all to the ethical,

[1] Bain's Moral Science, p. 308; also, Data of Ethics, sect. 45.

unless we reduce the ethical to the dimensions of that which is materially useful and harmful. Such moral emotions, it is supposed, will spontaneously respond to this kind of right and wrong conduct, even though we may not be able to tell how the particular acts in question are useful or harmful; and conscience in this view must be only a dim and vague feeling that they are so. But if the moral sense does not refer at all to the serviceable or harmful as such, that is, to the material consequences of actions, but to personal conduct, that is, to the internal spiritual action of a being intelligently choosing and directing its own course, this theory does not account for it, but for another and totally different element of our nature. It should be employed rather to account for the persistent impulse towards self-preservation, the impulse to live, — to seek what will maintain life, and reject what will impair it.

Besides, "if the proposed explanation were good for so much, it ought to be good for more; the operation of such an organized and inherited experience should have produced habits as well as intuitions and sentiments. The mental result attributed to such a course of experience could only have taken place if its impressions were yielded to and its lessons obeyed. Had the indications of past experience and their meanings been disregarded or defied, its results could never have been transmuted into intuitive and unfaltering judgments; had they, on the contrary, been acted on, their observance in conduct ought to have become as deeply graven into our habits as their significance into our thoughts and feelings. If moral intuitions had such an origin, moral habitudes must have grown up with them. But how great is their disparity needs not to be told. The immediacy

and vividness of our knowledge of right, and our ability and disposition to do it, have often little relation to each other. If the one has come to be organized and consolidated into direct and unintentional exercise of faculty, how is it that the other is still so difficult and painful?"[1]

SECT. 101. In the "Data of Ethics"[2] Spencer exhibits the subject in a somewhat different light. Moral sense is said to be "a feeling that is at once massive and vague, . . . that instead of being constituted by representations of incidental, collateral, non-necessary consequences of acts, is constituted by representations of consequences which the acts naturally produce. These representations are not all distinct, though some of them are usually present; but they form an assemblage of indistinct representations accumulated by experience of the results of like acts in the life of the individual, superposed on a still more indistinct but voluminous consciousness due to the inherited effects of such experiences in progenitors."

This moral feeling must be of late origin in the history of the race; for "only after political, religious, and social restraints have produced a stable community, can there be sufficient experience of the pains, positive and negative, sensational and emotional, which crimes of aggression cause, as to generate that moral aversion to them constituted by consciousness of their intrinsically evil results."

This moral feeling has connected with it the idea of authority and that of coerciveness. This idea of authority has grown up through long time and experience. "Accumulated experiences have produced the consciousness that

[1] British Quarterly Review, July, 1878, p. 21.

[2] Chapter vii. sections 45 and 46.

guidance by feelings which refer to remote and general results, is usually more conducive to welfare than guidance by feelings to be immediately gratified. . . . The idea of authoritativeness has therefore come to be connected with feelings having these traits; the implication being that the lower and simpler feelings are without authority."

"The element of coerciveness" in the sense of duty "originates from experience of those several forms of restraint that have established themselves in the course of civilization, — the political, religious, and social. To the effects of punishments inflicted by law and public opinion on conduct of certain kinds, Bain ascribes the feeling of moral obligation. And I agree with him to the extent of thinking that by them is generated the sense of compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes, and which the word 'obligation' indicates. . . . Accepting in the main the view that fears of the political and social penalties (to which I think the religious must be added) have generated the sense of coerciveness which goes along with the thought of postponing present to future and personal desires to the claims of others, it here chiefly concerns us to note that this sense of coerciveness becomes indirectly connected with the feelings distinguished as moral. For since the political, religious, and social restraining motives are mainly formed of represented future results; and since the moral restraining motive is mainly formed of represented future results, — it happens that the representations, having much in common, and being often aroused at the same time, the fear joined with three sets of them becomes, by association, joined with the fourth. Thinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act excites a dread which continues present while the intrin-

sic effects of the act are thought of; and being thus linked with these intrinsic effects, causes a vague sense of moral compulsion. Emerging as the moral motive does but slowly from amidst the political, religious, and social motives, it long participates in that consciousness of subordination to some external agency which is joined with them; and only as it becomes distinct and predominant does it lose this associated consciousness, — only then does the feeling of obligation fade." It follows "that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases."

SECT. 102. *We see that the sense of duty or moral obligation in this theory* is a late acquisition of the human race, and not an original gift to it; that it belongs only to a period of transition in the history of the race from a condition below the moral level to another condition which is supposed to be above it; that it has reference only to a special kind of advantage and disadvantage, namely, that which flows as a natural consequence from our acts, in contradistinction to that advantage and disadvantage which is caused by the interference of some personal being or of society, — that is, it has reference only to the material adjustment of man to his environment, an adjustment which is being accomplished by the operation of natural causes without any of that element which is by the common mind called human responsibility.

SECT. 103. The various theories concerning the nature of the moral faculty, which have now been briefly stated, may be exhibited in a tabular form, together with the names of their chief supporters, as follows: —

- The Moral Faculty may be regarded as
  - Original
    - In the Intellect — Cudworth, Clarke, Price, Reid, Stewart.
    - In the Sensibility — Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Brown.
  - Derived
    - From Intellectual Elements — Bentham, Hartley, Paley, James Mill, J. S. Mill, Austin.
    - From Elements of Sensibility — Hartley, Adam Smith, Mackintosh.
    - According to the Modern Theory of Evolution — Darwin, Spencer.

CHAPTER XI.

THE EFFECTS OF CONSCIENCE.

SECTION 104. *This moral element in the soul is a disinterested principle of action*, just as all the implanted principles are disinterested. It is not in its nature a seeking of pleasure or an avoiding of pain; it is a seeking of duty and an avoiding of what we ought not to do, without reference to the effect of conduct on the susceptibility. Conduct has an effect on the susceptibility through the moral sense or sensitiveness, and we may and do form a self-love in regard to it, as we do in regard to all the other spontaneous activities. This kind of self-love, which grows up in view of the ethical sensibility, is a proper and an elevated principle of action. It respects moral integrity, or wholeness and healthfulness; it secures our moral self-preservation.

We must observe also that as an endowment of our nature, while having reference to the moral, and creating for us or opening to our apprehension the existence of the moral, while being the essential ground of our ethicality, this moral sense is itself as an endowment non-moral in the sense that the possession of it does not confer merit or demerit. "None can apply moral attributes to the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities, or call his moral sense morally good or evil, any more than he calls the power of tasting

sweet or bitter, or of seeing straight or crooked, white or black."[1]

SECT. 105. *Without this sense of duty the intellectual and active powers of man would be aimless and wandering forces,* except so far as they were merely instinctive or blindly guided. As a rational being man would have no overmastering principle, and no law for the guidance of his life; he would not be lifted into the rank of the personal. But acting under the pressure of this sense, and guided by the notion of duty, we inquire what we ought. When after examination and reflection we have learned what we ought to do, the sense of obligation to go on and perform the act becomes stronger, if the decision is clear, because it is then concentrated in a definite course of action. When this principle is obeyed, whether in actively seeking or in outwardly performing duty, the soul experiences a calm, high satisfaction, a sense of duty done, the greatest of all satisfactions, —

> "A peace above all earthly dignities,
> A still and quiet conscience."

If it is disobeyed we have shame, remorse, a sense of duty violated, the deepest and most permanent of dissatisfactions.

This inward self-approval and self-disapproval of our conduct has the force of reward and punishment, and they are the natural sanctions of our conduct, annexed with the apparent purpose to attract us to good and deter us from evil behavior. Thus conscience has the force of a law over us, or we may say that as a faculty it reveals or gives utterance to a law which is over us, a law which executes itself. We cannot think of it as self-made or as subjective only, nor as arbitrary or out of relation with the realities and supreme

[1] Hutcheson, Illustrations of the Moral Sense, sect. 1.

forces of the universe. We did not impose it upon ourselves, and we cannot put it off from ourselves. We feel it to be of right, and rebellion against it does not silence it or lower its tone of authority. "Without being consulted, without being advised with, it magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns" us according to our attitude towards duty.[1]

SECT. 106. *Conscience implies that there is a personal moral governor over us.* We cannot otherwise explain its existence. It is the voice of a personal moral lawgiver. "Duty" means what is due by some person to some person; "ought" means what is owed to some person, not what is due or owed by material things to a mere material world, to some impersonal being, or being devoid of knowledge and will. Thus all duties are to persons, or on account of personality, and nothing lower than an Infinite Personality, the First Cause, Governor, and Judge of all things, can account for the strenuousness and persistence, the wide and ceaseless demands, of duty.

Here, if anywhere, do we find the ultimate intellectual justification and explanation of morality. Morality cannot be intellectually justified in the sense of being derived by deduction from some more general abstract principle lying above and beyond it. But if it can be shown that our nature has its unity and culmination in the ethical, that it finds its perfection in every aspect, and fills its destined place in the universe, by our seeking to be, to do, and to gain what, as personal moral beings, we ought, this would certainly be a practical justification. If it should appear that both the outer world and the morality which we find within us imply as their logical and real antecedent a Moral

[1] Butler, Sermon ii.

Author, Governor, and Judge, in whose moral and intellectual image we are made, this is as much of an intellectual justification as we ever secure for anything when we plant ourselves on an intuitive principle; as, for example, when we plant ourselves on the doctrine of causality in material science. Would it not be an intellectual justification of the action of any creature made by a wise and good author to show that it is thereby occupying its place in the world, fulfilling the end appointed for its being, harmonizing with the principles which underlie it and the world in which it is to live? To seek a higher and broader justification is to go beyond the field of human ethics into that of the ethics of the divine conduct. We would not deny to the human mind the privilege of speculation even on questions pertaining to this high sphere. Those questions have always been as attractive as they are high; but it should be recognized that the grounds for prudent judgment concerning them are very small; that they are only the analogies of our infinitesimal experience, while a comprehensive philosophy of the infinite is possible only to an infinite being. There have always been some who, even on this small basis, would not only "justify the ways of God to man," but would justify God himself, his being, and the laws of his conduct.

SECT. 107. *Can an atheist then give an intellectual justification of morality?* His philosophy will be as faulty here as on every other ultimate question. He will have the same fault and the same difficulties as the man who denies all intuitive principles, and who cannot, therefore, properly justify anything except by the fact that it is, — "whatever is, is right." He is like those ancients who said that the earth rests on the shoulders of Atlas, and Atlas stands on the back of the tortoise; while beyond that their minds failed them.

The atheist can justify morality only as a fact, as a thing of interest and prudence, or by the blind principle of duty in the soul. We would not ask him to abandon morality because his philosophy is thus faulty. He should adhere to it as real, however unaccountable, and he should never allow either Atlas or the tortoise to escape. Let him cultivate morality by all means, and preach it. Ethical culture, even when its principles and grounds are inadequately conceived, is not to be lightly regarded; life and peace rest on it. The true principles, the ultimate explanation, may at length be found and accepted.

We know that there is a great and powerful Author and Sustainer of the world and of everything in it, because it is a finite and dependent world. We know that this Cause of the world is intelligent, because the adaptations, beauty, and order of the world imply it. In the same manner we know that this Intelligent Cause is a Moral Being and our Governor, because the moral law within us and the moral world about us imply it. I cannot, as a man, be supremely and universally bound by duty or obligation, except by a Supreme Being who is self-conscious, personal, and moral.

The moral judgments which we pass upon ourselves and others anticipate and look forward to a higher and more correct judgment with just and adequate consequences in another life. This is our best proof of the immortality of moral beings. All morality seems in its very nature to imply that at some time and somewhere there will be an authoritative decision upon conduct. The Moral Governor will finally judge men. The universal sense that we have not in all things faithfully sought and done our duty makes men fear that final judgment and seek for some means

to compensate for their deficiencies and propitiate the judge.

This fact, that conscience necessarily implies a Moral Governor and final Authoritative Judge, lifts the feeling and impulse and thought of duty far above all other elements in the soul. The things which we do in obedience to the lower and simpler voices which speak out of our own constitution in its relations to the world about us are many and various and full of a true and wonderful significance; but the things which we do and the affections which we cherish in obedience to this highest voice, speaking out of our constitution in its relations to the world above and beyond us, as well as to that about us, have a rank, a meaning, and a scope all their own and of supreme significance.

There are other elements in the human soul which hint at immortality, — as, for example, the desire to be loved and esteemed, especially the desire for posthumous fame or favor, and the affections; but probably their significance is really due to the ethical, or is only a form in which the ethical manifests itself. By this relation to God and to immortal life the ethical is lifted into the religious, which is only the supreme form of the ethical. We are thus brought into the highest relations, under the noblest law, with infinite anticipations.

SECT. 108. *This subjective sense of duty must have an objective correlate,* not only in the lawgiver and his higher law, but also in the world of men and things amid which we live. The world of men is of course a moral world, as human beings are moral beings, and all the relations between them are dominated by the moral relation. But the material world must also be in some sense a moral world; its ruling power and its laws must be in some sense not

merely mechanical, but moral, or at least must be so formed and shaped as to be subject to and harmonious with the law of morality. It is a moral world in the sense of being morally governed. If it should be said that the physical world can only be governed physically, yet even this physical control can be exercised only by a moral being, and no other end is conceivable for its government except a moral end. It is a moral world also as being fitted and specially made for the exercise and cultivation of moral qualities, and it does in fact call forth and train moral powers, either for good or ill, according to the use we make of it. It is impossible to believe that the ends of the material world are material. That which is material does not lie anywhere in the region of ends, but is strictly limited to the sphere of means.

The arrangements of the material world which fit it for this end and show that it was intended for it are its order, beauty, and law, its resistance which calls forth energy, forethought, wise planning, self-control, industry, and patience, in order to assert and maintain our place in it; also the happy results which follow from our obedience to its laws, and from the right use of things and powers, and the evil results following from their perversion and abuse. It is evident that all our relations to the material world make it a great occasion for both private and social morality. It is also a moral world in the sense that we have the most complete and adequate view of it and of all its parts and arrangements, and also of its end, when we regard it as the work of a moral being for the residence of moral beings and for their moral training.

The world is such that a general standard and rule for moral conduct can be formed. If this standard is good, that is, if it is in harmony with the nature, relations, and

ends of man and with the ends of the world, it tends to our personal, social, and religious prosperity, happiness, and improvement. Such a standard cannot be merely conventional, nor a matter of subjective opinion. It must be fashioned, according to the best knowledge and ability we have, to the fixed nature of things and of men, to the real relations in which we stand. The standard will admit of variation in its forms and modes of application and expression according to the circumstances of the parties, while the principles, if the true and real ones have been discovered, should remain ever the same. Moral standards do in fact change with changing knowledge and feeling, and they have also a powerful influence on the knowledge and feelings of men.

There is a real objective right and wrong resting on the constitution of man and the arrangements of the world, and these relations cannot be reversed. All human interests are secured in the long run only by the principles of moral right and truth in both outward and inward conduct; and so far as this at any time appears not to be true, it is owing to the temporary thwarting, evading, and resisting of the natural course and tendency of things by the violent and cunning devices of evil men. But after all the resistance and evasion which men can offer, the natural good and righteous tendency ever reasserts itself at length, and must finally conquer. Moral wrong and falsehood cannot really prosper materially; nature and human nature are leagued against them: however they may seem to succeed for a time, they ultimately bring ruin and loss which no wit of man can evade. Thus the outer world is seen to be moral, and to correspond with the moral world within.

To find what the morally right is in all the manifold rela-

tions in which we must act, and practically adhere to it, tasks our mental powers and tests our loyalty to duty to the utmost.

SECT. 109. *Does conscience, as moral sense or sense of duty, have authority, and on what grounds?* We reply that it does have authority, on three grounds: —

First, the psychological ground. The sense of duty is an unconditional imperative in the soul itself. It will not be put aside as a transitory sentiment; it is an ever-present practical conviction and command, "which would remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the whole, be the consequences of observing or violating it."[1] It claims to rule as though representing the central and supreme essence and interest of the entire nature and life of man. Unless this inner and highest voice of the soul can be silenced or set aside on some higher ground, it must rule.

Second, the philosophical ground. When we ask what duty is, and what rank is to be given to the idea of duty and to moral ideas, we elevate them to the highest place intellectually in their comprehension and explaining power. When we ask why duty should be so imperious and binding, we find a reason in the value of that which it commands, in the ends of our nature individually and socially, in the well-ordering of all the parts and endowments of our nature, keeping each impulse in its place and tributary to its proper end. It is thus only that harmony and full development of all the powers and of the whole as a whole can be secured, — thus only that the highest elements can be made dominant, and the man retain his place and grow as a man.

[1] Butler, Analogy, part i. chap. vii., near the end.

Third, the metaphysical ground. The law of duty in us points to and presupposes a Moral Maker, Sustainer, Governor, and Judge of the world. This voice within us declaring that *we ought*, is his voice, and has his authority. It has its vital, pervading, and uplifting power by the fact that it not only expresses the central essence and life-interest of man as a finite being, but because it essentially relates us to God and to the eternal nature, thought, and purpose of the universe, whether we will or no, even though we may reject or deny God's being and law. Theism is the necessary presupposition of the world and of human nature in every aspect, but pre-eminently in its ethical aspect.

SECT. 110. *The law of duty in the soul is developed in various degrees of clearness and definiteness in different persons*, according to the degree of moral cultivation and moral thoughtfulness. It is in this respect like our other endowments, none of which are given full-formed and developed; we receive them in germ only, or in possibility, and by training they are unfolded and matured in various degrees. But the same germs or possibilities are present in every soul which is truly human. Every human being is subjected to various forms of education, all of which have for their chief end and most important result the development of the sense of duty and the wise regulation of conduct under it by means of suitable principles and rules, according to the prevalent notion or standard of what is duty. But many principles and all rules can be questioned, and we are frequently thrown back upon the original bare sense that *we ought*, to seek and determine by a new examination what and how we ought. The sense of obligation does not tell us *what we ought, but only that we ought.* It does not give us a developed philosophy of ethics, nor point

us to some one universal ground of obligation, nor to any catalogue of duties or rules of conduct, as the natural consciousness does not give us a developed philosophy of the human mind. Why we ought, — that is, the ground of obligation, — is ultimately a matter of our own constitution and the constitution of the universe in which we live and of which we form a part; it is the fact that we are of a moral nature, living in a moral world whose Author, Governor, and Judge is morally good and wise.[1] *Why we ought* and *what in particular we ought*, we learn as we learn all other things. In our particular decisions of these questions we may err, and men may disagree; but as to the declaration *that we ought*, that we live under the *law of duty*, in this there can be no error. Conscience in this sense is infallible.

[1] Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. p. 260.

CHAPTER XII.

THE DERIVED PASSIONS.

SECTION 111. We have now completed our view of the sensibility in its three aspects or parts, as indicated above (Chapter III.). There are many *passions* for which we have names in common language which have not been mentioned in our analysis. If the analysis is correct and complete, all these must be derived, secondary, or complex passions, and not original principles of our nature. It must be possible also to show how they arise from the original simple principles, and what is their composition. To enter into a full discussion and classification of these derived passions is beyond our present purpose, and would be in itself unsatisfactory and unfruitful. Every classification which has been made is open to numerous objections, and the entire subject belongs rather to the dictionary than to an ethical treatise. We only mention the more prominent passions in such a way as to indicate their origin. They all arise out of the sensibility through the action of the powers of knowledge and thought.

In view of good to be obtained, we have *hope*, which is a compound of desire of gratification and expectation of gaining it. In view of good obtained, we have *joy*, *gladness*, *contentment*, *satisfaction*. In these the susceptibility is a

very prominent element. In view of our own superiority, we have *pride, vanity, haughtiness, contempt;* in view of the superiority of others over us, we may have *humility* or *envy*. Growing out of our good opinion of others, whether as superior to ourselves or not, we have *respect, admiration, veneration, reverence*. Into these *love* and *fear* enter largely.

In view of evil which we are suffering, we have *grief, sorrow*, and *melancholy*, or *patience* and *resignation*. In view of evil anticipated, we have *fear, dread, terror, horror, despair*. In view of injury or injustice received, we have *anger, revenge, malice, hatred*. In view of injury anticipated, we have *suspicion, jealousy*, and all the passions which real injury excites.

In view of evil and injury, either real or imaginary, there arise antipathies. Antipathy is not an implanted principle, like sympathy and resentment, though it is sometimes supposed to be a sort of inbred or inherited aversion. However ill-grounded antipathies may be, they grow up from reason under the influence of resentment and fear, and they often become settled and controlling forces in the character. They are a sort of permanent active resentment towards the supposed evil character of other persons, or towards the harmful or disagreeable action of animals or of inanimate things. They are often foolish, springing from mere ignorance and narrow-mindedness, and may be removed by better knowledge and acquaintance; or they may be well-grounded and justifiable, as when we are convinced that the motives of a man or a party are base, and their acts pernicious, — then a permanent resentment, a fixed opposition and hostility, is proper and desirable, and a part of the healthful moral tone of a virtuous character. "Like sym-

pathy, antipathy assumes a variety of forms, — such as antipathy to those of a different race or nation or color; antipathy to those of a different occupation; antipathy to those of different tastes or opinions, or to those of a different religion or a different party or a different grade in society."

SECT. 112. *It is obvious at once that all these so-called passions are secondary.* They grow up after thought has more or less clearly apprehended the kinds of good and evil, and the objects and persons which bring them. The natural impulses then go out towards these in various degrees and combinations. The chief source of those now named is the desires and affections, especially the general desire of happiness. This fact shows that they are largely of intellectual origin; or in other words, that they are not native and original endowments like those impulses which we have called "implanted principles," but that they grow up afterwards, and by reason of the action of the intelligence. The appetites also enter into some of the complex passions, and the sexual appetite is specially prominent in this respect.

Whatever is known after experience or by imagination as affecting the sensibility in any of its forms pleasurably or painfully, excites a secondary desire or aversion. These derived desires and aversions may be in the sphere of the natural appetites, desires, or affections, or of the moral sense or feeling. Many of these impulses may unite in one direction to form one powerful passion; they may also combine in various ways and draw in different directions, so as to produce discord, vacillation, and weakness in character. The part which the will may take in any case decides in general the course of action and forms the character.

SECT. 113. *It will be noticed that these complex and*

derived passions are in fact the impulses which we more commonly observe and speak of in real life. It is not claimed in the analysis of the sensibility which has been given in these pages that those simple impulses long or commonly act alone. That would be in contradiction to the fundamental truth of psychology, that when the powers of the soul are once developed, no psychical action is simple in the sense of our analysis, but the whole soul acts in all its activities. Psychical combinations are thus early formed; and it is probable that we never return from our composite and developed life to a state in which we are moved by the simple original impulses, unless it be in a condition of imbecility. But when we are inquiring after the original elements of our moral nature, we must isolate the various simple forms of activity and passivity in the sensibility, just as we isolate the various faculties of the intellect; that is, the simple and original or elementary forms of its activity. If the elements are not to be found in the soul, the compound states could never arise.

But while the sensibility in each of its three aspects is essential to our moral nature, we should not be moral persons if we were wholly subject to its sway; that is, if we acted always impulsively. We have higher powers, to which the sensibility is obviously subordinate. We proceed, therefore, to consider the will.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE WILL: ITS DEFINITION.

SECTION 114. *The will is generally regarded as one of the three leading faculties* of the soul by those who hold that there are three kinds of powers; and all who hold that there are only two, make the will one of the two. Those who divide the powers of the soul into Intellect, Feelings, and Conative Powers make the will one of the Conative or Striving Powers, including with it under this head what we have called "the implanted principles of action," which Hamilton calls by the general name of "desires."[1] But the will is in so many respects different from the other conative powers that we prefer the classification given above, and now more commonly adopted, of Intellect, Sensibility, and Will.

The discussions upon this branch of our subject seem interminable. There are two chief questions: First, what is the will; how is it to be distinguished from the other powers or faculties of the soul? Second, is the will free in its action, or is it, like the other forces in nature, only a link in the series of necessary causes?

We must first inquire what the will is, and distinguish it from the other sources of action within us. Physiologists tell us that our animal life is concentrated in a nervous

[1] Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 86.

organism, which is composed of two kinds of nervous matter, — a gray cellular tissue, and a white fibrous tissue. The former is found in the ganglia. The fibrous tissue originates in the cellular and extends to all parts of the body, to the organs of the special senses, the muscles, viscera, and bones. In a living animal the cellular tissue is an originator of force. The nerves proceed from the ganglia in pairs, — the afferent, and the efferent. Any affection of a nerve at its extremity, or anywhere in its course, is reported to the ganglion, as we may say, by the afferent, and force is sent back by the efferent to the muscle of the part affected, by which the requisite motion is executed. These processes may be performed, and in the sympathetic system are regularly performed, without any volition on our part, and even without any consciousness.

Through the presence of this reflex-motor system in the nervous constitution we find that a living animal is spontaneously active, apart from and prior to any stimulus from the senses or the sensibility, and of course anterior to thought or will. The fœtus in the womb moves with energy after a certain stage of growth through the spontaneous action of the nervous force, although it has no intelligence, and receives no impression from without. This bodily motion of spontaneous nervous origin continues after birth, and increases in force, variety, and regularity as the sense, the sensibility, and the intelligence add their stimulus and control. It becomes at length regularly co-ordinated and intelligently directed to particular ends.

SECT. 115. *Along with the growth of this bodily life and activity*, and upon it as a basis, we find the beginning and growth of intellectual action. The mind, as well as the body, is spontaneously active. Its first sensations and emo-

tions are very confused and undiscriminated, as are the bodily motions at first. After some experience the mind comes to separate them from each other, and gradually brings out the consciousness of self as a permanent being, and of these as its own sensations and emotions.

This discrimination of the permanent self from the various transient activities of the soul and body is the essential condition of *will*. Not all our activities, therefore, nor all those activities which are for definite ends, are activities of will. Will is a faculty of a self-conscious being as such, of a self, an ego. "Will is conscious self-determination, the self-determination of an ego. As there is no real exercise of will while self-consciousness still slumbers, so there is no real self-consciousness without the exercise of will. Self-consciousness and self-determination appear together, as if by magic, in one and the same moment." [1]

But we cannot say that mere self-determination is will, unless we have first defined "self" to be a rational, conscious, moral person, an ego. The fact that a being is determined from within does not make it a voluntary nor a free being. All organic beings are determined from within. Perhaps we might even say that all beings, of whatever kind, as having a nature or constitution, are by that fact determined from within.

As intelligence increases, the mind, that is, the man as a rational being conceiving ends and devising means, gradually acquires the power consciously to direct and control all its own action and that of the body. With proper care and thought, this control over our activities grows in completeness and precision, until through age or disease the

[1] Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin. Clark's Foreign Theological Library, vol. ii. pp. 23, 24.

nature decays. The soul has also the ability to stimulate and increase, as well as to restrain and diminish, this activity of itself and that of the body. *This power of the soul rationally and consciously to stimulate, check, direct, and control the natural psychical and physical activity, is what we mean by the will.* It is the power of the self, the ego, the person, endowed with all the natural spontaneities, rationally to act and to control action. It would perhaps be intelligible, and would convey a correct impression, to say that the will lies back of and above all the other impulses and powers of the soul as their arbiter and master. It is not first, but last, developed of the psychical powers in the order of time, but it is the ruling power; it is pre-eminently the man, the rational self-conscious being, acting and controlling the subordinate activities of his nature. It may abdicate the throne and leave the soul to the sway of conflicting passions; but this brings disorder into the life, and reduces the man to a lower level.

From the previous chapter we see that this ruling power is not an absolute, arbitrary, or autocratic master, but must rule according to law, — the fundamental law of duty implanted in the soul. It is in connection with the *will* that this *sense of duty* comes forth to the consciousness of the self as the implanted and self-asserting law of its rational life. Man is, therefore, an impulsive and intellectual being, with the power of rational self-stimulus, self-direction, and self-control, subject to the ever-present law of duty.

SECT. 116. *There are, therefore, three sources of activity within us:* first, the purely spontaneous and unconscious nervous activity which aims at no special end beyond itself, but terminates in action merely, and is fitful. This is at

first entirely physical; but in connection with it, what we call the psychical activity at length comes forth in all its fulness. Second, the implanted principles of action, which we call appetites, desires, and affections. In these there is a definite end to be gained, though the actor is not originally self-conscious in it, but is impelled towards the end prior to his own thought, and independently of it. This kind of activity is also inconstant, and in some of its forms periodic. Third, the will, *which is the power of the soul as a rational and self-conscious being rationally and consciously to stimulate, check, direct, and control the natural, psychical, and bodily activities.* The stronger this power or source of activity, the more vivid is our self-consciousness, the stronger the personality, the more dominant the man.[1]

The first kind of action is found in all animals, however low, and is the prime distinction of animal life; the second is found in all the higher forms of animals. The latter also have instincts which impel them to acts which seem in many respects to be rationally chosen and guided. The will is an endowment of man only, and is more steady and constant than the other kinds of activity; it may become entirely fixed and permanent in the form of a settled purpose to pursue some ultimate and supreme end of life.

After the unfolding of the will proper the two lower forms of activity still continue, and the three intermingle in various proportions in all the subsequent actions of our conscious life. While we can point out in general the distinction between the will and the other forms of activity, and show it to be a distinguishable element, it would be impossible in most of our actual conscious states to draw the line and say

[1] See Ulrici, Gott und der Mensch, vol. ii. pp. 12–34. Also Jouffroy, Introduction to Ethics (Channing's translation), lectures ii. and iii.

decisively: "This element is will, this is appetite or desire, and this is merely nervous action." As we are spiritual beings, coming into existence and developing with an animal body, with and through which we always act, in our full life there must be a thorough blending of the three kinds of activity.

SECT. 117. *But we do not have the full rational and self-conscious life all the time.* Our highest powers cannot, like our lowest animal powers, act constantly. They must alternately act and rest. We are therefore let down periodically upon the lower plane of mere impulse and reflex nervous action, while the rational and voluntary powers rest and recuperate for future action. Sometimes also we find cases in which the nervous action becomes uncontrollable in mature and intelligent persons, as in certain nervous diseases like St.-Vitus's-dance, and in paralysis. Instances in which the second kind of action predominates are much more common, and are not always owing to bodily disease. We see many persons who seem to be chiefly controlled by the implanted principles of action all their days, — as those who follow mere appetite. There are many whose thoughts seem to follow almost wholly the lead of sensible impressions, or the blind laws of association, and their outward actions coincide; the rational will they leave uncultivated; so far as they form purposes at all, it is in the service of the impulses of the moment. The highest powers, instead of ruling, in such cases become enslaved to lower powers, and we correctly say that the man is enslaved to appetite or ambition, to some one of the implanted principles.

In a wise and regulated life, such as our constitution indicates was intended for us, the will is uppermost, as its very nature implies; and it subdues and controls all the lower

powers for their subordinate ends, as tributary to the great end of the moral person as such. It directs the whole man by the light of reason according to the law of duty; or rather, it is the whole man acting ethically, that is, self-consciously and rationally under the sense and the law of duty. The lower kinds of activity do not cease, for we could not possibly live without them; reason and will without them would not be sufficient to sustain our life or to guide our action. But it does not follow that these, necessary as they are in a subordinate position, are to rule our life; they should rather be taken possession of and regulated by the will in the light of reason. The lowest kind of activity sustains, all unconsciously to us, those bodily operations which are requisite for animal life and health, and which constitute the basis on which all else rests. The implanted principles indicate the states and needs of the body and soul, point out the special ends which our nature requires us to seek, and they are perennial fountains of action which stimulate and call into exercise the will, and require that constant government which keeps the highest powers always watchful and active, and thus makes life such an unceasing discipline. This shows the evident design that the will should be the ruling power; and it is always regarded as a perverted and disordered condition when the nervous or the impulsive elements rule, or act without a steady control.

SECT. 118. *The will should certainly be treated as a special faculty*, if we speak of faculties at all. In certain aspects we might perhaps rather call the will *the self which has faculties*,[1] or the central and predominant element of the self. In other points of view we can hardly say that

[1] Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 158, 160. "The will is simply the man."

any one element of the moral nature is any more central or any more essential than another. The will is generally regarded as one of the three great powers or faculties of the soul. But it is important to notice the simplicity of the will as a faculty, compared with the intellect and sensibility. These latter may be divided into various subordinate faculties or forms of action, which are consciously distinct as kinds of activity, and distinct also in their products. But the will is one simple kind of activity. It has sometimes been treated as though it had two faculties or functions, — *choice* and *volition* (ἡ προαίρεσις and τὸ ἑκούσιον); sometimes even three functions have been ascribed to it, — *purpose*, *choice*, and *volition*. The will does indeed make choices or decisions or determinations, differing in scope or comprehensiveness, and with more or less of thought and deliberation; it holds its purposes for a longer or shorter time before execution; or it may execute immediately by one act, or by a long series of successive acts extending even through a whole lifetime: but as an active power, and as distinguished from the other powers of the soul, it cannot be analyzed into different faculties or functions. The apparent differences arise from the degree of intellectual action consciously present with the volition, and from the time which elapses between the grasping of the thought as one to be executed, and the actual final and complete execution of it in the outer world.

SECT. 119. *In further elucidation of the question, What is the will?* (Sect. 114) we must mark the distinction of it from the other powers, and its relation to them severally.

1. The spontaneous nervous force is not likely to be confounded with the will, for it is often wholly out of consciousness, and when we are conscious of it, it is known

only as something to be controlled and used by the higher powers for their ends.

2. The will has often been confounded with the implanted principles of action. These, like the will, move the soul and body to action, and direct the action to definite ends. They are truly "conative or striving powers." If any one of them is in great force and unaccustomed to submission, it may bring all the other powers of the soul into its service. It thus presents a semblance of the will in its exciting and controlling power. But will has been chiefly confounded with desire.

Hartley says that "the will appears to be nothing but a desire or aversion sufficiently strong to produce an action that is not automatic primarily or secondarily. At least it appears to me that the substitution of these words for the *will* may be justified by the common usage of language. The will is therefore that desire or aversion which is strongest for the then present time."[1]

Dr. Thomas Brown says that the only difference between volitions and desires is that the former are followed immediately by bodily movements, while the latter are not.[2] Psychologically, therefore, he considers them the same. Austin adopts the view of Brown. "Certain movements of our bodies follow invariably and immediately our wishes or desires for those same movements, — provided, that is, that the bodily organ be sane, and the desired movement be not prevented by an outward obstacle or hindrance. These antecedent wishes and these consequent movements are human *volitions* and *acts* (strictly and properly so called). They are the only objects to which those terms

[1] Observations on Man, part i. chap. iii. sect. iii.

[2] Cause and Effect, part i. sect. iii.

will strictly and properly apply. But besides the antecedent desire (which I style a 'volition'), and the consequent movement (which I style an 'act'), it is commonly supposed that there is a certain 'will,' which is the cause or author of both. The desire is commonly called an act of the 'will,' or is supposed to be the effect of a 'power' or 'faculty of willing' supposed to reside in the man.

"That this same 'will' is just nothing at all, has been proved (in my opinion) beyond controversy by the late Dr. Brown. All that I am able to discover when I *will* a movement of my body, amounts to this: I wish the movement. The movement immediately follows my wish of the movement. Our desires of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them are therefore the only objects which can be styled 'volitions.' But the structure of established speech forces me to talk of 'willing,' and to impute the bodily movements, which immediately follow our desires for them, to 'the will.'"[1] As powers, therefore, will and desire are the same; they differ only in the issue. If bodily movement follows the desire immediately, it is a case of volition, or will; if means must be employed for the attainment of the end, it is a case of desire. Hobbes says that "will is the last appetite in deliberating."[2] Trendelenburg says that "the will is the desire which the thought has pervaded."[3]

That the will and the implanted principles are not the same either as powers or acts, is evident, — (1) because we often consciously desire or wish what we do not will, and

[1] John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, lectures xviii. and xix.
[2] Leviathan, p. 49.
[3] Logische Untersuchungen (3d ed.) vol. ii. p. 109.

what the will rejects; and we will what we do not desire or wish. (2) We may have contrary or inconsistent desires at the same time, but we cannot have contrary volitions at the same time. We consciously decide between desires which arise in the soul. (3) "The object of our volition must be something which we believe to be in our power, and to depend upon our will. A man may desire to make a visit to the moon or to the planet Jupiter, but he cannot will or determine to do it, because he knows it is not in his power." [1]

The entire discussion concerning the relation of "will" and "desire" doubtless arises chiefly from the ambiguity of these two terms. We have endeavored to employ both of these words in a strict and limited sense, in which the two activities are clearly distinct to consciousness; but many writers employ them in much wider significations. Especially is the word "desire" often used broadly to cover the whole field of the will and of the conative powers. Besides, the co-operation of all the "striving powers," of all the psychical powers of every kind, makes it difficult by mere abstraction and analysis to maintain a clear distinction between them.[2]

SECT. 120. (3) *The will can never be thought to be identical with the susceptibility*, for it is a consciously active power, while the susceptibility is commonly said to be passive, — a mere receptivity. It should be noted, however, that the soul responds to the impression made upon it so far as consciously to receive it.

[1] Reid on the Active Powers, essay ii. chap. i.; Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, book ii. chap. xxi. sect. 30.

[2] Cf. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, book ii. chap. ii., specially sections 137–47.

(4) The distinction of the will from the moral sense is the same as from the implanted principles, and on the same grounds.

(5) *The will is distinct from the intellect* and from every faculty of it. It might most easily be confounded with the judgment or thought-power. The act of will is put forth in the light of thought; that is, after we have come to the conclusion of our consideration of the subject. By its definition the will is the power *rationally and consciously* to exert or restrain the powers of the soul and body; or, in the words of Locke, "The will is nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction."[1] The will adopts the conclusion of thought, however hastily it may be formed, chooses it, seizes it, and puts it into act, or holds it steadily in its grasp in order to put it into act, when the fitting occasion arises, or in order to carry it out by a series of acts through a considerable period of time. But we do not always choose or will or carry out in action what we conclude to be the best. Will sometimes loses its grasp, and we allow mere impulse to carry us away; when we well know and approve the better, we do the worse. Moreover, a conclusion of thought, even when it has been actively and voluntarily attained, does not execute itself, does not realize itself in the outer world of being and action. It requires an act of will to hold it as a purpose, choice, or plan, and to carry it into execution, to make it anything more than a part of the passive contents of our consciousness.

SECT. 121. *Some authors make a distinction between*

[1] Essay concerning Human Understanding, book ii. chap. xxi. sect. 29.

choice and volition, as though these were two kinds of acts of will, or as though the will could be analyzed into two subordinate faculties. But we repeat the view (Sect. 118) that the acts of the will are all of one kind and cannot be distinguished as those of the intellect are distinguished into presentative, representative, and thought powers. In that act of will which is called "choice" the intellectual activity forms a larger proportion of the compound state, and the attention is directed more particularly to that element; while in "volition" the voluntary element, the positive and conscious exertive element, the element of practically adopting and seizing the conclusion of the thought for execution in the real world of being and action, is the element prominent before the attention. The two elements must always be combined, from the very nature of will, from the very nature of the soul (when one faculty acts, the whole soul acts); but the union of the elements, as we say, may be in various proportions, or one element or aspect of the activity may be more prominent than the others. The intellect acts in weighing or considering the subject and the alternatives presented, forming an opinion as to what is wise and right and good. It may be urged and held to its thinking by the will. The practical adopting or seizing the conclusion for execution in the objective and real world is willing, or volition. It is an act in which the self-conscious person rationally and ethically directs himself to the realization of some idea, whether in the outer or the inner world.

SECT. 122. *We are conscious that we can stimulate, direct, and control the intellect*, as well as the bodily powers. There are obvious cases of mental action in which the will has no part. There is a spontaneous mental activity which

is necessary as a basis for any voluntary activity. In all our subconscious mental action, in dreams, revery, and abstraction, the will is dormant or suspended. In our most energetic mental work we can readily distinguish the perceptions of agreement and disagreement, the arrangement of parts, from the rational force or impulse which urges the mind on and holds it steady to its work. Even in voluntary thinking there are different degrees of will-force employed,— that is, there are degrees of *attention* of the mind; and this variation in the degree of energy makes clear the distinction between will and intellect.

What is thus true of the place and power of the will in respect to the intellect, is true in like manner of its relation to the other powers of the soul. They can all be heightened or lowered in tone and force, either directly or indirectly, by the action of the will, as they can also all act spontaneously without its presence and direction.

The will, as a power or faculty, is thus clearly distinguished from the other powers of the soul.

SECT. 123. *We now go on to consider the relation of the various powers to the will.* All the spontaneous activities are material for the rational will, when developed, to govern and use. They are the proper subjects of the will as a governing power, acting under the sense of duty. Without this superior ethical control of the subconscious person, our life must ever be irrational, like that of the brutes, subject to any passion or impulse which may happen to be strongest at the time. But all these activities, strivings, impulses, so soon as thought and self-consciousness are developed, constitute occasions and excitants for the will to act, since it alone can check, direct, and choose between them and their objects rationally. At the same time, these spontaneous

activities, which as native gifts are in full force prior to the development of self-hood, are essential conditions of will; they form a ground and place for it; they constitute a demand for it. But the will alone, acting under the ever-present sense or feeling of duty, can blend and combine into one all these impulses, interests, convictions, principles which constitute our being and make up our life. It is that rationally discriminating and voluntary power alone by whose ethical acting we are made persons, by which I am one person.

From this point of view we need not be surprised when it is said: "The will is simply the man. Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is. . . . If it is a genuine definition that we want of what is common to all acts of willing, we must say that such an act is one in which a self-conscious individual directs himself to the realization of some idea, as to an object in which for the time he seeks self-satisfaction. Such being an act of willing, the will in actuality must be the self-conscious individual as so directing himself, while the will in possibility, or as a faculty, will be the self-conscious individual as capable of so directing himself."[1]

SECT. 124. Having now answered the question, What is the will, and how is it distinguished from the other powers? (Sections 114 and 119) we proceed to elucidate the distinction still further by saying:—

The will acts in view of some foreseen end to be gained, and of the means to be employed. Intellectual action, therefore, must precede volition. If there is no intellect and no self-consciousness, there can be no will. But does the mental action produce volition in the way of causation?

[1] Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 158 and 160.

It does not. Intellectual spontaneities hold the same relation to will as all the other spontaneities. Even voluntary thinking holds the same relation to the subsequent volition put forth for the purpose of realizing the idea in action. It furnishes the occasion for an act of will, not the cause of it. Rhetoric recognizes the need of instructing the mind and convincing the understanding, and, beyond that, of appealing to the feelings and the will. The orator explains and argues that his hearers may have the light in which they may intelligently act; he arouses the feelings that the will may have occasion to act, that the knowledge may not lie passive in the mind, but that his hearers may be interested and impelled to act. It is a general and accepted truth in psychology that we only will when we know and feel. We are daily conscious that our knowledge does not move us to do what we know is suitable and best. We perform the rhetorical process upon ourselves to warm us up for choice and action. We voluntarily think, perceive, remember, imagine, and actively arouse our sensibilities, to the end that we may be stirred or impelled to choose and act clearly and strongly. In view of knowledge, interest, and impulse, often voluntarily acquired, the will — that is, the man as willing — acts to gain the foreseen end or good, and to avert the evil.

SECT. 125. *The sensibilities are often called "the powers of the will,"* or "the springs of action," "because by stimulating us in various ways they give occasion to our voluntary determinations as free agents." "By 'springs of action' I mean an impulse towards any *unselected form of activity*, that is, any which might instinctively arise, though there were no other possible to the same nature, or at all events present at the same time. Under such instigation the nature is *pro-*

pelled forward by a want towards it knows not what."[1] The rational will, if it be developed, then takes charge of the aroused forces and checks them or directs them to its end. In other words, a sensitive and spontaneously active nature is an essential condition to a rational and voluntary, or ethical, nature. All our spontaneous activities of every kind are equally "powers of the will," or "springs of action," and no action of any kind could ever begin without them. But these impulses are not the person; they are pre-personal, and intended as a preparation for personality and to be subject to the person, when he is developed, or when he arrives upon the scene. The person with the ever-present ethical sense stands among and above these impulses, as it were, with conscious right and power over them. This is the very idea of a person.

The impulses are not the causes of volition as acting mechanically, or in any way efficiently, upon the will, for the will can control them, as we know. A prudent man will often deliberately suppress his rising or his raging impulses, and say, like Ulysses among the suitors, "Be still, my heart," because the hour for rational and decisive action has not yet arrived. But the will is itself a native, original, spontaneous impulse of the soul, as self-conscious, rational, and ethical, to choose and act in view of ends which lie before it and are presented to it in its own nature and surroundings. It comes into action only after the development of thought or mental activity, and along with the sense of duty. But this is no objection to the statement that it is a spontaneity. The intellect is not active at the beginning of our lives, but develops gradually; and yet it is self-active. If it were not self-active, it could never act at all, as the will

[1] Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii. p. 261.

develops only after the intellect. As the intellect is formed after and on occasion of the action of the spontaneous nervous force and the implanted principles, so the will is formed after and on occasion of the action of all the previously formed powers. Thus only could it be a rational principle of action under the ethical sense, or have any value or dignity which could place it above the irrational impulses.

SECT. 126. *The terms by which we designate the action of the will* are many, but they all contain other elements than that of pure volition. None of the so-called powers or faculties of the soul act in isolation, and therefore the words in common use to designate their action must carry with them a suggestion, to a greater or less degree, of all the various elements. The terms "choosing," "approving," "preferring," and their opposites, contain more of the intellectual element than of the volitional; "liking," "embracing," "inclining," "being pleased with," and their opposites, contain more of the sensibility; "determining," "directing," "commanding," "forbidding," contain more of the volitional element.[1]

[1] Fleming's Students' Moral Philosophy, part i. book iii. chap. iii.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE WILL (CONTINUED). — MOTIVES.

SECTION 127. *At this point the second general question* concerning the will emerges; namely: Is the will free in its action, or is it, like other forces in nature, a link in the series of necessary causes? We give this chapter to the consideration of motives before entering on the direct examination of the question of moral freedom.

The will does not act without occasion, ground, or reason. The common expression is that the will always acts in view of motives, or that there is no such thing as an unmotived act of will. It has already been said, and is commonly admitted, that there must be feeling before there can be volition, and also an end foreseen, a good to be gained, or an evil to be averted. Out of these acknowledged facts arises the question concerning freedom. We must therefore inquire more particularly, What do we mean by motives?

Since the state immediately preceding volition is thus compound, consisting of the two elements of feeling or impulse, and knowing or thinking, we may make either the one or the other the prominent element, and define motive accordingly. All the various senses of the word fall under one or the other of these two heads. All motives are therefore either impulses or spontaneous activities pressing immediately upon the will for action, thought being subsequently

awakened, or they are objects of knowledge and contemplation, or ends before the mind as worthy to be sought or rejected, the impulses arising subsequently to the thought and knowledge. We might thus speak of the subjective motive and of the objective motive. It would be intelligible also to speak of the motives of the will (meaning "the springs of action," or "powers of the will" pressing immediately upon the will for action) and the motives of the man (meaning the apprehended end of action); the impulses arising subsequently.

In general we say that *a motive is anything which forms a ground, occasion, inducement,* or *reason for the will to act,* — anything which appeals to the will for a decision, — anything which makes it necessary for the rational man to decide and take ethical control of action.

SECT. 128. (1) *In the objective sense,* any external object which is the proper end of any implanted principle, artificial appetite, secondary desire, or moral affection, is called a motive; when known, it forms an occasion for the will to act, — it is something to aim at, an end to be sought or rejected. In like manner any end whatever which rises before the mind, however immediate or remote, broad or narrow, is called a "motive." "Motive," says Sir A. Grant, "is properly the efficient cause (ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις); but applying it to action, we use it invariably for the final cause (οὗ ἕνεκα), which was Aristotle's term for the motive of an action."[1] "Die Vorstellung des Zweckes bildet das Motiv," says Zeller.[2] "Die Vorstellung, auf deren Antrieb das Begehren handelt, heisst Motiv," says Trendelenburg.[3] "A motive," says

[1] The Ethics of Aristotle, i. 387.

[2] Ueber Begriff und Begrundung der sittlichen Gesetze, p. 20.

[3] Logische Untersuchungen, ii. 111.

Green, "is an idea of an end which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realize."[1] "The motive, in the ordinary sense of the word 'motive,'" says Bradley, "is always the object of desire, and never the feeling of desire, —. . . the idea of an ulterior end, or that which we commonly call motive."[2]

Motive in this sense is sometimes called the "objective" motive, sometimes the "moral" motive, sometimes the motive "of the man." But this end as conceived or thought of cannot be motive or moving power in itself, but only by exciting the sensibility in some of its forms. Indeed, if the sensibility is not excited by the object or in the presence of the object, it could hardly be called in any sense an end. We know no ends and have no ends, except as we are endowed with a spontaneously active nature going out of itself towards objects and ends, and needing, according to our constitution, to be intellectually grasped and ethically guided. In other words, we are moral persons endowed with various spontaneous activities towards ends, which we must take possession of and direct towards the ethical end of the whole as a whole. The ability and the prompting thus to take conscious possession of all our endowments and to use them is what raises us above the other animals and gives the special dignity to our nature.

SECT. 129. *In the subjective sense*, a motive is any one of the various conscious impulses, tendencies, or strivings of the soul itself; not the original and simple ones only, but all the secondary and compound or derived impulses. If these impulses are not aroused, that is, if the soul remains wholly unmoved and unresponsive in its sensitive or emo-

[1] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 93.
[2] Ethical Studies, pp. 233, 231.

tional nature in the presence of objects, there is no call, no ground, occasion, or reason, for volition. If motive in the first sense, or the objective motive, is influential at all, it is only through these impulses.[1] But whenever the soul is moved by any of its impulses, of whatsoever kind, there is occasion for a decision of the will; that is, for the will to take ethical control. And since impulses never come singly and alone, but many incompatible ones often rise up together and contend for the mastery of the man, it is evident that there can be no harmony and steady direction of the life, no unity of plan or of conduct, unless the predominating power of rational will, acting under the sense and law of duty, takes the reins of government into its strong hand.

(1) The first act of the will in such a case of excited impulses is to hush the conflict, to check the aroused emotions, so that they may not go on to execute themselves blindly, may not turn the man into their service. This power belongs to the soul as a self-conscious person. The will is inclined and enabled to take this action because it comes into being and ever acts under the sense of duty in reference alike to all "the springs of action" and the objects or ends presented to us.

(2) The second act of the will in such a case of aroused impulses is to set the intellect to consider whether any one of them ought to be carried out, and which one.

(3) The third act of will is the decision or choice be-

[1] Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, book ii. chap. xxi. sections 30–46. Cf. also Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, part ii. chap. i.; Mackintosh, Progress of Ethical Philosophy, pp. 84–5; Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, book ii. part iii. sect. iii.; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, book i. chap. iii. (1st ed.); Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. chap. vii.

tween them.[1] Or if all the impulses at present aroused are rejected, and yet it is thought that the case calls for some positive action, the will may set the intellect to the consideration of the subject in order to find the true view of it and what motive or impulse ought to prevail. The proper impulse will then arise in presence of the true view. It is thus that unity is given to the being by making all these activities instruments of the man acting ethically for a chosen end; and a state in which mere natural forces are acting is transformed into a moral state, — a state in which the moral person acts.

In this view it is truly said that motives are the very sphere of morality; that is, the motive or impulse which the man chooses and seeks to execute, exhibits and determines his moral standing. It may also be said of motives in the objective sense, that they are the very sphere of morality; that is, the ends chosen, held before the mind, and sought to be realized, exhibit and determine the moral standing of the man. The truth of both views is obviously grounded in the actual and necessary adaptation of the inward impulses of the soul and the real world of things amid which we live.

Of these functions of the will in the presence of our spontaneous impulses we may say, in the words of the Duke of Argyll: "It is as if there were within us one being always receptive of suggestions and always responding in the form of impulse, and another being capable of passing these suggestions in review and of allowing or disallowing the impulse to which they give rise." [2] In the same manner

[1] Locke, Essay, etc., book ii. chap. xxi. sections 46, 47; Ulrici, Gott und der Mensch, ii. 25.

[2] Contemporary Review, November, 1880, p. 5.

Lotze speaks when defining an act of will: "We are convinced that we meet with an act of will only where the impulses urging to action are apprehended in distinct consciousness, where, moreover, the decision whether they shall be followed or not is deliberated upon and is left to be determined by free choice of the mind, which is unswayed by these pressing motives, and not by the force of these motives themselves."[1]

SECT. 130. *It is common to speak of "mixed motives."* It is true that subjective impulses and objective ends never act except in combination; it is also true that various impulses often arise at the same moment and urge to action, and in like manner that various ends may be before our thought at the same time. If the will be firm, the intellectual sight clear, and the character established, we shall brush aside many of the motives which present themselves, and move steadily on in the path of a fixed principle; but a person whose will is weak will often be distracted and made inefficient by the presence of many urgent motives. Motives may also be mixed in the sense that many impulses may urge and many ends invite us in the same direction, so that it may not be easy to say which was the predominant motive or the real principle of the action. It is for this reason that the moral interpretation of the conduct of others is often so difficult and doubtful; and there are times, perhaps, when we find it hard to be sure of our own.

SECT. 131. *Motives, in whatever sense the term is used in Ethics*, are never to be regarded as forces acting on the will mechanically, or after the manner of physical causes. They are wholly apart from the sphere of mechanics and physical

[1] Microcosmus, book ii. chap. v. sect. 5.

forces. But we speak figuratively of the power of motives and of their comparative strength. But no impulses have a power which the man in his normal and sane condition cannot and ought not to subdue and control. It is the obvious intention of nature that the rational and moral person should rise above the impulses and make them subject to himself; although the complete attainment of this condition is a matter of education and discipline. We are to listen to the suggestions of all our implanted principles, and then to act in view of them as we deem wise and good for the rational and moral ends of our being.

The power of motives is very various. All men have the same original endowments of soul, though not in the same degree nor in the same proportion; but acquired habits and dispositions vary widely. The external objects presented to all are the same in kind, but men's views and estimates of them are very different. The impulses and feelings vary much in different men, and in the same man at different times; but in no case can any physical efficiency be exercised upon the rational and moral person either by objects, thoughts, or impulses. Motives are *influential* merely as furnishing occasion, ground, reason, or inducement for the will to act ethically. They have the same relation to choices or volitions that the arguments and appeals of the orator have to the subsequent action of his hearers. We judge of a person's character by the motives, whether ends or impulses, which prevail with him, or which he falls in with and chooses to execute. It is in this way that we praise or blame men as sensual, or ambitious, or kind, or resentful, or conscientious.

SECT. 132. *What are the motives of good moral action*

and a good moral life? We may answer in general, all those things which have been already named as grounds of the authority of conscience (Sect. 109). The original and simple motive is the ever-present feeling of duty under the impression of which we always act, — a feeling which claims to be the supreme utterance of the whole nature in its relation to the universe in which we live. This is the most permanent of all motives, and in its steady, though quiet, self-assertion, it is the most powerful of all. If it is obeyed, there is no limit to its uplifting power. It will bring knowledge and intellectual progress for the sake of duty and moral advance. Nothing could prevent this but the conviction that duty and moral sense were chimeras, or delusive in their teachings; and such a conviction, if it ever became real, or deeper than a mere form of words, would work intellectual and moral confusion inextricable. Moral principles, habits, and affections are gradually formed, which also act spontaneously as motives.

Social motives co-operate, — as the opinion of good men among whom we live, especially of those whom we regard as wise and great, and to whom we would approve ourselves. The examples of admired characters in history, and the ideals which we form of that which is true and noble and good, command us and lead onward. Pre-eminently the thought of God's presence with us, of communion and society with the perfectly Holy and True One who is over us and about us with a father's love and solicitude to approve, to cheer and support us, uplifts and inspires us in right living and well-doing. These social motives enter into the very centre and fountain of life within us, and especially does this divine motive quicken us in the very source of all our activity.

Objectively, everything which impresses on the mind a greater sense of the importance of virtuous action increases the moral motive; that is, aids the sense of duty in gaining power over the will, and the will in gaining control of all the activities. If the world is morally constituted so that interest and happiness lie on the side of virtue, the discovery of this gives new force to conscience, causes more attention to be paid to it, and strengthens it as an influential principle. The tremendous truths implied in the sense of duty; namely, that we are under a Moral Governor who expresses his law in the constitution of the universe and in our constitution; that we are going on to a final and authoritative decision upon all conduct, such as will satisfy every intellectual and moral demand of all moral beings; that we shall ourselves ultimately have the full measure of self-approbation and disapprobation, as well as that of all the good and of the Supreme Being, — these are objective motives of unspeakable weight to all who apprehend them. If the Moral Governor appoints rewards and punishments as sanctions of our moral conduct (and this is involved in the very idea of the word "moral," and also of the word "governor"), whether as natural consequences of conduct or as positive sanctions, these give force to the moral motive (or they are moral motives) by the vast importance which they impart to moral action.

SECT. 133. *So important have these objective motives to moral action* and a good moral life been regarded, that it has often been maintained that there could be no morality without theism, or without religion. Locke has gone so far as to say (and many have followed him) that the only ground of obligation is "the will and law of a God who sees men in the dark, has in his hands rewards and punish-

ments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender."[1]

We have shown already that the ethical is inborn and inbred in the human soul in every aspect, function, or faculty of it. It is certain that the reality of duty and obligation for us as individuals and as societies does not depend on opinions or theories, nor on any assumptions less profound than those silent and unavoidable ones which form the essential principles and laws of minds and of things, and which are consciously or unconsciously present in all our mutual action and relations to one another. Ethics, therefore, must stand practically and really, whatever may become of any professed metaphysics or religion. Man begins with conduct, and can never cease from moral conduct while he has a conscious life, however dim his perception of the underlying principles of knowledge and duty. He is led on to thought and speculation by his desire to explain conduct, to justify or correct the practical rules and principles which he has received or framed. It will be a shallow philosophy which does not go back at last to the Personal Author "of whom and through whom and to whom are all things," which does not see at the beginning and at the end —

> "That God which ever lives and loves,
> One God, one law, one element,
> And one far-off divine event,
> To which the whole creation moves."

But conduct under the law and sense of duty does not cease, however various or inadequate the explanations and justifications of it may be.

At the present time we see the pendulum of thought at the opposite extreme of its arc, and many are laboring to

[1] Essay concerning Human Understanding, book i. chap. iii. sect. 6.

establish a morality "based exclusively on indubitable facts of natural knowledge;" that is, on the facts of life viewed in the shallowest manner and in the most superficial relations, — a morality without God and independent of religion; and we are even hearing of "a morality without obligation and without sanction." But we may welcome all attempts to establish ethics, whether theistic, untheistic, or antitheistic. Ethics is really warranted by every aspect and relation of life, the shallowest as well as the profoundest; and these efforts show how deep and true and all-pervading *the ethical* is as a principle of mind, of the world, and of our life.[1]

This treatise on the Beginnings of Ethics will not leave it in doubt that the fact of Ethics is ultimately based on the fact of a personal God, whether we choose to allow the thought of his being, character, and government to reinforce the primary moral motive in our minds or not. We accept the words of Cudworth as stating the true philosophy: "It is not possible that there should be any such thing as morality unless there be a God, — that is, an infinite, eternal Mind that is the first original and source of all things, whose nature is the first rule and exemplar of all morality; *for otherwise it is not conceivable whence any such thing should be derived to particular intellectual beings.*"[2]

It should be added that the Christian idea of God as found in the New Testament, and of his relation to the universe and to us, combines in itself all those elements which have power both to inspire, to invite, and to urge the moral creature to go forward and upward in the path of moral progress, to work righteousness, to live well, and to

[1] Cf. J. S. Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (4th ed.), pp. 590–91 and note.

[2] Eternal and Immutable Morality, book iv. chap. vi. sect. 13.

do good in all the relations of life. It contains all that the social motives contain, presents the perfect example and the supreme ideal. It also establishes that divine centre for our life and being which is the centre, source, and end of all things; it brings us into conscious and substantial personal relations with all that has worth and is enduring, with the All-Wise and All-Good Witness and Superintendent of the universe; it makes us sharers in the eternal truth as well as in the eternal justice and eternal love which overshadow the world; it enlarges the soul which takes it in as an element of daily life and thought, so that duty and goodness become a powerful impulse, an abiding enthusiasm, a high privilege, and a supreme joy.

SECT. 134. *It has often been maintained that the hope of reward and the fear of punishment* as motives of action corrupt, or even destroy, all virtue. Shaftesbury said that they were selfish, and therefore inferior motives. "Neither the fear of future punishment nor the hope of future reward can possibly be of the kind called good affections, such as are acknowledged the springs and sources of all actions truly good. Nor can this fear or hope consist in reality with virtue or goodness, if it either stands as essential to any moral performance, or as a considerable motive to any act of which some better affection ought alone to have been a sufficient cause."[1] But he owns their efficacy in reclaiming from vice, rousing from lethargy, and in guarding a feeble virtue. "How mercenary or servile soever they may be accounted, they are yet, in many circumstances, a great advantage, security, and support to virtue." Mill says that they give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man's feelings of duty from the

[1] Inquiry, book i. part iii. sect. 3.

interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them.[1] Zeller says that "he who refrains from the wrong out of fear of punishment, or does the good only from regard to the opinion of men and the advantages which it will give him, his real aim and motive is not to avoid the wrong and do the good, but to secure his own well-being or satisfy his vanity. It makes no difference if the advantages in view of which he acts are transferred to another life."[2]

Butler replied to those rigoristic philosophers who would reject as immoral all appeals to hope and fear, that, "Doing what God commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice, and charity may form distinct habits of these particular virtues, and will certainly form habits of self-government, and of denying our inclinations whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all religion proceeding from hope or fear. For veracity, justice, and charity, regard to God's authority and to our own chief interest, are not only all three coincident, but each of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. And he who begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that character which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral, and to the relation which God stands in to us as moral governor of it; nor, consequently, can he fail of obtaining that happi-

[1] Essay on Liberty, p. 96.

[2] Ueber Begriff und Begrundung der sittlichen Gesetze, p. 26.

ness which this constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that character." [1]

We may add that the objection to hope of good and fear of evil as motives to a good moral life would be equally strong against every sort of appeal to the sensibility or the susceptible nature. If that is true, the susceptibility ought to be eradicated. But a proper care for the sensibility is no more selfish and immoral than a proper regard for the dictates of the judgment. The judgment itself must dictate such a care, if the man is to live and act at all in the world, if judgment itself is not to cease. How could the intellect act if we had no sensibility? Each is essential to the other in the human constitution. Kant's saying, "Sinnlichkeit ohne Verstand ist blind; Verstand ohne Sinnlichkeit ist leer," is just as true of the entire sensitive and susceptible nature as it is of the powers of presentative knowledge. The enjoyment of good and the suffering of evil are the only adequate means that we know of to create a rational apprehension of the real nature of our acts and our conduct. We are not such purely intellectual creatures, and intellect is not of such a nature, that cool, unsensitive reason alone and unprompted can clearly and certainly apprehend the nature and relations of things. The whole soul is sensitive in all its parts, so to speak. "Sensitive indifference comprehends and involves ethical indifference," and equally intellectual indifference.

This objection seems to rest on the assumption that we are not naturally sensitive beings, or that all our sensitiveness is only physical, and therefore low and unworthy. Many writers have gone so far in this direction "as to deny that prudence, as long as it regards ourselves, can be

[1] Analogy, chap. v.

morally approved, — an assertion contradicted by every man's feelings, and to which we owe the Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, which Butler annexed to his 'Analogy.'" [1]

The original motive to duty and virtue thus reinforced ought to be sufficient to lead all men to a virtuous life. But the great truths of our life and being are dim or hidden from many; the storm of the passions often drowns the voice of conscience and hides from the mind well-known facts and truths which might give strength to it. The sense of duty itself may be dulled, as may every other faculty. It must rest with the moral agent himself to reinforce and give effect to the good principles of the soul, or to pervert and corrupt them, to listen to truth and righteousness, or passionately and blindly to follow evil and wrong.

[1] Mackintosh, Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 127. See also Butler's Dissertation, and Sermon xi., at the end; Analogy, part i. chap. ii., near the beginning; and Sigwart's Vorfragen der Ethik, sect. 3.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL, OR MORAL FREEDOM.

SECTION 135. *We come now to the direct consideration of the second main question* concerning the will; namely, Is the will free? or is the man free in willing? or has man moral freedom? These three forms of the question ought to mean the same thing for the purposes of this discussion.

About this question innumerable doubts have been thrown, and interminable debates have arisen. The idea or meaning of freedom in this relation has been in much doubt, as well as the reality of it. Freedom has reference to a law, — the law of duty; a law not arbitrary and external, but implanted in the soul, and of the very central essence of the soul; a law not self-imposed, but speaking with the authority of a higher power, declaring, as we have seen, the central and supreme will of the world.

We might say at the outset that the phrase "free will" is tautological, and thus settle the question at once. The word "free" adds nothing to the word "will," but simply repeats. So true is this that it has been said that "the proper characteristic of the will consists in the freedom of decision between several motives which present themselves to the consciousness at the same time. So closely is the idea of freedom

connected with that of the will that we may say in general: Freedom is the ability of a being to will some definite thing." [1] The same remark may be made concerning the phrases "free choice," "free purpose," "free decision," "free determination;" the adjective here adds nothing to the thought, but is tautological. One of the oldest English writers declares that "the verb to will has no imperative, for that the will must be always free." [2]

SECT. 136. *The first form of the question, Is the will free? is objectionable*, as seeming to imply a real isolation or separation of the faculties of the soul; whereas what we call faculties are only various modes in which the one indivisible soul acts, or different sides or aspects of the action of the soul. There is no such thing as a will acting singly and independently. What we call "will" is an activity which is always preceded and attended by some state of the sensibility which forms the subjective motive; and this is preceded and attended by some action of the intellect in which we know the state of the sensibility and that in view of which it is affected; that is, the soul acts in willing on occasion of some subjective and objective motive.

It is the man, or the person, or the soul, which acts, and not one indivisible portion or organ of the man; it is the moral person in his complex nature, made up partly of free, partly of unfree, elements. Freedom can only be the quality of an agent; but the will is not an agent, it is only one faculty, that is, one mode of action of an agent. "Not the will, but the willer, is free; for not the will, but the subject whose the will is, is autonomous, — indeed, the will itself cannot give laws to itself, but only make practical laws

[1] Hugo Sommer, Gewissen und Moderne Cultur, p. 13.
[2] Aelfric, A.D. 900.

which are given to it, that is, raise them into the character of commands." [1]

SECT. 137. *The better form of the question is:* Is the man or the moral person free in that act or state called willing or choosing, or is he under necessity? The kind of necessity here intended must be that kind which prevails in physical things, — a necessity of physical causation, — or a necessity so like that that it produces the result with the same irresistible certainty and compulsion, and which can no more be contended against. It must be an all-embracing necessity, compulsion, or control, as strenuous, sure, and fatal as that in physical things, which outward things have in their operation on the intelligent person, though he is not conscious of it; or a like necessity which inward things, impulses of some kind, or thoughts, have prior to and above or beneath consciousness, — such a necessity that the conscious person is held in a predetermined course of action as in an iron groove which he cannot modify or change; or through some secret combination or conspiracy of the outward and the inward, the mastery and direction is in no sense in our own hands, as we ignorantly suppose it to be.

The question is not whether the man is free in his outward action or bodily movements, whether he is free to act as he has willed, in the way of execution, but whether he is free in that kind of inward action called willing, or choosing. If we chose to avail ourselves of it, we might cut the matter short by saying that willing and choosing involve in their very idea that freedom of which we are in search. (Sect. 135.) But this would settle nothing in the minds of those who deny freedom, and it would be regarded as begging the entire question.

[1] Felsch, Einführung in die philosophische Ethik, p. 22.

The question is not whether the man is *infinite*, or *unlimited*, or *arbitrary*, or *without motives*, in his willing and choosing; it is not whether he is in every respect free from the operation of necessary causes; it is not whether he is free from the influence of impulses and thoughts, or outward objects and events, which exist and present themselves to him prior to and independent of his personal action, and in the presence of which he must act and choose. Advocates of the doctrine of moral freedom do not contend that man is self-created, nor that he is prior to the world; man does not in their view make his own world into which he descends and acts as though he were above it and supreme over it.

The real question is, Has man moral freedom? or Is man a moral agent? If this is conceded, we may be satisfied so far as Ethics is concerned. The mixture of the three kinds of activity (Sect. 116) in our nature has probably tended to confound the discussion. If there is any freedom, it must be admitted that it is that of a being which also has activities which are not free. The question is not to be settled by any *a priori* method, nor from any previously accepted idea of God and of his relations to the world; it is a question of fact in the life of the individual soul. As a question bearing on Ethics, it must be determined by observation, by the experience and testimony of mankind as shown in the practical life of individuals and of societies.

SECT. 138. *We must now consider the question, What is moral freedom?* It is not the freedom of an entire indefiniteness and indeterminateness of nature and character, as though a free being were a mere abstract possibility of action. A free being must have a nature and constitution as a basis for his freedom to stand upon and act from. This nature or constitution is a fixed, embodied force or collec-

tion of forces co-ordinated and united into one, which *must act*, and act according to some fixed law.[1] Moral freedom is not the spontaneous and primary movement of the will itself as a power, apart from all connection with other powers. It is the freedom of a man, not of a faculty. As it is fixed in its basis, that is, in the constitution of the man, it must have a fixed law for its action. All forces of which we have any knowledge act according to some law.

Moral freedom is not mere self-determination, or determination from within; that is, from inner as distinguished from outer forces. It is not the same as spontaneousness of action; for other animals act spontaneously or from the prompting of inner forces, as also does man before the development of will. Plants and all organisms act from an inner force. Polar force, chemical force, and gravitation, are all inner forces, acting spontaneously in certain given circumstances and conditions, and according to certain fixed laws. But these forces and the beings, or substances, which are moved by them, are never supposed to have moral freedom.

Moral freedom is rational and moral self-determination; that is, *the self-determination of a rational, self-conscious, ethical being — a self, a person — through his rationality and moral sense*, which are subject to fixed laws as forces, and are guided by an ideal law (the law of duty) towards an ideal end (the attaining of the end of our being as a whole and in all its parts in the proper measure of each) and acting in a world with a fixed constitution and laws.

This moral freedom comes most clearly to consciousness in the deliberate decisions of great alternatives, in the diffi-

[1] Butler, Sermon iii., at the beginning; also Preface to the Sermons, p. 373 (Bohn's edition).

cult emergencies of life, or amid the strife of mutually hostile impulses and the invitation of inconsistent ends; when we seek to change the moral direction of our lives, to alter our character. *It is that freedom which is implied in and essential to the self-conscious, rational, personal direction of our powers*, by which we cease to be the sport of natural and pre-personal forces, and are able to form our own lives, within certain limits, according to a plan, and to shape or change our character.

SECT. 139. *We ascribe moral freedom to men*, and to no beings less highly endowed. A considerable degree of intellect is essential with moral sense and rational will. There is no moral freedom without a moral nature, and we cannot conceive of a moral nature without these three essential elements. Such a being finds himself acting when he comes to full consciousness. He gradually acquires and becomes aware of his self-hood or ethical personality. He gradually finds and learns to use the power to stimulate, direct, check, and control all his various activities; that is, he develops and learns to use the power to will or choose. This power is his own, — a faculty of the spiritual being, of the ethical person, just as the power to reason is. We can say "I think," "I know," "I feel," and equally "I will," "I choose," "I determine," "I resolve," "I prefer," "I command;" "I have powers and I use them; they are subject to me, or they are my modes of acting;" "I act in these ways under the sense and law of duty, that is, because I feel with more or less clearness and certainty that I ought."

Even those who deny the freedom of the will as a formal doctrine of philosophy, admit the power of moral self-direction in some degree, and thus practically admit that moral freedom for which we contend. These persons employ

motives and influences, arguments and appeals, to lead or induce men freely to do as they desire them. Thus J. S. Mill, while arguing against the freedom of the will, admits all that is really claimed in behalf of moral freedom. "Our character," he says,[1] "is formed by us as well as for us; but the wish which induces us to attempt to form it is formed for us: and how? Not, in general, by our organization, nor wholly by our education, but by our experience, — experience of the painful consequences of the character we previously had; or by some strong feeling of admiration or aspiration accidentally aroused. But to think that we have no power of altering our character, and to think that we shall not use our power unless we desire to use it, are very different things, and have a very different effect on the mind. A person who does not wish to alter his character cannot be the person who is supposed to feel discouraged or paralyzed by thinking himself unable to do it. The depressing effect of the fatalist doctrine can only be felt where there *is* a wish to do what that doctrine represents as impossible. It is of no consequence what we think forms our character, when we have no desire of our own about forming it; but it is of great consequence that we should not be prevented from forming such a desire by thinking the attainment impracticable, and that if we have the desire, we should know that the work is not so irrevocably done as to be incapable of being altered.

"And indeed, if we examine closely, we shall find that this feeling of our being able to modify our character *if we wish*, is itself the feeling of moral freedom which we are conscious of. A person feels morally free who feels that his habits or his temptations are not his masters, but he

[1] Logic, book vi. chap. ii. sect. 3 (6th edition).

theirs; who even in yielding to them knows that he could resist; that were he desirous of altogether throwing them off, there would not be required for that purpose a stronger desire than he knows himself to be capable of feeling. It is of course necessary, to render our consciousness of freedom complete, that we should have succeeded in making our character all we have hitherto attempted to make it; for if we have wished and not attained, we have, to that extent, not power over our own character, we are not free. Or at least, we must feel that our wish, if not strong enough to alter our character, is strong enough to conquer our character when the two are brought into conflict in any particular case of conduct."

Even materialists accept what we call the moral as a special kind of action, though they may be illogical in it. Human nature and the facts and necessities of life and society are too strong for any anti-ethical theory.

SECT. 140. *So far as we know anything about moral freedom* by introspection or by observation and endeavoring to influence or control others, we do not know it as dependent on any physical cause for its reality or exertion. It is an original and most intimate or essential characteristic of the human soul when once developed to a normal self-consciousness. The ego, the self, the person, is the sole possessor and cause of it; not the material body, nor the physical forces acting upon it or within it, but the spiritual being, the man who dominates and uses the body, whose the body is. The exercise of this power in particular acts of choice is a psychical and not a physical exercise. It may not call forth any physical movement, or exhibit itself or its effects in the material world. It is not boundless in its extent, nor unrelated to material things and forces. Though

not physically caused, it may be physically limited and restrained. The will, like all the other powers of the soul, is a limited power of acting. Even as spiritual beings we are finite; but this spiritual being is embodied in flesh, and whatever it might be or do, if it were disembodied, we are daily conscious of being checked and limited in the power of spiritual action, and in the power of realizing the thoughts and purposes in the outer world, by this physical incumbrance. All our faculties may be specially narrowed by physical disease and pain. We know how our ability to perceive, remember, and think, is affected by bodily conditions.

Moral freedom in the light of experience is that freedom, be it more or less, *which is implied in the sense of duty and accountability for our conduct*, — the freedom of a self-active, morally sensitive, self-controlling person, to choose or refuse its proper ends, to act or refuse to act according to its relations, to make all the spontaneous powers obedient to itself in its rational and moral action. While affirming this moral freedom, or this power and privilege of moral self-direction, we also admit that there is much that is unfree in us; that this power must be exercised in a world which has a fixed constitution, and which in all its forces and laws is under physical necessity; that moral action is caused and is put forth under strict conditions; that the power of willing and acting, like all the other powers of our nature, is itself spontaneously active, and that it acts according to fixed laws.

"It is sometimes vaguely thought that a belief in free will requires us to maintain that at any moment we can alter our habits to any extent by a sufficiently strong exertion." [1] We

[1] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 1st ed. p. 54; 3d ed. p. 68.

need to banish all such extravagant notions, if we would gain a practical and real view of our moral nature, or appreciate the facts of our moral life.

SECT. 141. *We have referred to the low estimate of the importance of theories* concerning the freedom of the will by some distinguished writers (Sect. 3); but the more common opinion exalts their importance, because it is felt that the entire possibility and reality of ethics, as a science and a life, depend upon the reality of freedom. This difference of view doubtless arises largely from the conception of what is meant by freedom of the will. But the opinion of Butler and others concerning the unimportance of the theory probably rests more upon the fact that no theory of necessity is likely ever to really control, or even take any hold of, the great body of mankind. Speculative theories may for a time blind the minds and cripple the conduct of a few philosophers, but they cannot reach the people with any controlling power. Those who are absorbed in the practical interests of life will be governed by facts and realities, by common-sense and feeling, as even philosophers will be for the most part, in spite of theories. But so far as men in general philosophize at all, right speculative opinions are helpful to conduct, because the man can be at his best only when his thoughts of the world and of life harmonize with the facts, when "mind and heart according well shall make one music;" otherwise the powers are more or less hampered, or distracted and weakened.

SECT. 142. *The general theories concerning the freedom of the will* may be said to be: (1) absolute indeterminism; (2) absolute determinism; (3) moral freedom, — which might perhaps be said to be relative indeterminism and relative determinism. Without entering into any discussion

of the two former theories, as being merely speculative and abstract, we accept moral freedom, in the sense already explained, as all that Ethics requires, and proceed to state the arguments for it.

(1) We may appeal to consciousness, and say negatively that we have no feeling or consciousness of necessity in our willing, of constraint or restraint within our limited sphere of knowledge and action, except from the sense of duty and responsibility, and from the force of arguments and motives intelligently received and freely admitted, and which we equally feel that we could reject if they were erroneous or unsound. A rational being as such always acts under spontaneous impulses, with a sense of duty and in view of truths and arguments conceived or known. We say figuratively that these have force and power with us; that is, as rational beings we see their weight and importance as truths, and we feel impulses in view of them. But we are never conscious of being necessitated as rational, spiritual beings by these or by anything else.

SECT. 143. (2) *If we were necessitated in our action* we could not account for deliberation, trial, hesitation. When the necessary cause operated, the ego, or person, would be powerless to check, direct, or control it; we should go straight to the end necessarily, fatally, and unthinkingly. But there is much hesitation, deliberation, weighing of ends and means, scrutiny of motives or impulses, careful and long-protracted thought; and choice often comes slowly and late, — sometimes so much so as to make action inefficient and vacillating.[1]

The power of the man to check his impulses as they arise

[1] Cf. Butler, Analogy, part i. chap. vi; Locke, Essay, etc., book ii. chap. xxi., specially sects. 47, 56, and 67.

in order to enter on a deliberate consideration of them and of the proper end to be sought in the case, is a power to raise himself above the control of all blind causation in the sphere of subjective motives, and to determine for himself. The possibility of deliberation is a possibility of freedom in the form of rational and moral self-direction. It cannot be asserted that this apparent deliberation is rather only a part of a more subtle and complicated mechanism. Such an assertion could have no basis except a preconceived theory of necessity. We have no sense or idea that we are in any respect mechanical when we check or suppress impulses and look calmly over the field of motives and ends to select a course which commends itself to us as rational and responsible beings. We cannot speak of the subject of deliberation at all except in the terms of moral freedom, and with a consciousness which puts their full meaning into the terms.

It is in this view that Professor Francis Bowen has said that "the decisive evidence of human free will is man's power of governing and restraining for a time the operation of motives, till he can consider and select from them a fitting principle of action."[1]

It cannot be said that the weakness of the cause is what gives place for apparent deliberation; for this could only mean that the causes operating within us are so weak and inefficient that the rational and moral person is not irresistibly urged on by them as by a *vis a tergo*, but is able calmly to take up and view all these, to adopt or reject any one of their suggestions, or to select a new and better course at his own suggestion. This is saying, in other words, that

[1] Principles of Metaphysical and Ethical Science, p. 265; see also pp. 124-5.

we have moral freedom. Hesitation and deliberation do in fact deny necessity. "*It may perhaps justly be concluded that since the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so.*"[1]

But it is not meant by this that in every moral act there is doubt and hesitation before the choice. That would imply a very imperfect virtue often, as well as a very feeble thought. In many cases hesitation would only prove that our freedom was impaired, or not yet fully matured.

There is, however, an apparent inconsistency in respect to hesitation and deliberation; but it is only apparent. On the one hand, we know that tempters desire above all things to secure thoughtless, hasty action, on the part of their victims, to prevent reflection and deliberation. They fear that cool thought will check the sudden impulse to evil, and give room for better motives to arise; that is, they desire to take away, or narrow down, the moral freedom. In this case, deliberation is our safety; the moral freedom stored up, or provided for, in it, is just the thing which it is desirable to secure and bring into action. We show and cultivate our freedom in doubtful cases by reflection, by suppressing impulse until the rational and moral man can come forth and take charge of action. On the other hand, he who hesitates or deliberates in the presence of plain wrong, we say, is lost. To deliberate whether we may not safely do known wrong, secure the gain of it, and escape the loss in the form of ill-repute and self-dissatisfaction, is morally to have weakened the force of upright and self-controlling character already; that is, to have surrendered

[1] Butler, Analogy, part i. chap. vi.

a part of one's freedom and narrowed his just and proper power, — it is to dally with and yield to a debasing and enslaving impulse for an unwise and unprofitable end, a false and illusory appearance of good.

SECT. 144. (3) *We say affirmatively,* in behalf of the doctrine of moral freedom, that we are conscious of obligation, duty, responsibility, accountability. This consciousness we cannot throw off, although it may be uncultivated and unsensitive, or it may be dulled by evil courses; but from it, in whatever degree of clearness and strength it may be present, we immediately infer moral freedom. "Du sollst, also kannst du."

> "So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
> So near is God to man,
> When Duty whispers low, 'Thou must,'
> The youth replies, 'I can.'"

We could not think ourselves obligated to choose and act, or responsible for our choices and acts, if we felt ourselves under necessary causation, that is, destitute of the power of personal self-control and conscious self-direction. Duty and obligation imply a possible variety of action amid which we are freely to select and carry out one course, rejecting all the others. There can be no conscious "ought" except where there is choice and self-direction. This idea and feeling of ought is so deep in human nature, is such a pervading and intimate element of our being, that it is, more than anything else, constitutive of man as such; and it is this chief constitutive element which decisively implies and declares our moral freedom.

We know we are not responsible, and we do not feel so, or judge others to be so, in those outward acts or movements which are necessitated. And this sense of account-

ability is universal among men in some degree and in some form.

It is often maintained that we are conscious of our freedom; but "consciousness and conviction are not the same thing." We are conscious of acting, conscious of power and of spontaneity, conscious of choosing and willing, — that is, conscious that we ourselves choose and will, — and we are not conscious of any compulsion when we choose and will; we are conscious of the duty which rests upon us, and have no doubt of our power to realize it in our action. If therefore we are not immediately conscious of freedom, the result is the same; we are as certain of it practically, and without argumentation or delay.

SECT. 145. (4) *It is the universal sense of mankind that we are morally free*, or, in other words, that we are moral agents responsible for our acts. The criminal does not think that in doing his wicked act he is mechanically urged on by an irresistible force which is not himself (if he does think so, we know he is insane), nor does society think so when it punishes him (if it does, it places him in the hospital, rather than in the prison or on the gallows). The criminal imputes the action to himself, and society imputes it to him. All laws and punishments as well as rewards, all the business and intercourse of life, proceed on the assumption of moral freedom. The very existence of acknowledged moral relations (whatever that may mean) proves that we are morally free, and not merely that we think ourselves so.

(5) Freedom is implied in remorse, self-approbation or satisfaction, in the sense and judgment of good and ill desert, praise and blame, in every degree, and in resentment and indignation. It will not do to say that we feel

approbation, satisfaction, regret, remorse, and the like, because we feel ourselves free, when in fact we are not really so. Such a deception could not so last; it would have been discovered and exposed long ago, not by here and there a philosopher, but by the common-sense of practical men, — society would have been reconstructed upon a fatalistic basis. Moral freedom is in fact an unavoidable assumption in all human conduct and in all explanations of conduct. "Among all the testimonies against determinism, I consider this the most striking: that it is compelled to declare a notorious and incontestable fact, one not even contested by itself, a fact of the universal human consciousness, to be an unavoidable illusion; and yet it cannot in any way show why it should be unavoidable."[1]

SECT. 146. *If we are necessary agents, the necessity is artfully concealed from us*, as is admitted by those who contend for the doctrine. No one ever suspects it as a practical truth, even though he may argue for it theoretically. The doctrine practically held must be deadening to energy and hope, "humiliating to our pride, and paralyzing to our desire of excellence."[2]

It does not follow from the freedom of moral agents that their actions are uncaused. "The law of causation is a universal law of finite being." There could be no such thing as freedom without causality; that is, there is no such thing as absolute freedom so-called, which can scarcely be conceived as anything but an abstract general possibility of action (Sect. 138), with no reality and no being to which it pertains. The moral agent is himself the cause, as the

[1] Rümelin, quoted by Schaarschmidt in Philosophische Monatshefte, Band xx., iv. und v. Heft, p. 214.

[2] J. S. Mill's Autobiography, pp. 168–9, and Logic, book vi. chap. ii.

word "agent" implies. Otherwise, he should be called "the instrument" instead of "the agent;" and that even would imply freedom somewhere in the world, — tracing back through the series of instruments, we must somewhere find an agent. If this moral agent is free, he is a free cause. But it will be asked: "Is not the agent himself under causation?" To be sure he is. He was caused to be a self-active, rational, self-conscious, self-directing, moral cause, — that is to say, a being endowed with moral freedom; and he has no knowledge, or consciousness, or practical ground of any kind, to suspect that any of his voluntary activities are in the bonds of a physical, or any other real, necessity.

We have seen that our whole nature, from the bottom up, has spontaneities, or is spontaneously active in all the forms in which it ever acts at all. It begins with the reflex nervous action of the animal organism. So the soul, as implanted principles, conscience, intellect, and will, is equally originative of action by its very constitution; but the origination in this sphere of the will or choice is rational and moral. Given the human being, body and soul, it acts of itself, the body on the soul, the soul on the body. The ethical will, that is, the will as acting under the ever-present sense of duty, is the central, controlling, and highest power of the soul. It comes into being only with the development of self-consciousness, — that is, with the self-apprehension of our own real moral personality, — and *it is the power by which the man is able consciously and without any physical compulsion or force from without himself, or any necessary blind action of impulses or thoughts within himself, himself to stimulate, check, direct, and control, within certain varying and undefined limits, all the powers of the man.* Or in other words, the man is a conscious, intelligent originator

and director of his own actions. Certain conditions are requisite; but given the conditions, consciousness as well as reasoning indicates that we are free first causes, or moral and responsible causes.

SECT. 147. Human power is very limited; there are also limits to our freedom, because man is a conditioned, dependent, and not an independent, a finite, and not an infinite, being. But the limits of our power and of our freedom *are never* irrevocably fixed, but are constantly varying.

(1) *Considerable development of soul is necessary* that the will may be formed, and place be made for freedom. "As the thought gradually ripens," says Trendelenburg, "so also the free will is not born ready made, but is acquired in development."[1] "The man is not originally free, but becomes free. The freedom of different men is different; it is different in the same man at different times, and in no one is it at any time guaranteed as against every other will."[2] As freedom is gradually acquired and enlarged, so it may be gradually lost by the decay of the powers in old age or disease, or it may be wasted and thrown away, after it has been well acquired, by folly or by loosening the rein of self-discipline. The outward circumstances into which we are born affect the degree of our freedom. "There can be no question that the man who has been subjected to the various influences, intellectual, moral, social, legal, and religious, of civilized life, and who has received the impress of those influences, possesses a far greater power of self-restraint than the savage, the Arab of our streets, the spoilt child, the undisciplined youth, or the man who, as we say, is the slave of his pas-

[1] Logische Untersuchungen, ii. 113.

[2] Volkmann, as cited in Felsch, Einführung in die philosophische Ethik, p. 22.

sions."[1] Not only is moral freedom acquired in development, but character also — which more than anything else is the ethically trained will, or the result of the training or want of training of the will — is an acquirement, not an original gift. Faculties and powers, temperaments and tendencies, in germ or embryo, are gifts, all else is acquisition.

SECT. 148. (2) *The fact that will is so late developed* in the history of the growth of the soul tends to limit its freedom and its power. We have seen that prior to it are the spontaneous nervous activity in the animal organism, the sensibility, specially the implanted principles of action, and the intellect.

Now, before the self has been developed and the conscious power of self-control is unfolded, these natural forces have become strong, and to some extent fixed habitually in their modes and tendencies of action. They have thus set up a decided bias of the soul. It is not as though the reins had been first placed in the hands of the conscious, rational, ethical will or self, before any movement began; not as though this self had with clear purpose and foresight first initiated and directed all movement, — but the ethical person comes on the scene and tries to take up the reins after the movement is strongly under way. Obviously, this fact must put a serious limitation on his power. He must win his mastery, if at all, by a severe contest with strongly self-assertive forces which already have possession of the field. It is conceivable that the ethical person, entering into this contest with the unfree activities, should go on steadily to a perfect rational and moral control. To attain this perfect moral self-control, that is, perfect moral freedom, is the proper end of all true education. It is conceivable also

[1] Fowler, Principles of Morals, part ii. p. 333.

that if our nature were perfectly pure, sound, and untarnished, without any disease, perversion, or corruption, and free from the influence of evil example, these pre-personal and unfree activities might all be perfectly in the line of what the will should choose and the conscience approve. They would thus be tributary and helpful to moral freedom, instead of being forces requiring to be conquered and ever ready to revolt. But the fact is that the bias of the soul is generally not in the right direction, from whatever cause. To say the least of it, the sensibilities are unbalanced and prone to evil and dangerous courses, and the mental sight is unclear.

SECT. 149. (3) *Acquired habit and prejudice, any evil and vicious character, formed and fixed,* may overmaster us and narrow our previous freedom; but good character is freedom of the highest kind.

(4) *Violent pain and great bodily weakness* may destroy the conditions of volition and self-control by weakening or confusing the mind. In like manner torture, or fear, or an overwhelming force of any passion may narrow one's freedom, or take it away entirely, for a time. Thus there may be such a thing as "emotional insanity," lasting but for a few moments, and, considered by itself alone, really excusing error, wrong, or crime. Violent emotions may make it impossible for a person to conceive or hold before the mind any other course than that dictated by the present passion, so that there is no place for thought and decision; one cannot separate his rational self from the blind impulse, which naturally arises and rages within him, so as to resist it, or even self-consciously to identify himself with it. He thus becomes for a time rather an instrument of blind passion than a self-conscious agent directing his own action.

When one comes to himself, as we justly say, out of such a passionate condition, or collects himself so as to view what has been done, he may see and acknowledge the evil and wrong of it; he may have a feeling of bitter pain and guiltiness that he allowed himself so to lose himself, so to fall under the control of blind forces and do things which are truly abhorrent to him in his sober and rational condition. But this power of recovering one's self will depend on the degree of moral cultivation, the strength with which the moral self-hood has been developed.

There are few who may not occasionally be taken unawares and be "betrayed," as we say, into unreasoning courses, — few who may not have their freedom temporarily narrowed or taken away by surprise or violence. We daily see differences among men in the degree of independent, self-controlling personality. But this is just like knowledge and intellectual power; there are different gifts, but in all, the gifts may be cultivated, or allowed to diminish and run low.

SECT. 150. *Neither the power of habit, prejudice, and formed character,* nor that of torture, fear, and passion, has any natural superiority to the normally developed personality, such that we are necessarily incapable of moral freedom. Very weak chains may bind a weak and unresisting person. But we may confidently say that in human nature the formation of a free moral personality able to overpower all the blind inner forces and the outer attractive influences, is the designed end of the constitution; and when this personality is formed, it will be able gradually to modify and transform even the most fixed character. All the natural situations of life in the family and school, in all the social, civil, and religious relations, are fitted and designed to secure for us moral freedom, and to broaden it into a com-

plete self-control. But these situations and relations may also be turned to evil, so as to give a bad education and a narrowed freedom. Everything which perverts or misdirects the powers, or in any degree injures the just and true balance of the nature, weakens and narrows the man.

The power and freedom of a man will have reference to, and depend on, the use he makes of his endowments in accordance with their nature and for their proper ends. But no right and just use of our powers can ever lift the man out of his finite and dependent nature into a so-called absolute freedom or infinite power. On the other hand, so long as the moral nature lasts, there will be some power and freedom. One's bondage may become very great, so that there is little likelihood of escape from it in the ordinary course of human training. Insanity may suppress one's freedom for a time, or permanently, if its cause is permanent; idiocy may destroy it altogether, or bring it to the very verge of extinction. We are all very far from having that perfect or ideal freedom which we would have if we were perfect in our kind and morally pure.

The greatest freedom possible to any given man at a given time is that which he has when his will is entirely subject to the law of duty, when to the best of his knowledge he promptly and perfectly seeks and does what he ought. Then the highest elements of his nature are regnant, and all the elements, so far as he knows how to secure it, will have their legitimate place and activity for their designed ends. There will be a harmony of the activities with each other and with the relations, so far as knowledge goes, and there will also be a growing knowledge and an ever greater harmony. Towards the state of greatest possible freedom for human nature we must advance with a

slow progress by moral education and training. Liberty is thus acquired, not given to us originally. The Duke of Argyll speaks of man as "a being comparatively free."

Limitations on our liberty and power which do not destroy them do limit our responsibility. We appreciate also the recognized fact in common life that there are many degrees of responsibility in different men, and in the same man at different times.

SECT. 151. *We have used the term "necessity"* to designate the doctrine which is opposed to that of "the freedom of the will," or of "moral freedom." But this word "necessity" is rejected by many in recent times, as savoring too much of physical causation, or as being equivalent to fatalism. "The subject will never be generally understood until that objectionable term is dropped," says J. S. Mill.[1] The word which is substituted is "determinism," or "predeterminism." These terms are "fairer," in Mill's view. What he wishes to get rid of is the idea or feeling that there is any more "stringent bond of union," "more intimate connection," "peculiar tie," or "mysterious constraint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent," than appears to the eye of the passive onlooker, or than is involved in the mere time-relation of succession. He wishes to abolish the entire idea of cause, in the common understanding of it, as a real force actively producing or compelling a result, with some such strain, stress, energy, activity, or exertion as we imagine we are conscious of in our muscular action when we lift a weight or exert or resist a pressure. "There is nothing in causation but invariable, certain, and unconditional sequence," without any force, or binding tie, or irresistibleness of positive action.

[1] Logic, book vi. chap. ii. sect. iii.

But Mill maintains that causation in the entire physical world is likewise merely "invariable, certain, and unconditional sequence," so that we have to reckon in the region of volition and choice with the same relation precisely which we call, and feel to be, positive, forceful, compelling, active energy in the outer world, with that which the physicist calls *vis viva*. If we call it merely determinism in morals, it is also only determinism in matter; if it is necessity, or blind, irresistible compulsion or active force in matter, it is the same in morals. But men think they know too much of the reality of active energy, force, or exertion of power in the material world, and of the pitiless, blind necessity with which it acts, to admit that it can be reduced to a mere time-relation. If we do not try to *influence* matter and bring about changes in it by argument and appeal, reward and punishment, but by active force which works blindly and unconsciously to the end; and if causation is of the same nature in both matter and mind, in a philosophical point of view, — we are more likely to import necessity into morals than to cast out causation from matter.

But how futile to try to operate, or to speak of the operation, in the same way in these two worlds, as though the relation were the same. The attempt to introduce the new word "determinism" shows how conscious this whole school of thought is that there is a real difference in fact: in the one world necessity, in the other moral freedom. If there is no difference, if cause is the same in both matter and morals, we should be satisfied with the word "necessity" in both, or should employ "determinism" in both. The change of term, therefore, can only produce confusion of thought or deception, and cannot relieve the subject of any of its difficulties.

CHAPTER XVI.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF MORAL FREEDOM.

SECTION 152. *As we have not entered into any positive statement* of the various theories of necessity or determinism with a formal refutation of them, it may be practically useful to state in brief the substance and ground of some of these theories in the form of objections, as they are often urged to what we regard as the true doctrine upon the subject, and to indicate briefly the answers which our doctrine suggests and requires. The doctrine of moral freedom holds the field everywhere as a practical doctrine. It may therefore justly require those who hold the doctrine of necessity or determinism to assume the burden of proof, and may content itself with short answers to merely speculative intruders upon its ground. These objections are mostly old, and are of various types, according to the special standpoints of their authors; and they, as well as the answers to them, form the common stock in trade of the debaters upon this standing puzzle of philosophy.

These objections may be divided into two general classes,— first, those which arise from the preconceived idea of God; and second, those which arise from the idea of causality.

We may remark at the outset, concerning both classes, that the attempt to settle a question of human psychology and ethics by arguments drawn from an abstract and *a*

priori principle is obviously an error in method, and is fitted rather to furnish a good field for lively and ingenious debaters than really to determine any question of fact and practical life.

SECT. 153. The first class of objections is based on the supposed inconsistency of moral freedom with the divine attributes of omnipotence and omniscience.

(1) *Human freedom is irreconcilable with God's omnipotence.* That is to say, if men were free, they would have a power which God could not control. But an omnipotent being who is rational and moral must have moral freedom himself, and therefore power to set bounds to his own working, to direct and restrain his own action; he must have power to create free agents like himself, and to assign them a limited sphere of action upon which he can refrain from infringing, which he will not enter except in the same manner and upon the same conditions that other men enter it, — namely, by argument and appeal. This does not set men above God's power, nor aside from it. It only implies that for some purpose of his own he wills to allow them a limited freedom, such as we call moral freedom.

This objection proceeds on the assumption that God is a mere irrational, all-pervading, blind force, without self-control, without law or end; it lowers the idea of God, and itself contradicts God's omnipotence.

SECT. 154. (2) *It is objected that human freedom would render impossible the divine prescience and foreordination.* But God does foreknow and foreordain all events; therefore there is no freedom in man. This objection lies against that boundless arbitrariness which is supposed to be involved in all freedom, and not against the moral freedom which man possesses.

Our conception of knowing, so far as it is applicable to this subject, is either that of immediately perceiving, or that of inferring from reasons. In the first case, there can be no immediate perceiving except of that which already exists. Our choosing or willing cannot, therefore, be known in this way until they have taken place; and it is then too late for the knowledge to affect them in the way of control or modification. In the second case, the divine prescience is reduced to the measure of human inference; it is supposed to depend on a careful tracing out of a series of events connected together by a chain of necessary causes, and is thus limited to the scale of human prescience; that is, God can foreknow only as the astronomer foreknows an eclipse. The objection assumes that there can be no subjective certainty except where there is objective necessity.

This objection reduces and so far denies divine foreknowledge. It may be that the divine prescience is not the result of a reflective or reasoning process based on probabilities, or on a mathematical calculation of the action of physical or necessary forces. We seem to have some gleams ourselves of a higher kind of knowing, which we call "intuitive."

It cannot be impossible for the Omniscient Being to foreknow the conduct of men who are morally free, since men often foresee the conduct of each other. But what other men may know, or foreknow, or imagine they foreknow, about me and my action does not affect my power or my freedom, nor in any respect predetermine me and overrule my power of self-control. Their knowledge is not at all in my consciousness, nor can it be with me an unconscious force or motive, or have any kind of causative relation to my action; it lies in quite another world from that

which moves me. "We do not feel ourselves the less free because those to whom we are intimately known are well assured how we shall will to act in a particular case. We often, on the contrary, regard the doubt what our conduct will be as a mark of ignorance of our character, and sometimes even resent it as an imputation. . . . We may be free, and yet another may have reason to be perfectly certain what use we shall make of our freedom."[1]

God's foreordination may only refer to the amount of power and to the general circumstances and relations of men, leaving them free morally to will and to work out their own sweet will in their appointed place. He may foreordain that his moral creatures shall choose and act freely, while he eternally and sublimely foreknows what the issue will be in its minutest particulars.

SECT. 155. (3) *It is objected that if men are free, this freedom will so limit God's power* and presence that he cannot be the guide and director of human history; history can have no regular course or progress; human freedom would turn it into a chaos. But we do find an orderly progress in human history as well as in the course of nature, though with various deviations from a straight line, with eddies and backsets.

This objection assumes that human freedom is boundless and arbitrary, that it has no limits, and human choices and actions no laws, that it is not a rational and moral freedom. Moreover it lies outside of the sphere of the facts which must settle the question. The limited freedom of a rational being with a fixed nature and constitution is not inconsistent with laws and an orderly progress under a wise moral governor. So far as men are arbitrary and irrational,

[1] Mill, Logic, book vi. chap. ii. sect. 2.

subject to thoughtless passion and impulse (and none are perfectly rational and free), we might well presume that progress would be more or less unsteady, as it is in fact; but the deviations may compensate for each other, and the result be a general orderly advance. Such has been the case in fact.

SECT. 156. *Concerning this entire class of objections* growing out of what we suppose the divine attributes to be, we may say (1), that our conception of these attributes is too vague and indefinite, too entirely negative, to form substantial grounds of argument as against the real facts of consciousness and of the world of human experience. To argue in this manner is to use the remote, vague, and unknown to discredit the near, definite, and known. (2) We may say also that if along with the perfection of God we can admit the existence of an imperfect world of men and things; if along with the omnipotence of God we can admit the existence of other finite powers in nature, — we can equally well admit human freedom along with divine omniscience. If God could resign his own personal all-being so far as to permit, and even to create, other beings which are in any sense and degree not part and parcel of himself, he could also resign his own all-causation so far as to permit, and even to create, other causes, even free causes, to act within whatever sphere he might choose; and to say that he could not, is to limit God's knowledge and power as the doctrine of the moral freedom of man does not.[1]

SECT. 157. The second class of objections to the doctrine of the freedom of man are those which arise from the idea of causality.

[1] Schaarschmidt, Zur Widerlegung des Determinismus, Philosophische Monatshefte, xx. Band, iv. und v. Heft, specially pp. 212–13.

1. The first objection *is based on the ground of the universal prevalence of causality* in the world of finite beings. But the doctrine of the moral freedom of man does not contradict this. It does deny the universal prevalence of physical causality; it denies that every event comes out of its antecedents necessarily, after the manner and with the constraining power of physical sequences, even though it be not produced by physical causes precisely. It denies the prevalence, in the realm of moral action, of a causality which produces its results with any such blind force, energy, or compulsion as that which exists in the material world. It denies that the link between antecedent and consequent in moral action is such that no thought, deliberation, hesitation, personal or ethical preference, free wish, will, or choice, can come in to consciously modify or change the existing antecedent and to work out a foreseen result by purposed, planned, and selected means.

It is a wholly groundless prejudice to say that physical, or any other kind of necessary, causation prevails through the whole universe of being because it prevails in a certain portion of it. It is not necessary to assume that there is a perfect uniformity in the whole universe, and that there is only one kind of cause. Everything which begins to be, necessarily has a cause, but not necessarily a necessary cause.

When we investigate the moral world we find just as much reason to believe in the reality of freedom, or free ethical causation, as we do to believe in physical and necessary cause when we study the material world. We might just as well try to extend free ethical causation over the material world as to extend necessity, or blind cause of any kind, over the moral world. Freedom has in fact been extended

over the material world. The whole material world was peopled by some of the ancients with personal or free causes. We call those old mythologies exploded superstitions. It is equally superstitious and absurd to attempt to make the ethical world a world of necessary causes.

Every volition has a cause, for it is an event. The man is the cause of the volition. But the man began to be; therefore he had a cause. If man is a free or ethical being, his cause cannot have been a blind and necessary, but must have been a free or ethical cause. At all events, the cause of man made him to be a free or moral agent, that is, an intelligent, rational, moral originator and director of action. He puts forth this free action only when there is some ground, occasion, or reason in the conscious activity of some of his spontaneous impulses, either bodily or psychical, and with a view to some foreseen end conceived as good or desirable. Then the rational choosing agent acting in a non-physical sphere, and without the control of blind or necessary causes of any kind, selects and pursues his own personal course of conduct.

If we trace an event to gravitation, we say that is its cause, and look no farther; though we might inquire what is the cause of gravitation. So if we trace an event to a man, we say he was its cause. Searching consciousness and studying the words and conduct of men as individuals and in social relations, we find that man is held to be, and is, a deliberating, foreseeing, choosing, self-directing cause, a first and free cause; though we may properly ask, "What is the cause of man?"

But we often ask, "What made the man do this or that?" We mean by this question, when applied to a person of sound mind, under what motive did he act, and how came

he to follow such influences; what impulse urged him, and what end did he seek? We do not mean to ask, What was the physical or necessary or blind cause of his acting thus? We are not thus asking, What cause supplanted or took away the rational and moral self-control of the man? Physical causation is employed in all those processes by which purposes, choices, volitions, are carried out in the real world of material things; but these purposes, choices, volitions, themselves lie in the moral and unnecessitated sphere.

SECT. 158. (2) It has been objected to the doctrine of moral freedom *that statistics show the universal prevalence of necessary causes* in the moral world. Thus it is maintained that the number of crimes committed in any nation or community will average the same from year to year, and even those of each month will show an average. The same is affirmed of each particular kind of crime, as suicides, murders, thefts, forgeries, assaults. The number of letters dropped into the post-office without address, and those without prepayment, show an average. There is even a regularity in the sexes and ages of suicides, and in the means by which they accomplish their purpose. There are averages in the various kinds of articles produced by human industry, and in the articles consumed. It is said that these averages prove that men's actions of whatever kind depend, not on any capricious and personal principle peculiar to each man, such as free will, but on the action of necessary forces operating under their fixed laws.

This objection is good as against that notion of a groundless, motiveless, unlimited arbitrariness which many suppose that free will, or moral freedom, consists in. But our freedom is that of human beings, and consists in the power and privilege of free decision or choice between certain given or

possible impulses springing up in the soul in the presence of their objects, or between certain ends presented and the various ways of gaining them. These impulses and their objects, these ends and means, are limited in number and kind; they are substantially the same with all men in every generation, though with infinite minor variations in shadings and proportions. All men are alike limited and dependent beings, with the same fixed constitution or nature, with only a limited freedom and power, and living in the same real world of men and things. It would be strange indeed if in these circumstances large groups of men should not work out such similar results as to show averages. But the fact that men do act in general, or on the average, in the same way under similar circumstances, does not prove that each act is necessitated, any more than the law of averages as applied to deaths or births or to the proportions of the sexes proves that every event or unit in the series must itself be at the average.

But all these averages in the field of human action give just as good ground to infer that conduct is governed by moral freedom as by necessity. To illustrate by one example: It is commonly claimed that the number of marriages in any community in a year depends on the prosperity of industries and the price of corn, and these things depend on the weather and on a long series of physical causes, — that is, marriages do not depend on the free choice of moral beings, but on things over which the human will can have no control, and therefore they are subject to necessity, and there is no freedom in them. But such an example pre-eminently shows the freedom of man. If people are deterred from marrying by an unusual cost of the necessaries of life, the fact proves that they are not controlled by impulse or any

other blind force. They reflect upon the realities of the present and the prospects of the future, and govern themselves accordingly. There could be no moral freedom if we had not ourselves a fixed nature which *must act*, and act according to established laws; and there would be no field for freedom if we did not live in a world of necessary beings and forces acting according to their fixed laws. But in such circumstances freedom is not inconsistent with law; it is even inconceivable that it should exist without law.

SECT. 159. (3) It is objected to the doctrine of freedom *that all our acts are necessarily determined by our previously existing character*, or by previous acts.

It is true that every man has a given natural endowment, a nature with certain powers which cannot be increased in number or kind, though they may be cultivated and trained either up or down. It is true also that fixed habits in any part of our nature do limit our power and give direction to action; but they do not destroy our power nor our freedom, — they do not give a fatal and unchangeable direction to our action. Character is not a fixed and changeless thing, over which the man himself has no control, which makes him its slave. Character in the proper sense is a moral acquisition, and we can change it and our habits, as even necessitarians or determinists admit. We cannot wholly transform them by one instantaneous act, but we can change them slowly and gradually, as we formed them.

That acts should be conformed to character, is involved in freedom, not contrary to it. It implies that the man as he is, controls his own acts; that is, he himself acts, he is free. "If a man's action did not represent his character, but was an arbitrary freak of some unaccountable power of unmotived willing, why should he be ashamed of it or reproach himself

with it,"[1] or endeavor to reform or improve his character? "Conduct which does not spring from character is not properly conduct at all;" it is only a series of chance events. Moral progress in that case would be impossible. "If, and so far as, in the past and present of individual men and of the society which is at once constituted by them and makes them what they are, this desire [to be better] is operative, the dependence of the individual's present on his past, so far from being incompatible with his seeking or being able to become better than he is, is just what constitutes the definite possibility of this self-improvement being sought and attained. If there were no such dependence, if I could be something to-day irrespectively of what I was yesterday, or something to-morrow irrespectively of what I am to-day, the motive to the self-reforming effort furnished by regrets for a past of which I reap the fruit, that growing success of the effort that comes with habituation, and the assurance of a better future which animates it, would alike be impossible."[2]

SECT. 160. (4) It is objected that even if we deny the efficiency of external causes in the sphere of the soul, yet *all its acts come necessarily out of the constitution of the soul itself*, which is given to it and which it does not create for itself.

This objection seems to rest on the assumption that freedom based in a nature, or the freedom of a constituted being, cannot be a real freedom; that is, it assumes that all freedom is a groundless, motiveless, unlimited, irrational arbitrariness, "a capricious principle," as Buckle calls it. It is true that the soul is necessitated to act, and to act according to its

[1] Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, book ii. chap. i. sect. 110.

[2] Ibid.

nature. But the question is whether it is not its nature to be a rational, ethical originator and director of its own acts; that is, to act with moral freedom. This is the natural belief of men.

(5) It is objected that a *free determination is inexplicable.*

It is true that we cannot account for a free or ethical beginning in the sense of carrying it back to a necessary or unfree cause, and showing how it comes out of that. But no real explanation is secured by tracing events through any series of blind causes. Explanation — that is, making things plain philosophically or intellectually to a rational and moral being — comes from ends rather than causes, from the final rather than the efficient cause. Nothing can satisfy the mind but that which is itself intellectual. Ends are intellectual themselves, and therefore intellectually justifying to us. Efficient causes are blind, material, and therefore have no justifying power to a mind. Laws are more justifying than causes. A law of nature is a formal statement of the manner in which causes act, and so far it is intellectual. If now we can step back from the efficient cause with its law to the final cause (that is, from the material to the intellectual, the purpose, or end in view, which set the efficient cause in operation); if we can see the efficient and material in its intellectual origin and intelligent purpose, — that satisfies the mind; that justifies. Moreover, what we cannot explain, what we cannot fully understand in its origin, causes, and ends, may yet be true. We can see a final cause for moral freedom; namely, to make a moral world. No one can give any satisfying reason for saying that there can be only a material world, or a world controlled only by blind physical or necessary causes. If a world of free ethical causes is

possible, it may be that we really have it and live in it, as mankind really believe.

(6) It is objected that free action is equivalent to uncaused action, and this is equivalent to blind or fatal action.

But free action is not uncaused, as we have shown; every event in the world of finite being has a cause. The free rational moral being is the cause of the free action. This removes it the farthest possible from the fatal.

SECT. 161. *If it should be granted that in the sphere of moral action* we are exempt from physical or necessary causation, or from that kind of blind causation, whatever it may be, which prevails in the material world, the question might still arise whether there is not some other kind of necessity which might take away our moral freedom and responsibility. We do, in fact, often speak of *moral* necessity and of *logical* and *metaphysical* necessity. Cannot these kinds of necessity forestall or take away moral freedom?

(1) *Moral necessity* means the strict and strenuous obligation of duty; it means that the law of duty is on me, — I must: not that I have any compulsion exerted upon me from without; the compulsion is from within, from my own sense and thought of duty, which I obey, if at all, freely. "That we do right, if we do it, freely, and yet with a pressure or urgency of it upon us, is the feeling of moral obligation."[1] "This consciousness in which the moral sense and the conscience become active, represents a necessary principle, but necessary in the sense that it is addressed to freedom, and in such a way that by this very consciousness of the morally necessary, the personality is invested with its rights as a free personality."[2]

[1] Grote, Moral Ideals, p. 459.

[2] Dorner, System of Christian Ethics, Mead's translation, p. 139.

Moral necessity is therefore a practical claim, strong and urgent, expressing itself within the consciousness of the man, not a necessity from without controlling the operation of natural forces. If you take away the freedom, you at the same time take away the compulsion. In this sense we have the paradox, — the greater the freedom, the greater the necessity; and *vice versa*. It is true that the more perfectly and constantly one obeys the law of duty, the stronger and more pervading its power becomes through habit and choice, or through established character, — the greater the freedom, the more we are lifted into the high and wholesome atmosphere of a true moral life, into the full harmony and strength of all our native powers, and into harmony with the moral forces of the world. In other words, perfect freedom is perfect submission of the whole nature to the law of duty.

> "Mortals, that would follow me,
> Love virtue, she alone is free;
> She can teach ye how to climb
> Higher than the sphery chime:
> Or, if virtue feeble were,
> Heaven itself would stoop to her."

Moral necessity, therefore, so far from interfering with our moral freedom, is itself moral freedom.

SECT. 162. (2) *Logical necessity* is the strong and irresistible rational connection of thoughts with one another as they stand before our minds. By the constitution of our minds and their relations to the objective world, we cannot but think one truth to be the ground, or reason, or condition, of another in harmony with the objective relations of cause and effect, — or that ideas and concepts have certain rational connections with each other. For example, we

must think the several steps in the demonstration of the Pythagorean proposition so firmly bound together that we cannot rationally deviate from the course of the thought, or refuse any one step after taking the previous one. We cannot refuse to go in any case wherever the underlying principles and guiding laws of rationality lead us. The premise is the ground on which we accept the conclusion by a necessity of thought. Genus and species, substance and attribute, whole and part, reason and consequent, have a certain necessary relation to each other in thought.

But these necessary thought-relations do not impinge on moral freedom; they are rather the essential basis for it; they are rather the necessary joints in the structure of a rational world in which alone moral freedom can exist and have play. If the world of thought were all afloat and lawless or indefinite, without fixed and necessary truths and relations, there could be no rationality and no morality, no ground for moral choice, no basis for voluntary action. Moral freedom, therefore, is subsequent to rationality and logical necessity, dependent on it as a condition, and not destroyed by it.

(3) *Metaphysical necessity* is a necessity lying in or growing out of the original assumptions of all knowledge, — a necessity in the foundations on which knowing rests, as logical necessity is in the manner of knowing, in the connection of the several parts of the rational superstructure. But knowing must have a foundation of firm and fixed principle, as well as a regular and well-jointed method in its structure, or there could be no rationality or morality. Metaphysical and logical necessity are therefore both essential conditions of moral freedom, and can in no way encroach upon it or interfere with it.

In concluding this consideration of the question of the freedom of the will, or the moral freedom of man in willing, we must emphasize one fact already noticed. If we compare the arguments for freedom with those for necessity or determinism, it clearly appears that those adduced in favor of the doctrine of moral freedom are all of a substantial and practical character, based on the real constitution of human nature and the actual life and experience of men in the world; while the arguments in support of determinism are wholly logical and theoretical in their character. They grow out of remote and unpractical conceptions, which in their bare form we may not theoretically deny, but accept and affirm as strongly as the determinist; but we cannot apply them in this sphere to the overthrow of reality and the destruction of all that we know to be true and important in life.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE SCOPE OF THE WILL.

SECTION 163. *The power of the will in the soul* is very great. We can stimulate, check, direct, and control all our powers, both bodily and psychical, either directly or indirectly. We directly control a large portion of our bodily movements in their regular action almost without thought; we create new movements, intensify or diminish and variously modify and combine old ones by directly willing it. Those movements of the body which are carried on by the reflex nervous system we can to a large extent control indirectly. It is a familiar fact that we can directly control the intellectual powers. We know by daily practice how we can increase their efficiency, or, relaxing our personal direction, leave them to wander spontaneously in loose and idle vagaries. Attention is a voluntary application and stimulation of the mental powers; revery and dreaming are the spontaneous, relaxed, undirected, involuntary action of the same powers.

We can to some extent control the appetites, desires, and affections, even in the presence of their proper objects, through the exercise of attention. We know that we can repress them indirectly by purposely turning away the thought to other things; we can excite them indirectly when their objects are absent by purposely turning the

thought to their objects and to their attendant feelings, as represented by the imagination. But we can also to some extent directly stir or choke down the feelings and implanted principles of action. By will-power we can increase or reduce the susceptibility to pleasure and pain. The stoic endurance of a Scævola and of the trained American Indian under torture, shows this. On the contrary, we know how the cowardly, irresolute, and weak-willed suffer and fear on the slightest occasions, or on the least foresight or imagination of evil and pain. The suffering and the pleasure which different people get out of the ups and downs of life is often thought to be a mere matter of native temperament; but native temperament may be schooled and trained in various directions by the intelligent action of our own wills and those of others upon us. Thus character in every aspect of it is a result of training, a matter of wise or foolish choice on our own part or on the part of our various instructors, — our parents and teachers, the community in which we dwell, all the public, political, religious, educational, and social influences amid which we live. There may be large, stupid, or culpable neglect on every hand, but this is no less a matter of will and choice.

SECT. 164. *The limit of duty must be the sphere of volitional control, positive or negative, direct or indirect.* The sphere of moral science therefore is co-extensive with the sphere of the action of the will, real and possible. "The moral life," says Martineau, "dwells exclusively in the voluntary sphere, and but for that would have no existence."[1] "The sphere of freedom is that of the moral," says Wuttke; "whatever is moral is essentially free, and whatever is free is moral. There is, indeed, an immorally

[1] Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 32.

incurred unfreedom; but even this unfreedom is essentially different from the unfreedom of nature."[1] Ulrici says: "As the consciousness in general rests upon the discriminating activity of the soul, so also the *moral* consciousness, the widespread assumption of an *ethical* side of our being, rests upon the discrimination of certain elements of it from others, which indeed likewise belong to it, but do not bear in themselves the character of the ethical. This character, or at least the prime criterion and general mark of the ethical elements of our being, consists in this, that they fall into the sphere of that power and activity which we call the power of the will, and that they presuppose the freedom of the will and the consciousness of it. Only those elements or factors of the human nature and life which have the power of the will and the consciousness of its freedom as the condition of their existence and quality, form the *ethical* nature of man and are designated as *ethical.* He who denies the freedom of the will, therefore, also denies all ethics, and with it the distinction of right and wrong, true and false, good and evil."[2] "Whatever has been brought under the control of the will, it is not too much to say, has been brought into the sphere of morality," says Bradley.[3] Whatever *can be brought under the control of the will* in our nature and life may be said to be in the sphere of morality; that is, we are acting morally and responsibly in taking or neglecting this possible control. It is upon the will — that is, upon the man as a willing or free being — that obligation rests; or, in other words, the man as voluntary or self-directing is the ethical being, whatever unfree or involuntary gifts and powers he may have.

[1] Christian Ethics, translated by John P. Lacroix, i. 13.
[2] Gott und der Mensch, ii. 10. [3] Ethical Studies, p. 196.

SECT. 165. *The will may choose and execute the impulse of duty,* the object which harmonizes with the purpose of our being and with our relations, or any other; and according to the choice we designate the character as sensual, ambitious, compassionate, benevolent, resentful, dutiful, etc. The will is therefore seen to be of the first importance in character and conduct. Whatever choice it may make and establish as a fixed and general principle, this becomes a powerful controlling force at the centre of our moral life to bend and shape the whole being to itself; it is likely to bring all the thoughts, impulses, and other plans and purposes into subjection to itself. Only in this way could the character of a man be unified and compacted into a consistent, solid, and effective force, whether for good or evil. If we are free, self-conscious, and self-controlling in these choices, then we are moral and responsible beings; if not, we can have no praise or blame, guilt or innocence.

A good character is a perfectly formed will governing the whole man in all his actions according to the law of duty. Moral discipline or training is that course of discipline through the experience of life by which we are forced to choose our way, in many cases and amid various circumstances, by which we become habituated to shape our own course and master our lives, or through idle and vicious neglect habituate ourselves to be shaped and mastered by other minds, or by our own transient impulses, or by outward events. The will and the character may thus be formed for good or evil. No man can live in the world and escape moral discipline in some direction, either by positive control and use of his gifts and acquisitions, or by careless neglect of them. It lies with each one of us to determine for himself what the issue shall be. Outside influences ever present and operative upon us we

can never escape; but these cannot wholly take away the conscious personal self-direction, except by our own fault.

SECT. 166. *The acts of the will are usually referred to three general classes,* — supreme choices, subordinate choices, and executive volitions. These do not differ in their psychological nature as acts of will, but only in their scope. Each kind may vary in its intensity or energy, according to the estimate put upon the object chosen, and according to the degree of feeling or emotion excited.

Supreme choices are those acts in which one selects, adopts, and enters on the pursuit of a supreme or all-embracing end of his whole life and being. The importance and far-reaching results of such choices upon the entire life and character are obvious at once, and are involved in the terms employed. This choice is a compound state in which the intellectual element is very prominent. It involves a comparison of the various ends conceived or imagined, the selection of one as adequate and the best on the whole, or as the true end, and the direction of all our powers to the gaining of it. There are but two really supreme ends or all-embracing choices open to us, because the morally good and the morally bad cover the whole field of morals. These ends are commonly expressed in the religious or theological way, as living for our own personal and private self, or, in other words, living for the world, and living for God. Expressed in strictly ethical language, we would say that the two supreme ends for us are the full and complete life of duty in all the relations in which we stand, or the rejection of duty for the indulgence of some of the selfish or lower and baser tendencies.

This supreme choice determines the character in general; but the particular type of character is determined by the

subordinate choices and executive volitions; that is, by the manner in which the supreme choice is carried out.

It is conceivable that the supreme choice might change often, but it does not in fact; it is generally permanent, though the conduct might often seem to indicate a change. It is sometimes held that moral freedom is found only in supreme choices. This would be to assume that all minor choices and volitions are necessitated by the supreme one. So far as the supreme choice is thorough and intelligently made, it does, of course, give a general direction to all the minor acts of the will. This is what is meant when we use the term "supreme choice;" it is a choice which embraces in its grasp all others, and gives direction to the whole life. But this does not render the minor choices and acts any less free in a moral sense. We freely adhere to our main purpose and carry it out in this or that direction; and there is always room for deliberation and choice among the various means of carrying out our chief end, — that is to say, among subordinate ends.

SECT. 167. *These supreme choices* in the strict and literal sense are with many persons more theoretical than real. Most men drift in their moral life, far more than they definitely and coolly decide on and steer consciously towards some one specific port. But all moral drifting implies practically a supreme choice, or it is morally equivalent in its results to a supreme choice. Not to choose, or to decline to choose, is still choosing practically. But such is human weakness and indecision that instead of a comprehensive choice deliberately made after a broad survey of the possible ends of life, most men practically settle their general course and character by some specific choice of duty or pleasure, with very little thought for the great

whole of their being and relations, with very little distinct consciousness of their position, and foresight of the permanent results of what they do. This could hardly be otherwise in the earlier periods of our self-conscious life. They subsequently fix that kind of choice by practice and habit, without ever broadly considering and deliberately selecting a great and general purpose. A real supreme choice is made when one, with deep reflection and sense of the wrong, error, or poverty of his life, resolutely turns from self-indulgence or self-seeking to the love and service of God. When such an outlook over the past and serious deliberation for the future comes fully upon one, it is the greatest moral crisis which can occur in the life of a man. One may also reject that life of high full duty and pure service; but the rejection is more commonly, if not always, involved in lesser choices and in the careless neglect of truth and righteousness, rather than in one supreme crisis of clear and positive evil decision.

Whatever supreme choice one may make, it is sure to be lost sight of sometimes. No man has intellectual grasp or cool thought enough to keep the one end always clearly in view amid all the excitements and temptations of life, or to appreciate the bearing of all his actions upon it. Men of the highest and purest purpose therefore need the forbearance and charitable consideration of their fellow-men; especially do they need to be judged mercifully by the Omniscient Being, on account of their weakness of mind and will.

SECT. 168. *Subordinate choices are so called from their relation to the supreme choice*, or, generally, to some other choice of a higher grade or more comprehensive character. They are those by which we select the means for carrying

out or executing the supreme or higher choice. They are numerous and of very many grades, embracing all the variety of plans with which we busy our minds and express ourselves in life. Some of the higher ones are the choice of a profession or occupation, of a residence, of a companion for life. These bring great troops of minor choices after them. Moral freedom extends equally over this entire field of minor choices in all their grades. We may "hesitate, deliberate, incline one way, determine, and at last do as we determine, as if we were free," in all of them.

We may illustrate the relation of volitions or choices to each other by an example: I will to go to the post-office; that I may get a letter; that I may have the money it contains; that I may buy my books and meet my personal expenses; that I may complete my college course; that I may be prepared to study law; that I may practise it as a profession; that I may get a livelihood, or gain office, or honor, or wealth, or power; that I may thus have my own selfish pleasure, — a supreme end; or may fulfil all my duty in the world to myself, my fellow-men, and to God, — a supreme end. Many steps might be inserted between most of those here mentioned. All these choices contain both the intellectual and the volitional elements.

When the will is fixed in a clear and strong purpose, whether of a supreme choice or of one of these major subordinate choices, it "attracts to itself those thoughts and feelings which correspond to its central and germinating tendency, not by a definite resolve, but as if by magic and imperceptibly, and makes these the prevailing motives and determining principles of the inner life which co-operate with it towards the given act." A choice clear on its intellectual side and resolute, or strong and persistent on its

volitional side, is of very great importance with reference to a man's power and reliability in society and in the work of the world. Moral drifting or moral opportunism can never make an admirable character or be in the highest degree valuable. But neither clearness and strength of mind nor force of will is given to all.

SECT. 169. *Executive volitions* are those acts of will by which we put in actual execution our more general choices. They contain far less of the intellectual element, and are chiefly volitional. For example, I choose to go to the post-office; I execute the choice by putting one foot before the other in walking thither. The thought of the thing to be done must be held in mind, of course, but not necessarily before the consciousness. The several particular acts by which the purpose is executed may at first be put forth with present thought and consciousness; but they tend constantly to pass into the region of the automatic and unconscious action, — that is, to lose the present conscious intellectual element which is so prominent in the higher acts of will. For example, in playing on a musical instrument, in walking, or speaking, we at first consciously think of each act, and distinctly will it. But when the kind of action becomes familiar by practice, one general thought and volition is sufficient to cover a long series of acts; we will the whole as a whole, and think not at all of the parts and elements which compose it. We can bring these parts back again into consciousness by attention, and perform the act as the child does; but this delays and encumbers it, makes it less perfect, more laborious and wearisome. The more of our necessary and routine actions we can thus cast out into the automatic sphere, the better, for thought and will are thus left free to attend to more important matters. This ten-

dency to automatism in action is both bodily and psychical. It is evident in all established habits. Habits are self-acting, as we say, and unless we carefully guard ourselves, evil habits may overmaster us and bind us in a chain from which we cannot easily escape. Habitual action forms the body and the soul, and fixes tendencies so deeply that they may be transmitted to offspring.

Frequent change in choices makes a man fickle, or vacillating and inefficient. Wisdom in selecting appropriate ends according to one's capacities, united with firmness and vigor in pursuing them, makes a man steady, efficient, and noble. If one makes it his supreme choice and purpose to learn and do all his duties towards God and men in all the relations of life, he becomes steadfast in the pursuit of that which is highest and noblest, he forms in himself the highest character, becomes largest and fullest in his own personal life and development, and most capable of doing and enjoying all that befits the nature of man in the world.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO MORALITY.

SECTION 170. *In order to justify the view of conscience* which has been presented above, and show the origin of our moral ideas and principles, and the nature of virtue and vice, it is necessary now to speak more particularly of the relation of the intellect to morality.

If we were continually led by whatever impulse was stronger in us for the time, without general ideas and principles formed by thought, without government and orderly direction of our powers and activities according to some fixed law, with reference to some end rationally conceived and held before the mind, we should not be moral beings, not even though the feeling of duty were found among our native impulses, and pressed its claims upon us with the rest. Our life would be but a restless and irrational pursuit, now under the control of one impulse, now of another. Whatever impulse might happen to be most prevalent, and whether order or anarchy, happiness or misery, were the result, we should be alike non-personal and non-moral beings; the self-consciousness and the will, the sense of obligation to some settled and orderly course of conduct, could not arise within us. We have already stated, and now reaffirm the fact, that the moral nature of man includes

and requires the intellect in all its faculties, products, and principles,—the same intellect, operating on the same basis and according to the same laws, as when we construct philosophy or the physical sciences, as when we lead a life of effective industry or commerce, or of public political or moral action for the welfare of the State or the individual improvement of our fellow-men.

The office of the intellect in morality is in general the rationalization and moralization of what are called "the active powers of man." The intellect is the means by which the will, acting under the sense and law of duty, lays hold of all the spontaneities, subdues and marshals them in fit and natural order as elements of the personality, harmonizing and directing them all into their proper channels for the attainment of the proper end of each in due subordination,—thus unifying the nature, making it one self-contained, self-controlled, self-directed person.

SECT. 171. We say then that *the first work of the intellect is to form the self and the idea of self*, to bring us to self-consciousness and personality. The ethical is a quality belonging to personal beings alone. We may owe duties to beings which are merely sensitive, and not themselves in any degree ethical or personal; but impersonal beings can owe no duties. In our conduct with reference to them the moral is, in a sense, one-sided; it springs wholly out of our personality.

"'Personality' is, no doubt, a term that has often been fought over without any very precise meaning being attached to it." It is defined by Green as "the quality in a subject of being consciously an object to itself; . . . self-objectification is at least the essential thing in personality."[1] Accord-

[1] Prolegomena to Ethics, book iii. chap. ii. sect. 182.

ing to Locke, a "person is a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking being, in different times and places. . . . Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person. It is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and of happiness and misery." [1] More fully we may say that *a personal being is one who, whatever powers and susceptibilities he may have, binds them all into one by a reflex consciousness of himself as permanent amid all his various acts and feelings, and of these as his, over which he has power, and for which he is responsible.* It implies and springs from a fixed centre of consciousness, unfolding into self-consciousness, with a sense of power and accountability.

Personality, therefore, is in its very nature ethical. The ethical is its central and most essential element; but the ethical presupposes thought, and goes hand in hand with choice or will, — or rather we may say that thought and will cannot exist in any high sense or degree except as ethical thought and will, or thought and will under the governance of the supreme sense and law of duty. When these three elements are developed into strength and activity, — that is, when the man becomes self-conscious and self-controlled under the sense and law of duty, — his personality is established.

SECT. 172. *From the idea of self or a person* as possessor of powers and subject of sensitiveness follows the idea of rights. Every person has a natural right to whatever is ne-

[1] Essay concerning Human Understanding, book ii. chap. xxvii. sections 9 and 26.

cessary for the preservation and defence of his personality; that is, for the integrity of his moral being, for his bodily and spiritual support and development. All sensitive beings also have rights, within limits, even though they have not mind enough to know and claim them as rights. The claim in these cases may be said to arise out of our own ethical personality, or it gains force only from our personality in its relation to their nature, and it does not arise out of their nature simply. Natural powers have a right to act within proper limits and in due subordination.

But we do not have the idea of rights for ourselves except as against other rational or ethical beings, — never as against brutes or mere things; that is to say, brutes and inanimate things do not owe duties to us, because they are not ethical beings in any respect, and cannot know or feel obligation. We do not set up for ourselves rights against them, because they cannot consciously or intentionally reach, or try to reach, over into the field of our personality to check or diminish it. The idea of rights and the idea of duties are so closely related that we could scarcely have the one without the other. They both grow out of the essential endowments of the personality, and they are correlative to each other: rights for one person impose duties for another, and duties for the first involve rights for the second.

The fundamental principle or ground of rights is, that a person as such must have a certain power and range of unrestricted personal action in order to be ethical and act ethically, in order consciously and purposely to pursue the ends of his being. There could be no personality to a being within the bonds of a blind, unreasoning necessity, without known alternatives and a conscious choice. There must be some range of action, be it more or less, within which we

shall not be infringed upon by any compelling power; that is, there must be some extent of moral freedom securely preserved and defended. This range of our moral freedom is hedged round and protected by a rampart of rights equally claimed and acknowledged by all. But within this sacred protected sphere the person is so much the more strictly bound by the law of duty.

It is evident that when we speak of the rights of unethical beings they must rest wholly on the ethical nature of man, and we cannot speak of the rights of one brute as against another except metaphorically, as in imagination we clothe them with the attributes of personality. Brutes have rights as sensitive creatures, because the intelligent and ethical nature of man yields the rights to them, and requires also that the rights should be conceded to them in order that his own moral nature may not be corrupted and debased.

SECT. 173. *From the idea of self as the possessor of powers and author of actions* follows the idea of duties. All personal beings have the duty, which presses upon them as a sense and overrules them as a law, to put forth their powers in self-directed, self-controlled action; to enter upon courses of action in a rational way for good ends; to gain in due proportion the several minor ends and the ultimate or comprehensive end of their being; to realize themselves in the full and harmonious development of all their powers; and to play their proper part of action and of service amid the varied relations of their life in the world. All persons have rights and duties which are substantially the same in kind, and are essential to the defence and development of their personality, and necessary to their relations to one another, to God, and to themselves. Under the guidance of these rights and duties we work out our own destiny, and

must, in the ethical constitution of things under which we live, ultimately receive according to our conduct.

SECT. 174. *From the idea of self as the subject of sensitiveness*, or as endowed with susceptibility, follows the idea of goods and of the good. It is only through our sensitiveness that there is a good for us, or that anything at all exists for us, or that we can form the notion of anything which we may desire or seek or in any way care for. There may be a good to sensitive creatures which have not intellect enough to form the abstract idea of it so as to choose or to seek it, except impulsively or instinctively. Good, as we now speak of it, is a satisfied or agreeable state of the sensitive nature in any one or more of its forms. This is ultimate good or good in itself, as distinguished from what we call good as a means to an end, or that which is good for something. A human creature might be good for something in the mind and purpose of another if he were not sensitive, as we find tools, machines, and inanimate things good for our uses; that is, fit means to accomplish our ends. But these things have no good, know and feel no good; they are purely instrumental to sensitive creatures, in whom alone real goods and final ends can be found. There are as many forms and grades of good for us as there are forms and grades of sensitiveness in us.

But if we observe these goods which are real ends themselves, we can see that they are at the same time related as means to higher ends in each of which there is a good, until we arrive at the ethical good and end, beyond which there is no other earthly and finite good. Or, in other words, we may say that each part of our complex nature has its special end and satisfaction; and as these ends are means to higher ones in an orderly gradation, so these various goods are

proper and necessary each in its place and due degree, and with reference to a higher good. And since goods and ends go together, if there is one comprehensive and supreme end for our nature as a whole, there is a final and supreme good for man as such. This supreme good of the ethical person as a whole we may call *the good*, or *the supreme good* for man. But man as a finite and dependent ethical being is himself ethically related to the Ethical Maker, Governor, and Judge, "of whom and through whom and to whom are all things," in whom therefore man and all created things must find their own last end, as they had there their first origin.

Our particular rights, duties, and goods may be intellectually constructed and justified from a consideration of the nature and ends of man, his relations to the world, to other men, and to God. This is the wide field of practical ethics, in which we lay down in principle and with more or less particularity what individual persons and societies may have, do, and enjoy.

SECT. 175. *What is our duty, only the intellect can discover.* The feeling of obligation pressing upon us as rational persons implies that there is something which we ought to do and to become. This sense arises always in the presence of sensitive beings and with reference to them, whether it be our individual selves or any others, rational or irrational: *I ought* with reference to them. But what ought I? My duty must have some proportionateness to their capacities, and to my power in relation to them. Thus my duty to a brute will be one thing, to a man another, to God another. Duty to myself will be one thing, to my family another, to other men another, to society and the State another. But the duty in each case grows out of their capacities and condition, and out of my powers and rela-

tions to them. There must be some such thing as duty generically, something common to all cases of duty, which may be stated and defined more or less clearly.

What this most general duty is, if it can be stated in one term or principle, or what the most general forms of duty are, if they cannot all be reduced to one, we can learn only by studying our nature to find its ends and adaptations, and by studying the relations amid which we must work out these ends. We ought with reference to our ends and our relations. If we can find the true, supreme end of our being, we shall have the general idea of what is obligatory upon us. This end is fixed for us without our choice, and the proper steps for its attainment are also fixed in the nature of things, and are entirely above our control. Our wisdom and loyalty are to be shown and tested by finding the real end and the right steps, and by faithfully going forward in the execution of them. We ought to fulfil the supreme end of our being by the methods appointed for us in the nature of things.

It is obvious also that each element of our moral nature has its place and its end in the constitution. These must be discovered, and set out clearly before the mind, in order that each may be made to do its part in strict subordination as a means of gaining the ends above it, and thus contributing to the end of the whole as a whole. The intellect must learn these various ends, and how to gain them. It is guided in this effort by the natural aspirations, impulses, and outgoings of the nature. Though these may have been exaggerated and perverted, they alone can give the true indication of the ends; and the ends cannot be artificial, nor imposed from without; they must be essential, and inwrought or implanted.

SECT. 176. *This general idea of what is obligatory upon us* is not sufficient to guide us in practical life. We must form principles and rules by which to regulate our acts and courses of action in the pursuit of the general end, and for the government of the various elements of our nature while gaining their several subordinate ends. These will be the moral rules and principles of our daily life, the fruits of thought and experience.

Such principles and rules of general application, thoughtfully formed and present before the mind, are necessary in order to restrain and control the impulses, to prevent the surprises of passion, to correct and supplement the views which we might hastily take of particular cases as they arise, and because the right conduct in a particular case often cannot be determined without ascertaining what would be generally right, useful, expedient, and wise in the society as a whole. As rational beings we need a broader view of things, and a better understanding of consequences and relations, than any single case can give us. We elevate the character and life by placing them on the level of high general principles consciously adopted and steadily acted upon. This is what is meant by the moralization of our nature: it is reducing all our natural gifts and acquirements into subjection to rational and moral principles.

But we cannot form and retain a perfectly fixed code of rules, because new cases will arise amid the changes in the means and manner of our life which the progress of civilization brings. We must be always morally thoughtful in order to appreciate these changes, and the new and more intricate or larger relations into which they bring us, so that we may broaden and improve our practical principles. Such principles are the products of a growing personality, an advan-

cing moralization of the nature and life; and if they are not blindly adhered to, to the disregard of time, place, and circumstance, they are a basis from which we may go forward in ever farther development.[1]

SECT. 177. *We have to seek our own personal or private ends* amid the complicated relations of social life, amid a multitude of other persons and sensitive creatures all pursuing their own ends and standing in various relations to us of equality, dependence, occasional contact, or special necessity. This society to which we belong is a great ethical whole, in which each member has a special part to play. We cannot escape the society with all its relations; it is essential to the completeness of the individual person, to furnish a suitable field for his activity, to call forth his qualities, and train and develop him on every side. All these individual persons have their own personal and individual rights, and each has corresponding duties, all together constituting an organic whole. The society of which we are members has also, as a moral organism, its public or corporate rights, which impose duties upon individuals and upon other societies. We are thus entangled in a complicated mesh of many duties which we cannot escape. No person can seek any of his ends regardless of others, and as though he were an isolated being. To find out all these various duties in general and in particular is a matter of no small study and experience. The accumulated wisdom of the past concerning our varied relations and obligations is of untold value for our direction, but it cannot so settle our duties as to relieve us from the necessity of constant thought in applying and improving them.

[1] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, book iii. chap. i. sect. 5 (3d edition).

SECT. 178. *The fact that our being has ends* for the various elements of it and for the whole as a whole, implies that its author was an intelligent being, just as the adaptations of the outer world imply the same for it. This truth brought home to us in a special manner by the sense of duty to pursue our appointed ends, and of our accountability for our conduct in the matter, implies that this Author is a moral governor and judge, and that we in all our lives are "in contact with a personal and righteous will." It is our own moral nature alone which forms the ground for our belief that God is a moral being. We might perhaps come to the knowledge of him as creator and preserver by studying the material world. But in matter and blind force, as also in mere impulse and instinct, we find no ethical. If we did not have a living experience in ourselves of the ethical, it could never come to our thoughts, as it does not come to the thoughts of the brutes; just as, if we did not have experience of intelligence within us we could never apprehend the fact that intelligence prevails in the world. If, being intelligent but non-moral, we could see that special class of phenomena which is now called moral, it could have no significance to us different from the phenomena of color, light, heat, chemical action, gravitation, and the like; it would be ethically indifferent to us.

To learn what we can of God as a moral being and of our relations to him, is the work of the intellect. If God is not a mere force, but a person, and our moral maker and governor, he must personally have rights, and we must have duties towards him. We are in relations with God, and himself is essential to the completeness of our own moral individuality and of the moral society, as the idea of God is the essential, underlying principle of all thought. This

region of our relations towards God is the field of religion, and religion is thus shown to be ethical, or a branch of ethics, — it is morality towards God.

SECT. 179. *The relations of our various duties to each other* require much thought and careful study, that we may clearly see and pursue the true path amid the complicated relations of our lives. It requires a careful moral thoughtfulness especially, that we may not forget ends by becoming absorbed in means; that we may not forget higher ends through the too earnest pursuit of lower ones; that we may not forget the rights of others, and our positive duties towards them, through forming too strong a notion of our own rights and our duties towards ourselves; that we may not forget our accountability to society, and that of society and ourselves to God, through forming too strong a notion of our own individuality and of the supremacy of our own personal views of rights, duties, and goods; that we may not forget our accountability to ourselves and to God through forming too strong a notion of the advantages which society offers and the claims it makes. The well-balanced view of all our many relations, and the cool, equable, and ever-present right judgment of them, are extremely difficult, and among the latest fruits of a careful moral self-discipline.

It is sometimes said that there can be no conflict of duties. In one sense this is true. If we really and fully understood all the relations amid which we are placed, our path would doubtless be always clear. But in our ignorance and want of foresight, our unequal appreciation of the various ends and relations of our lives, there must be seeming conflict and often much difficulty in determining what is the true line of action. Hence the necessity for incessant thought and study concerning our duty.

But by the diligent use of our minds we can generally discover what is right and just and wise in action, what is conformable to our nature and relations, and conducive to the real ends of living, just as we can discover the real elements of knowledge and the truths of science. We are urged on to understand and develop science by an implanted principle, the desire of knowledge, curiosity, or wonder, and we are guided in all our thought and investigation by certain *a priori* or innate principles or laws of knowing. So also in the moral sphere, we are urged by a sense of duty to seek and do what we ought; we go forward in the search under the guidance of all the *a priori* principles or laws of knowing, and also under the additional principle of duty which pertains only to this sphere, or to our action in this one aspect. But it should be observed also, that in all our knowing and doing, of whatever kind, we as persons live and act under this ever-present sense and law of duty, because the moral sphere is not a narrow and isolated one apart from every other, but we are moral in everything; the whole of life is moral.

SECT. 180. *It is thus obvious that the formation of moral rules and principles, of moral ideas and ideals,* for every relation in which we live, is an intellectual activity carried on under the ordinary laws and principles of mind. Ethics is as truly an intellectual product as mathematical or physical science, or as the knowledge which grows up from experience and common sense. It is not meant that any man comes to this work unformed and unaided, as to a new discovery which he must work out altogether for himself. We are born into the school of society, and taught its morals from the first dawning of intelligence. In this school every human being is both teacher and pupil, and

from the beginning of our lives, even before the development of self-consciousness, we are forming what are practically moral habits, just as we are bodily and mental ones. These habits may be good or bad, helpful or harmful; but they are the beginnings of character. All that has been received or acquired by our family or society, of theoretical or practical ethics, is urged upon us by our teachers, whether we will or no. But all this we can reconsider when we come to our freedom and personality. With the growth of intelligence and experience we can make it as truly our own as though we had first thought it out and constructed it. This we should do, if we approve it; but if we do not approve it, we are in duty bound to change, remodel, or reconstruct it, according to more just views, into a higher and truer standard of action.

The good man, therefore, or one who wishes to know and do his whole duty, finds that he has an intellectual task of the greatest importance, from which there is no release, and one which requires much clear thinking.

SECT. 181. *Since morality is thus an intellectual product, it may be progressive*, both in its theories, rules, and principles as understood, and in its practice; and every man is in duty bound to advance in his moral feelings to a higher and purer character. The practice, the principles, and the feelings mutually act and react to elevate or degrade each other. Morality has in fact advanced to higher and purer principles and to a better practice, and the stages of its progress may be noted in history. Distinct efforts have been made, as in other departments of human interest, to carry it forward, and we see and enjoy their fruits. The great agitations of our times are all for the purpose of bringing about improvement in moral knowledge and practice. Nothing else can

take hold of the public mind and stir it to united and effective action.

We may mention the agitations about forms of government, principles of international intercourse, rights of trade, laws of war, slavery, general education, the powers and privileges of women, the relations of capital and labor, the treatment of the poor, the aged, the ignorant, the sick, vagrants, criminals; agitations concerning the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicants, narcotics, opiates, explosives, — these are all distinct attempts to improve our moral knowledge and practice; and we may say that the whole of the preaching in our churches and a large part of all other religious services have for their aim to improve our moral thoughts, feelings, and conduct both towards God and our fellow-men. This is the only way of establishing peace, truth, and righteousness, or the kingdom of heaven, in this world. Every morally thoughtful person does make progress under the experiences of life, does come to new knowledge and appreciation of rights, duties, and goods, to better moral feelings and conduct.

SECT. 182. *This action of the intellect under the sense of duty* discovering moral relations, principles, and rules, is so obvious, incessant, and various that it is not strange that conscience should be thought to be an intellectual faculty, or the intellect as employed about a certain kind of matter. It is held by many that conscience is the intellect employed about right and wrong, virtue and vice; the only difference between conscience and intellect being the objective one of the matter in consideration. Thus Dr. McCosh says[1] that right and wrong, virtue and vice, are qualities of voluntary states, and conscience is the intellectual power which per-

[1] Intuitions of the Mind, pp. 247–8.

ceives these. Others treat conscience as a power intuitively knowing and spontaneously enunciating general truths and rules about right and wrong.

But if we divide the intellect into faculties in view of this difference of matter, we must make other divisions also in a like manner. But the faculties should be divided on subjective, not on objective grounds; that is, on the ground of internal action, and not on that of the matter with which they deal. There is another objection to this view of conscience; namely, it leaves obligation, the binding power of duty, as well as the rewarding and retributive action, unaccounted for. No intellectual perception or comparison can create the sense or feeling that *I ought*. This is something new, not found in objects and relations, subjective, but not intellectual, and not produced by perception or comparison. If it should be said that the intellect affirms obligation in view of certain qualities of objects contemplated, it is answered that the intellect only perceives, compares, and affirms the result as a simple truth, and its operation is the same in kind, whatever the matter. It must act in moral things as in all others: it is eyes to the sense of obligation, and finds for us what in particular is obligatory; but it cannot create the sense or idea of obligation itself, nor see it in the objective world, where it does not exist.

Therefore when we examine the soul to find its endowments and learn how we come to be moral, we find the prime source of morality, as distinct from all other things which we see, know, and feel, in the sense of duty or obligation, — an original element of the human nature. We may call this conscience, or moral sense, or moral sensibility. Having this, the intellect in its ordinary action goes on to discover our nature and ends, the beings about us and our

relations to them, our rights, duties, and goods, and moral rules and principles for our daily guidance. If any one should call the sum-total of our moral judgments conscience, the language would be intelligible, but it is not in harmony with our treatment of other faculties of the soul. It is not a faculty in the ordinary sense of the term. Nor is the power to form moral judgments a faculty distinct from the power to form other kinds of judgments.

CHAPTER XIX.

VIRTUE AND VICE.

SECTION 183. *We have now reviewed the several elements of the moral nature,* accepting the view generally received, — that the powers of the soul are of three kinds: Intellect, Sensibility, and Will. We have endeavored to set forth the place of each of these and their action in the synthetic whole. While these powers are in general the same in all men, they are combined in very various proportions as original endowments or potentialities. The special history of each individual, and the entire environment, both material and social, tend to produce farther differences. That education and training, which are consciously directed, have infinitely diverse effects upon the originally various endowments. Thus every human being has his particular physical, intellectual, and moral tone, his temperament, his native and acquired character. But these differences do not change the general character of the moral nature, nor will they change the substance of moral principles, or affect their validity. The idea of duty and the sense of duty remain the same universally. But they do affect the question what each one shall consider to be his duty in particular cases; they do affect the real duties, the rights and goods. But this is only that diversity which real life in every class of

creatures everywhere presents, — unity of general principles and forces, variety of fact and life.

Bearing these things in mind, we can answer the question, *What are virtue and vice, right and wrong?* Virtue and vice are not, properly speaking, qualities of actions, but qualities of agents. Personal agents or persons, and they only, are morally good and morally bad, virtuous and vicious. If it be said (with Butler) that actions include the intentions from which they proceed, and thus have moral quality, we answer that both actions and intentions belong to an agent; they do not exist as separate entities to be praised or blamed in themselves, but the agent is praised or blamed for his intentions, which he forms, and over which he has control, just as he forms and controls his outward acts. If we praise or blame an intention or an act, the expression is figurative. Nothing but a moral being can be virtuous or vicious, or have praise or blame.

Actions are right or wrong according to their fitness or unfitness to accomplish their end, or as they do or do not conform to a rule. Thus we see that virtuousness depends on the internal springs from which our action flows, rightness on the external adaptation to the sphere of their display. But since the proper end of all actions is to work out the end of our being in accordance with the relations in which we are placed, we call those actions right — meaning morally right — which tend to this end agreeably to these relations; and those wrong — meaning morally wrong — which do not thus tend. But in themselves neither actions nor intentions have any moral quality.

SECT. 184. It is often asked, *Where in the agent — that is, in which element of his complex nature — is the moral quality situated?* It is usually said, In the will. But the agent

is *one person*, and not a union of many. Faculties are not organs nor agents; and we cannot assign to one faculty a quality which could have no existence, which we could have no conception of, except as a quality of the one agent constituted with all these various powers, faculties, or modes of action. The moral quality belongs to the agent as *one*, and not to one inseparable abstract part of the complex nature. But if we wished to measure or estimate the degree of virtuousness of the agent, we should do it by the purity and strength of his choice of duty; this would exhibit itself in his outward acts and in his moral affections.

SECT. 185. The question then arises, *When is the agent virtuous, and when vicious?* We answer, He is virtuous when with choice and purpose he obeys the sense of duty; vicious when he does not. "The regard paid by an agent to the sense of duty is the virtue of that agent."[1] Conscience imposes its obligation in view of the ends of our being and the relations in which these must be sought. If we should say, "These ends and relations are fixed and appointed by God; therefore the agent is virtuous when he lives according to God's law," we should place virtue in a distinctly theistic light. If we were solitary, the pursuit of the great end of our being would seem to be comparatively simple. But we have to seek it and work it out in the society of multitudes of men, all of whom have their individual powers and ends, and their consequent rights, — a society of which we are members whether we will or no, and which is essential to our own moral completeness and development. No one therefore has an end which he can seek apart from others. We are as truly and originally social as we are individual beings; the ends of all are bound

[1] The Philosophy of Morals, Alexander Smith, i. 185.

up together, and must be jointly sought. Each one, therefore, has some responsibility for all others, so far as they come within the range of his influence and powers. While our duties are thus immensely complicated, and the task of keeping the true path is rendered much more difficult, the general principle is not changed.

We are to seek our ends with due regard to the ends, rights, and interests of all other sensitive beings with which we are brought into any kind of relation. One may have little knowledge or mental training and little correct understanding of the true end of his being and how to gain it; he may in his ignorance greatly mistake the course of action which his relations call for. Even the wisest are sure to err at times. But that man is morally good or virtuous who, according to the best light he can get, uses the best means he can devise to gain that which he considers the true end, observing all the known rights of others and doing all his duties to others according to his ability. Ignorance and error of judgment, when all our abilities and opportunities have been faithfully used, do not diminish the virtue of the agent.

SECT. 186. *Just so far as any person fails to yield to the sense of obligation* in view of his knowledge, actual and possible, he comes short of perfect virtue. The negation or defect of virtue in moral beings is vice, — though to the lesser defects we do not usually apply so harsh a name. We see thus what a vicious man is. Vice may be conceived of any degree, from the least defect of virtue up to the complete neglect and repudiation of all that one ought to choose and do, to the rejection of the proper end of life and the disregard of all that one's relations require. In a word, then, *virtue*, dynamically, *is choosing and doing all known duty;*

statically, *it is that fixed state or condition of the person by reason of which he chooses and does all known duty.* Vice is the opposite of virtue. Moral character is determined, fixed, and set by our choice and action in reference to duty. "What does a person choose; what does he do; what is he interested in; what does he pursue?" are the important questions. "The ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be ἕξις τοῦ δέοντος, *the habit of duty*, — the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the most unexceptionable which is yet to be found in any system of philosophy."[1] Aristotle also defines virtue to be a habit accompanied with deliberate preference.[2]

What is our duty in all particular cases, we learn just as we learn other things; but it all centres about choosing and pursuing the end of our being in conformity with the relations in which we are placed. The end of our being we learn by studying its nature and adaptations. This end cannot be anything which is not equally within the reach of all, in whatever proper and necessary work of life they may be engaged. It must be *one and essentially the same for all moral beings* in their individual and social capacities. *Human nature is adapted to moral growth and moral perfection* amid any and all of the complicated relations of life. *This is the highest end possible or conceivable for all men;* and it is certainly the only thing within the reach of all.

"Not enjoyment and not sorrow
Is our destined end or way;
But to act that each to-morrow
Find us farther than to-day."

[1] Stewart's Moral and Active Powers, book iv. chap. i.
[2] Nicomachean Ethics, book ii. chap. vi. sect. 15.

The same thing stated theistically would be the perfect development of godlikeness, — the perfect agreement of our entire being and life with the ideal, or with the will of God.

> "Our wills are ours, we know not how,
> Our wills are ours to make them Thine."

Any person's character at any given time is determined by the attitude of his will with relation to the law of duty planted in his soul. Moral growth is advancement in strength of will and in the control which the will exercises over the whole nature under the law of duty.

SECT. 187. It will be said that *the definition of virtue now given is purely formal, abstract, and of no practical value*, while something real and positive is needed to guide our conduct, something which we may directly lay hold of and cultivate in the life and character, as being virtue itself. We grant that the definition seems largely formal and abstract. It throws back upon every one the constant urgent inquiry, "What is my duty? What thoughts and feelings ought I to cultivate? What choices ought I to make and execute?" It is not pretended that these questions can be answered and virtue can be gained by contemplating the abstract conception of duty, or by dallying with the sense or feeling of duty, but only by finding out and doing the particular duty required by our nature and relations, whatever these may be. But it is asked, Can we not lay down some one real course of inward and outward action which may be pursued by all in every situation, — some course the faithful following of which shall make one really virtuous, in that it points out specifically what his nature and relations do in fact require?

This must certainly be a matter of practical wisdom, of

insight into human nature and into all the relations and situations of the real life of man in the world. It would be easier to name a number of principles which together would cover the whole ground, than to name some one broad enough to be a universal principle. The ancient moralists laid down certain cardinal virtues or principles, obedience to which would secure real virtue in all the relations of life. But if it were required to name some one single, real principle which would cover all conduct, and obedience to which would secure universal virtue, we should draw from the New Testament those commandments, one in substance, but two in form, which sum up all the teachings of the law and the prophets, — love to God and to our neighbor. But this will require daily and hourly interpretation and application in all the fields of rights, duties, and goods.

This love, if taken as the sum and substance of all virtue, must not be any mere sentiment or natural affection; it must not exclude justice, nor self-care, nor high honor and personal self-assertion; it must not sink to low views of a narrow and temporary utility or happiness. Love to God and man as the fulfilling of the moral law must be a high, broad, and deep principle, embracing all our thoughts, feelings, and choices, reaching down to the common and humble acts and wants of the individual, and up to his eternal welfare, and out to all the wide and varying interests of society, the State, and of all mankind, both now and in the future. If we give to love this wide and deep meaning, — the spirit which seeks, delights in, and labors universally for, the good, the welfare, the well-being of all men now in the world, and of all that shall come after them, so far as our conduct can in any way affect them; which renders also to God that

which is due to his divine majesty, — we have indeed a grand and glorious principle. If really grasped, taken in and lived by, it would be itself the sum and essence of all conceivable virtue.

But love thus broadly conceived is scarcely less abstract and formal than duty. Its perfect application in practical life would require almost an infinite wisdom. Place the two principles side by side: "Find out what universal love requires, and do it;" "Find out what duty to God and man requires, and do it." Duty is not to be looked upon as a cold taskmaster, any more than love is to be regarded as a hot impulse. If there is more of a quickening personality in love, it has so far the advantage; if there is more of high loyalty in duty, it has so far the advantage. Love inspires to duty; duty requires us to love with a broad wisdom and a far sight of consequences. Our duty is to love God with all the heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Adhering perfectly to this high principle, we shall surely work out the end of our being and perform all that is required in every relation of life; we shall secure the best moral growth, and in the end moral perfection; we shall easily concede all their rights to others, and gain all that are worth having — all that love and duty do not prompt us to freely sacrifice — of our own. The lesser goods or satisfactions of life we may or may not have in this disordered world, but the one supreme good of man — the ethical good — cannot fail us, either as it grows out of our conduct in relations with men, or in those with God.

SECT. 188. If it were required in like manner to point out a less formal and more real ethical end than that of moral growth and moral perfection, or to show by what immediate activity this end could be secured, we could

only name the promotion of good as that concrete end, — the good of all sensitive or susceptible beings. But as with love considered as the constituting principle of virtue, so this good, considered as the ethical end, must have no low and narrow interpretation, but the utmost breadth and generality. It must not be thought to be any mere sensual and temporary pleasure or gratification; it must be as broad and as varied as the sensitivity of all sensitive beings; it must be wisely proportioned to the rank of the sensitive being and to the importance of that portion of the nature in which the good is experienced. The sensuous and temporary good, all good of every grade below the highest, needful as it is in its place, must be strictly regarded as subordinate, and must be employed and looked upon chiefly, as means to the ethical and eternal good of the individual and of all moral beings.

Moral progress and moral perfection certainly cannot be gained as an ethical end by the contemplation of self or of our own moral state or that of others, — any more than we can learn what our particular duty is by contemplating the abstract conception of duty, — nor by striving directly for any inward moral state, any more than our own happiness or satisfaction consists in or can be gained by mere self-love.[1] The ethical end, whatever it may be, must, according to the constitution of our nature, be sought by some course of direct action. Good or satisfaction, as has been shown, is an attendant or by-result of our direct action for the objects towards which our nature goes out directly. So in like manner we go forward in the path of moral improvement, not by fixing our minds on moral improvement, nor by contemplating our present state and that which we

[1] Butler, Sermon xi.

would attain, but by taking more and more fully into our thought, feeling, and purpose the things which duty points out as those which we must do and strive for. If we shall say that the great duty of life is to seek with loving and devoted care the highest welfare or well-being of all who are capable of experiencing good, then we shall realize that ethical end of moral growth and moral perfection, as an attendant or by-result, by striving to promote the good of beings capable of it, in due proportion and with wise reference to permanent and universal results.

CHAPTER XX.

OUR DUTIES.

SECTION 189. *We have seen that there is a sense of duty implanted in the soul,* and that there is also an *a priori* idea of duty which is a guiding principle in all our thought about conduct. But if there is duty, there must be duties; if there is virtue, there must be virtues; for the sense and the conception can be realized only in specific concrete acts. But it is impossible to lay down directions for individual acts. In the nature of things these can only be left to the discretion of the individual person. Moreover if we could direct individual acts, we should thereby diminish their moral character by so far removing them from the judgment and choice of the person who should be responsible for them; he would be so far released from responsibility, and left to execute the thought and will of another. This is a kind of treatment suitable only for children or weak-minded persons who are under the tutelage of others. But we can lay down general principles or instructions for the guidance of conduct without infringing on the moral freedom of the actor. These general principles, pointing out lines of conduct and the grounds of them, are needful or desirable for all. They must all be determined by considering the ends of our being and the relations amid which these must be worked out.

SECT. 190. Having these ends in view, *we have five general classes of duties*, —

1. Towards ourselves, as having powers and capacities to develop and use, and as we have a destiny here and hereafter under the government of God.

2. To our fellow-men individually, as they have powers and capacities to develop and use, as they are capable of enjoying and suffering, and as they have a destiny here and hereafter under the government of God.

3. To the civil and social community, as the necessary sphere of our life and development, and as influencing the character and destiny of men.

4. To God, as our Creator, Benefactor, and Governor, who has given us our nature, appointed our relations, and fixed the law for our conduct.

5. To brutes, as they have sensitiveness, and as they have a destiny with reference to men in this world. Our duties in each class vary with our particular circumstances and relations.

SECT. 191. (1) Our duties to ourselves are —

(a) *Self-preservation, including defence and support.* As life was not of our own choosing, so we have no right to terminate it or allow it to be terminated unnecessarily. We are sent into the world for an ascertainable end, which we are bound to pursue, amid all doubts, perplexities, and hardships, and which these are even necessary to enable us to attain. The discipline of maintaining ourselves against nature and against men is essential as a means to moral growth.

The Stoics represented man as a sentinel or a soldier placed at a post of duty which he has no right to desert, but where he must serve till the commander shall recall him. "My friends, wait for God till he shall give the signal and

dismiss you from this service; then return to him. For the present, be content to remain at this post, where he has placed you. The time of your abode here is short, and easy to such as are disposed like you; for what tyrant, what robber, what thief, or what court can be formidable to those who thus count for nothing the body and its possessions? Stay, nor foolishly depart."[1] They also represented man as an athlete or a scout. "Difficulties are things that show what men are. For the future, in case of any difficulty, remember that God, like a gymnastic trainer, has pitted you against a rough antagonist. For what end? That you may be an Olympic conqueror; and this cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion, has a more profitable difficulty on his hands than you have, provided you will but use it as an athletic champion uses his antagonist."[2] Socrates represents the same situation by saying that man is a prisoner, and is not allowed to open the door of his prison and run away; and again, that man is not his own property, but a possession of the Gods, and he has no right to make away with that which does not belong to him.

(β) *Self-control. This was provided for and obviously intended* when we were endowed with the sense of duty under which we act in the use of all our powers. All our endowments ought to be put under the control of the will and directed to the special ends for which they were intended, and restrained within the proper degree, for the purpose of gaining the supreme end of life. Self-control includes temperance and chastity in appetites, moderation in desires and affections, justice, fidelity, and veracity in conduct.

(γ) *Self-culture. We are to preserve and control our-*

[1] Discourses of Epictetus, book i. chap. ix., Higginson's translation.
[2] Ibid., chap. xxiv.

selves for the sake of gaining an end. But this requires that we should perfect all our powers by training, — the powers of the body and the senses, that the soul may have the best instrument; the powers of the intellect, that the will may have clear and abundant light in which to act; the powers of the sensibility, that our souls may be strongly impelled to action, — the susceptibility, in order that we may have that enjoyment which is necessary for our refreshment, interest, and sustained energy; moral sensibility, that the thought of duty and accountability may be strong and ever present to guide the will. We must train the will, that our life may not be merely impulsive, irrational, and uncontrolled, but may be in all things directed with clear and strong purpose to a rational and good end.

This self-culture in all its more important aspects is possible only in society and by performing all those acts of duty which we owe to others in the various relations of life. Duty to ourselves, therefore, requires that we should live in society, observing the rights and performing our duties to others.

SECT. 192. (2) *Our duties to other men individually* are, that we should, according to their character and condition, exercise towards them the several affections, and when a proper regard for their good and the good of the whole permits or requires it, should go on to perform the corresponding outward actions. Thus towards the injurious, careless, and wrong-doing we should feel indignation, and in some cases we are bound to punish them. Towards the good we should have love and esteem, carried out into action according to the relations, as towards parents, children, brothers and sisters, benefactors, rulers, and so forth.

Towards the unfortunate and the suffering we should have pity, and in some cases should render help; towards the

successful in what is good we should have congratulation; towards those whom we can wisely help and profit in whatever rank or condition of life, we should render generous assistance; towards all we should have a just regard for rights, feelings, and interests, as they are sensitive and personal beings, having their own individual interests and ends.

Justice is the general dictate or result of the proper and well-balanced action of all the affections, both the kindly and the defensive and punitive. Justice in thought and purpose is well defined by the Civil Code: "*Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi.*" Justice in action is rendering to each one *his due* according to a standard determined by his character, his needs, and our power and relations to him. The idea of justice results from reflection on the nature of men as individuals and as destined to live in society. It is not an innate idea, nor the result of any special affection.

These duties to other men are not discharged by having and acting on our merely natural impulses. The natural promptings of the soul and the relations in which we stand must be thoughtfully considered; we must understand and adopt them, and act upon them voluntarily or rationally, under the sense of duty, for their proper ends. We thus moralize our affections, or transform the natural into moral affections. They may at length become secondarily spontaneous, and be just as prompt and vigorous as are the original impulses. This is what we should seek to attain in character. Thus virtue becomes no longer slow, hesitating, and self-denying, but quick, sure, and strong.

SECT. 193. (3) *Duties towards the social and civil community* are, to bear our share of its burdens, to contribute to its defence, well-being, and improvement, by obedience to

its laws, by a generous sympathy in its interests, by devoting thought and time to repair its evils and unequalities, by self-sacrifice for it.

We should observe that social duty often goes far beyond what the municipal law requires of the citizen. We are bound to consider not only what we *must* do to escape legal and social penalties, but how much we *may* do to relieve, to profit, and even to cheer and divert others. To pay taxes, serve on juries, vote, bear office if necessary, bear arms, aid in moral reforms and the like, are some of the special forms of these duties.

SECT. 194. (4) *Towards God as our Creator and Governor* we owe obedience in carrying out all the ends of our being in due degree, standing firmly in our chosen or appointed place, and acting towards our fellow-men according to the relations in which he has put us and the instructions which he has given us. This is serving God, — a thing which is possible for us only by acting wisely and faithfully according to our relations to our fellow-creatures. We owe reverence, submission, worship, and whatever acts he may require as suitable to his majesty or becoming our relations to him. To God as benefactor we owe love, gratitude, service, — all that we can render in any way of devout reverence and homage to the Supreme Majesty of the universe.

SECT. 195. (5) *Towards brutes as sensitive beings* our duty forbids cruelty, and requires kind treatment and care of all those under our control or in our power. It does not forbid our using them entirely for our own interest, nor taking their lives in order to provide for ourselves food and clothing; but this must never be done with cruelty, nor so as to cause any unnecessary suffering. They must always be used kindly, according to their nature. When we see them

in suffering, we are bound to relieve them. We say that our duty towards brutes rests on the fact that they are sensitive creatures, and this is sufficient in itself for any being who knows duty; but it finds also another basis in the necessity and obligation to preserve our own nature and character uninjured and undepraved, — that is, our duty towards brutes is also duty towards ourselves and towards our fellow-men. We have a direct ethical interest on our own account in enforcing mercy and kindness to brutes, because cruelty to them leads on to cruelty to mankind; it hardens and corrupts our whole character.

SECT. 196. *There are many sources of knowledge of our duties.* We know originally that we have *duty*, by the implanted sense of it. What our *duties* are, we learn (1) by our own observation, experience, and reasoning about the endowments and relations of men, the necessities of individuals and societies; (2) by the opinions of men as expressed in laws, customs, and literature, as enforced in education at home, in schools, and by example; (3) from the Bible as a book from God intended to teach us the true religion, which must always be carried out and realized in a life of duty. The Bible gives moral instruction in many forms, but it is not a set treatise on theology, morals, or religion. Christianity is a historical religion. The Bible is the history of God's interferences in human affairs for the redemption of men and the establishment of the kingdom of heaven on earth, and it contains those divine instructions in many literary forms, especially in the form of precepts and examples, which are requisite to this end; but these precepts and instructions are given in a historical, and not in a systematic form, nor with the intention of producing a scientific system.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE CRITERIA OF CONDUCT.

SECTION 197. *The two greatest standing questions in the field of Ethics* have been, "Is the will free?" and "What is the nature of virtue?" Concerning the latter question many theories have been set up and sustained with great ardor and force of argument, as though the cause of virtue itself depended on the philosophical account which could be given of it. All these theories have been attacked also with equal zeal and earnestness. The effort in this high discussion has been to name some one quality or element which forms the constituting principle or essence of all virtue as such in whatever circumstances or relations it might exist or be exhibited. The specific virtues have often been deduced from the general theory of the nature of virtue, or presented and enforced as though they were deductions from it. So far as this deduction could be rightly made, it would tend to confirm the theory, even though it might narrow the scope and weaken the force of the particular duty. Thus a more scientific form and logical connection would be given to this important branch of knowledge.

The theories of the nature of virtue which have received the widest acceptance are: (1) that virtue is constituted by benevolence or the love of being; (2) by accordance with

reason or the fitness of things; (3) by accordance with the will of God; (4) by utility or conduciveness to the happiness or well-being — (*a*) of the actor (egoistic hedonism); or (*b*) of all within the scope of its influence (universalistic hedonism).

It is obvious at once that these theories are by no means mutually exclusive. "Many of the theories of morals which have been taught in the schools," says President Porter, "when compared in their elements or traced in their history, will be found in no sense to be inconsistent one with another. More frequently each separate theory rests on some single relation, which rather presupposes and implies the others, than excludes and repels them. . . . Each theory represents one or more of the elements which go to make up the concepts of moral good and evil when ideally completed. . . . That only is the true theory which provides for them all."[1] But whether the many implanted impulses and tendencies of our nature, all of which go out towards some natural, lawful, and needful end, can all in their appropriate place, degree, and needful action be summed up under one general concept any more specific than that of *the choice and pursuit of duty*, or *the realization of the end of our being in all its manifold relations*, seems doubtful, to say the least of it. In other words, our nature is so complex and our relations to God, to our fellow-men individually and socially in all their various characters and conduct, and to the sentient creatures about us, are so manifold that it is doubtful if all duty and all virtue can be reduced to one abstract concept from which alone they shall take the word of command, without greatly overworking that concept, without stretching it so as to make it cover a wide field which does not naturally and properly

[1] Elements of Moral Science, part i. chap. xii. sect. 83.

belong to it, and which can be brought under it only by a sort of violence.

It often seems that we must close our eyes to many obvious aspects of truth before we can adopt as satisfactory any of the theories which have been so prominently put forth. "The truth seems to be," says Sidgwick, "that most of the practical principles that have been seriously put forward are more or less satisfactory to the common-sense of mankind, so long as they have the field to themselves. They all find a response in our nature; their fundamental assumptions are all such as we are disposed to accept, and such as we find to govern to a certain extent our habitual conduct. When I am asked: 'Are you not continually seeking pleasure and avoiding pain?' 'Have you not a moral sense?' 'Do you not intuitively pronounce some actions to be right, and others wrong?' 'Do you not acknowledge the general happiness to be a paramount end?' I answer yes to all questions. My difficulty begins when I have to choose between the different principles. We admit the necessity, when they conflict, of making this choice, and that it is irrational to let sometimes one principle prevail, and sometimes another; but the necessity is a painful one. We cannot but hope that all methods will ultimately coincide; and at any rate before making our election we may reasonably wish to have the completest possible knowledge of each." [1]

SECT. 198. *But action or conduct is every moment necessary.* It comes before theory, and is urgent, whether we can set up a satisfactory and all-comprehensive theory of it or not. Practical criteria of action, therefore, while waiting for the perfection of philosophy, are our most pressing need.

[1] Methods of Ethics, book i. chap. i. sect. 5 (3d ed.).

The general criterion of virtue is simple, and every one can apply it directly to himself in his own consciousness. Every one knows within himself, or may know directly, whether he chooses to seek and do every duty or not. It is impossible thus immediately to know the moral state of others. We can only judge other people from their acts and words, and this is often a very doubtful judgment.

The peace, prosperity, and happiness of the individual and of society depend so largely on outward actions, and these have such an educating power, that practically some of the most important questions of ethics are questions of outward action; that is, of right and wrong. Every one who has inward virtue will necessarily seek to carry it out or embody it in appropriate expression; that is, he will seek not merely to feel, think, and choose inwardly, but to act outwardly according to his relations. If the outward action does not fit the case and the relations, we conclude that there is no inward virtue, or that there is great lack of mental perception and judgment. It is essential to our own moral and religious peace, to our harmony with the moral forces of the world in which we live, and to our proper development as persons, that we should have inward virtue. This is moreover the only security that one will seek to do right actions when he knows them. But even the most virtuous man is not omniscient about right and wrong; with the best inward purpose he will be often puzzled to know what it is his duty to do in outward action, even though he may be a person of large knowledge and experience of life, and may have the Bible in his hands. We are often seeking for criteria and tests for special cases and for whole classes of cases. The criterion need not be that abstract principle which constitutes the action or course of action morally right or wrong;

but what we need is practical tests, convenient and applicable for the use of life.

SECT. 199. To determine the right or wrong when we are called upon for some specific action, we may ask: (1) *Is this proposed act or course of action likely to prove useful or harmful* to the interests of those concerned? What would be its general and ultimate effect in this respect? Whatever view we may take of the nature of virtue, we cannot avoid asking these questions, and seeking practical guidance from them. "On the whole, there is no doubt that the theory of an ideal good, consisting in the greatest happiness of the greatest number, as the end by reference to which the claim of all laws and powers and rules of action on our obedience is to be tested, has tended to improve human conduct and character."[1]

If we were to ask these questions with reference to our own private interest alone, we should be likely to take a very narrow view, and thus to be misled. But a broad view of interest will generally, if not always, give a true indication, especially if we reflect on the interest of character and peace of mind, on the interest of the whole community in which we live, the State, and the race, as affected by our acts and our example; if we could give to our view of interest the breadth of Kant's imperative: "*Act according to that maxim which you can wish at the same time to become a universal law.*" But we are liable to take too narrow views under the influence of passion or wilfulness or ignorance, which are the chief causes of wrong-doing among all classes of people. Only the cultivation of moral sense and judgment, or of moral understanding, as Butler calls it, can save us from error in this respect, and guide us aright. But whole sys-

[1] Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, book iv. chap. iii. sect. 331.

tems of morality have been built on the principle that tendency to private happiness was not merely a test of right action, but the only ultimate motive to it, — that the only ground of moral obligation was that an act would conduce to the private good of the doer. Other systems place both the test and the ground of obligation in the fact that the act will conduce to the good of the many, or to the greatest good of the greatest number.

SECT. 200. (2) We may ask: "*Is this proposed act or course of action fit for us;* that is, suitable to our nature as moral beings?" If we have just views of the elevation of our rational and moral nature, this will give an indication of the true path, and it will always be helpful as preventing precipitation and passion, and as tending to moral thoughtfulness. The Stoics always used this criterion: "It were no slight attainment, could we merely fulfil what the nature of man implies. For what is man? a rational and mortal being. Well; from what are we distinguished by reason? From wild beasts. From what else? From sheep and the like.

"Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild beast; otherwise you have destroyed the man; you have not fulfilled what your nature promises. Take care, too, to do nothing like cattle; for thus likewise the man is destroyed.

"In what do we act like cattle? When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk? Into cattle. What have we destroyed? The rational being.

"When we behave contentiously, injuriously, passionately, and violently, into what have we sunk? Into wild beasts.

"And further: some of us are wild beasts of a larger size;

others, little mischievous vermin, such as suggest the proverb: Let me rather be eaten by a lion.

"By all these means that is destroyed which the nature of man implies.

"When is a flute, a harp, a horse, or a dog preserved in existence? While each fulfils what its nature implies.

"Where is the wonder, then, that manhood should be preserved or destroyed in the same manner?"[1]

SECT. 201. (3) We may ask: *Is this proposed act or course of action just?* To answer the question correctly, we need a true view of the powers and relations of the parties concerned. We may easily have some knowledge of these, and asking the question helps to more correct and fuller views; it tends to prevent haste, and the control of passion and selfishness.

(4) We may ask: *Is this act or course of action benevolent,* — a willing or choosing of the good, the kind, the charitable, the helpful, towards others? This implies a knowledge of what is good for others and of the relation of means to this end. We have much knowledge of this kind in many cases. Benevolent action in the broad view, governed by adequate wisdom, — that is, the willing of the highest good to all concerned, according to their relations, — would surely be right, and in the broadest view always right. The kindly and helpful spirit is valuable as well as beautiful; but there is great need of care that it do not lead us away into an indiscriminate and thoughtless benevolence which sets aside justice, overlooks utility and fitness, and cultivates pauperism and crime.

(5) We may ask: *Is an act or course of action conformable to the truth and reality of things,* or to the facts and real

[1] Discourses of Epictetus, book ii. chap. ix.

relations of things? Is it according to the realities of the world and of life, or have we deceived ourselves? This will often put us on the right path. It will certainly tend to correct narrowness and prevent haste.

(6) We may ask: *Is an act or course of action conformable to the will of God?* We may learn God's will and purpose from nature, providence, and the Bible, and if truly learned it would be a perfect criterion of action for all conduct.

SECT. 202. *It is obvious that in important affairs we should not trust to any one single test*, or, in other words, that we should not limit our view to one aspect only of the case before us, but should view it from many sides, and question it in all possible lights. This a morally thoughtful person, conscious of the limitation of his views, will always do, especially when forming general principles for conduct, or when aroused to the necessity of reviewing and revising former judgments and principles.

But in trying to make use of these criteria we might think they pointed in different directions, so that we should be confused by our many questionings, instead of being settled in our judgment. Thus utility might seem to point one way, and benevolence, or justice, another; and various seeming conflicts might arise. Especially will the narrow views and the biases caused by education, which no person can be free from, create perplexities and give occasion for great varieties of judgments. What should a good man, conscious of his short sight, and firmly set on finding and pursuing the right course, then do? Shall one of these criteria give way to another; or shall he put the question to vote, and follow the path pointed out by the majority of these tests? Does one criterion have any natural superiority to another? or have

they all equal value? Is there any absolute test to which we may bring our actions directly, or to which we may bring these various criteria, so as really to free us from the doubts and uncertainties of human judgment?

If several criteria coincided in their indications, while the others were doubtful, or pointed in a different direction, we should certainly prefer the path indicated by the many and the clear signs; but the indications might also have various degrees of clearness.

These questions and considerations only show that our moral life in the world requires incessant thought and care, as well as an ever-present sense and purpose of duty; and we may add that our moral discipline and moral conduct are rather in this inner world of thought and purpose, "in the hidden man of the heart," than in outward action.

We should hesitate to say that all these criteria had equal value as philosophical principles, or as practical guides, unless we were to give to each of them such a broad sense as would make them all really synonymous, and only different aspects of the same thing.[1] And we should hesitate, in view of the use which has been made of all these criteria in the ethical theories of the past, to give supreme and absolute authority to any one of them, so long as they must all be understood and applied by merely human judgment.

SECT. 203. *In case of such a conflict as often arises*, when the ordinary criteria of right and wrong seem really to fail or to confound us, what shall we employ as the arbiter or criterion between or above all these criteria? The only resource of the good man intent on doing right will then be to seek a larger and juster view of the facts and relations of the case and of what we may call the great moral laws and

[1] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, book i. chap. vi.

moral aspects of the universe. Cautious thought and wider knowledge of men and things will then be helpful. A soul well practised and habituated to consider without selfishness and prejudice, and always purposed to seek and do faithfully what is believed to be right, has then a great advantage in quickness of sensibility and clearness of moral judgment. Such a person's morality is condensed, not into a system of dead formal rules, but into a living and active spirit of uprightness or of righteousness and goodness; he will have a moral apprehensiveness and enthusiasm which germinates and grows, and which takes hold of all problems and situations with a master hand.

Especially will a good man in such a case act deliberately and charitably towards other men and other views, with an open mind to receive every suggestion and a readiness to change or modify his own course on the smallest indication of something better. He will think it right to learn even from an enemy. A steady purpose to do duty at the expense of pleasure or wilfulness has as its first effect *open-mindedness* and sensitiveness to all the moral aspects of life; this is the prime condition of moral insight and practical wisdom in our ethical life.

We cannot name any special criterion above the ordinary criteria of action; we cannot rise altogether above the difficulties of our finite nature. We can only say that such a wider view of things may perhaps carry all these tests up into one, or make them in their broadened interpretation really coincide instead of conflict. It would probably be easiest and most satisfactory, as we have shown, so to extend our conception of love or benevolence as to make it the all-comprehensive principle and criterion, including utility, fitness, justice, conformity to truth and to the will of God. The

use which is made of this conception in the Bible, where love is set forth as the most comprehensive expression of God's moral character, and as that which is chiefly required of us, gives to it an advantage over the other conceptions named. But, as before remarked, the interpretation of the conception must be the broadest possible, and its perfect application in our relations with men would require an infinite wisdom.

CHAPTER XXII.

OF RIGHTS.

SECTION 204. We have seen (Sect. 172) that from the idea of self as the subject of sensitiveness and possessor of powers follows the *idea of rights*. *Every person has a right to all that is necessary* to the integrity and development of his ethical personality. He has a right also to what is necessary to his bodily and spiritual existence and development, if he has not foregone it by idleness or forfeited it by misconduct. In other words, every person has a natural claim, which appeals to the consciences of all moral beings, whether it is enforced by society or not in legal form, to certain acts and forbearances on the part of others, to protection and freedom in all that pertains to the integrity and development of his personality. Natural powers have a right to act within proper limits for their ends and in subordination to higher powers.

We might, if necessary, confirm the statement that all men by nature have certain rights, by the general consent of men and by every man's impassioned claim for himself. However inadequately rights may be conceived, they are everywhere admitted in some form, and maintained by laws and punishments. The ethical destiny and responsibility of man require that he have the privilege of free personal

action within due limits. Acknowledged rights are a defence of this privilege, because they check the violence and excited passions of men. An egoism unrestrained by rights would ruin society, and thus ruin the individual. Rights are seen to be essential also because without them we could not perform our duties or enjoy our goods, — in a word, we should lose our personality. "The ultimate idea appears to be to insulate the individual so far as it may be needful to enable him to live his own life, build up his own fortune, create his own character, and work out his own destiny."

Rights are the necessary correlatives of duties and goods as between moral beings. As between men and brutes, the rights of the brute impose duties on men; but the rights of men cannot impose duties on the brute, because the brute is not a moral being, and cannot know or have any obligation. Between brutes there can be no rights or duties, nor can they have any moral goods. Thus we see that all rights are ethical in their nature and origin on one side at least, if not on both. The doctrine of rights is therefore a part of Ethics as really as the doctrine of duties.

SECT. 205. *Since they are ethical, all rights must be claimed, held, and exercised* within and with reference to the principle of obligation or the law of duty. In this view a right is an assertion of the personality and freedom of the man as a member of society, — a defence of these against all exaggerated claims on the part of other persons. Freedom stands in rights. It is by virtue of his rights that a man, while social and thus a part of a greater organic whole, is yet an independent or individual person and an end himself.

But this possession of rights does not relieve the person from a single element of positive duty. It only leaves him

a clear field for the free performance of duty and enjoyment of goods. We see also that a person may have a right (in one sense) to do wrong; that is, he may be protected against the interference of other persons while he is doing what his duty forbids.[1] It is evident also that every right or power of undisturbed action which a person may have imposes duties. Where all restraint and control on the part of others are forbidden, so much the more strongly are self-restraint and wise moral thoughtfulness demanded. If a new right or power of action could be in any manner conferred upon us, it would bring with it new duties and responsibility. Duties are therefore fully commensurate with rights. This is readily seen in the case of political rights.

SECT. 206. *A person is not obliged to demand and use in full all his rights at all times.* From considerations of duty or privilege, or where the application of principles is doubtful or not clear, we may waive some rights for a time or even permanently. But a permanent waiver of certain essential rights would impair the moral personality and interfere with the moral destiny.

In order to the full possession and exercise of all rights, it is requisite that one should be in the full possession and exercise of all the human faculties in a sound or balanced condition. A child has not yet grown up to the full rights of a man; he needs to be under tutors and governors for his own safety and moral development. An idiot can never have the most important rights. An insane person has lost the power to exercise them with discretion, and he may, therefore, be restrained from the use of those in which he would endanger his own welfare or the rights of others. Old age or sickness may so impair the powers that one

[1] Butler, Analogy, part i. chap. vii, ii. first.

could not be allowed the full use of all rights with safety to himself or others. This is only stating the obvious truth or truism, that full rights can belong only to those who have full powers or full personality; for rights have reference to powers and to the exercise of these with a view to attaining the end of man, — that is, with a view to moral growth and moral development amid the manifold relations of our life in the world. Any justification of autocratic or oligarchic government, either in the family or the State, must proceed on the assumption that the members of the household, or the majority of the people, are not now equal to the exercise of the full powers of moral persons.

All the rights of men have limitations; they are in this respect like our moral freedom, which in its very idea cannot be limitless and arbitrary. They belong to a finite nature which is "clothed with circumstances," — that is, it is not abstract, but concrete and real, existing and acting in a real world of men and things. This necessary limitation results also from the fact that all men have the same rights in general terms, and each one must therefore so hold and exercise his own as not to infringe on the rights of others. We are social beings, and this character is just as fundamental as our individuality; it is even essential to individuality, — that is, limitations are essential to the very idea of rights.

SECT. 207. *Natural or moral rights are variously classified*, and the divisions may be carried to such an extent as is convenient. The aim should be to mark most distinctly the powers and privileges of the ethical personality, so as to enforce duties. The principal classes of rights are presented briefly with this end in view.

(1) *The rights of the person;* that is, the corporeal

person, the living being. Every human being has a right to life, safety, and free movement. As life is God-given, and is fundamental to all other rights, this is a right which cannot be waived. This is enforced in the sixth commandment of the Decalogue, — "Thou shalt not kill." No one can deprive a man of his bodily life so long as he is conducting himself within his own proper sphere and not invading the rights of others. Accordingly, a person may, and even must, defend his life when attacked by craft or violence, even to the extent of taking the life of his assailant, who has forfeited his own right to life by crime in assailing the life of another. The right of safety from bodily harm or mutilation — the right of limb — is included. Our members are necessary to the integrity of life and to the performance of the duties and enjoyment of the goods of life. Free movement is essential to the same end.

SECT. 208. (2) *The right of property.* This is enjoined in the eighth commandment, — "Thou shalt not steal." This right of property in general is primarily the man's right to his own person, corporeal and spiritual, and therefore to his own labor and its fruits. Labor is personal, — a thing of choice; and as one man or person cannot be the property of another so long as any rights exist, so the activity of one — that is, his labor — cannot be the property of another unless he has freely given or sold it. No one but the laborer himself can present any claim to the fruits of labor. Moreover every one needs the fruits of his labor to maintain his life and gain the ends of life. If the laborer did not rightfully have the fruits of his own toil, he would lose the motive to labor; life itself would become uncertain; fraud and violence would be encouraged.

Land is in many respects different from movables, but

property in it rests on the same principles. Land in the narrow physical sense — that is, this earth — is not the fruit of labor, but is the gift of God to the race as a whole for public and social as well as for individual ends; it is the foundation of all else; and we may lay down the naked proposition that, abstractly considered, every human creature has an equal natural right in it, not in his individual capacity, but as a member of the social organism. The right is in the society as a whole to have, to hold, and to use the land for the ends of the whole and of the individual as a part of the whole. Whatever right of ownership the individual may have, is a concession from society, and may be resumed on just terms whenever the welfare of society requires it. And society does often resume its right to land, as in appropriations for highways, public buildings, and the like.

But land must generally be mixed with a great deal of labor before it will yield much for the support of human life. This labor produces the crop to which the laborer has a strict right; but at the same time it leaves, or may leave, permanent beneficial results in the soil, which the laborer may justly claim as his own, and which claim society must concede and compensate when it appropriates the land for public purposes. Society may also lay down some general principle as to the conditions and period of ownership or permanent possession, such as it shall judge most conducive to the welfare of the whole; that is, most conducive to the end for which society exists. Doubtless some considerable degree at least of permanency in possession should be allowed, or the motive to apply skill and labor to the land for its improvement in reference to health and future crops would in large measure fail; there would even be a strong motive in the opposite direction.

The right of property does not imply that one owns much or little, but only that one may produce and earn and save and possess, if he will; it is the privilege of all, and no one can interfere.

SECT. 209. (3) *The right of contract.* "A contract is a transaction in which two parties, acting freely, give to one another rights and impose on one another obligations which relate wholly or partly to some performance in the future."[1] It rests in the obligation of mutual truth, and that each should render to the other what he has a right to, — what each has given the other a right to, because, acting freely, he thought it would be useful to himself.

This right presupposes the right of property and completes it. It is the right to dispose of personal powers and the fruits of their exercise according to personal choice. It is implied that the contract is not to do an immoral thing. Nothing can ever bind one to do wrong; it is a truism to say that only right and duty can bind. If we should say that wrong or immorality could bind a person, it could only bind him to shun and flee it.

Contracts may be informal,—that is, not written, but merely verbal; they may be not even verbal, but by any intelligible signs; and not even by any fixed ceremonial of signs, but in any way by which one person voluntarily and intentionally raises in the mind of another a fair and reasonable expectation that he shall receive something in the future.

SECT. 210. (4) *The right of association.* Men have a right to associate for mere enjoyment, for literary, political, and religious purposes, for trade and industry, for mutual help and protection, or in order to gain any of the legitimate

[1] Woolsey, Political Science, vol. i. part i. chap. ii. sect. 33. Also Woolsey, International Law, part i. chap. v. sect. 101.

ends of our human life. This right comes from and rests in the social nature of man, and is necessary in order that he may realize any of his proper ends.

(5) *The right of marriage and of the family.* The necessity for marriage is found deeply laid in the physical and social nature of man; and this kind of union or association, with the relationships which it brings after it, is the most important of all for the just and proportionate development of the intellectual and moral character. It needs to be defended by an acknowledged right, because it is the foundation of all permanent society and of the State, and because all moral and religious life and training must have their beginnings and their centre here. Marriage is a divine institution and the foundation of all other institutions, not a casual and transient arrangement nor a human invention. In its form it is a contract and mutual covenant to enter into a union of hearts, hopes, and all interests for life by two persons of opposite sex who have the proper age, the proper moral and physical qualifications, and who are not within certain degrees of relationship. Like other rights, it presupposes adult age and power of discretion and self-control, or full moral personality. It is based primarily on intelligent affection, and implies the deepest mutual devotion, with the spirit of patience, forbearance, and helpfulness alike in prosperity and adversity. The specific contract, whatever form it may take, is for the sake both of the parties to the marriage and of society. The contract does not supply the place of the mutual affection, but it gives formality and solemnity to the obligations, so that all may have due notice of the relationship established, and that the obligations may not be lightly forgotten or put aside.

Marriage implies monogamy and monandry. Polygamy

and polyandry alike are forbidden by the fact that the nature of the union, its interests, its objects, its affections, the moral and material welfare of the parties and of society, will not allow them. They degrade both parties; they reduce an institution fitted and intended for high moral and intellectual ends into a mere arrangement for the gratification of animal passion; and they render impossible the wise and pure training of children. Nature declares against them also by the equality in numbers of the sexes during the period of life in which marriage can result in the production of children. The family cannot exist except with monogamy and monandry, and the family is an institution absolutely essential to the State and to the decent moral life and cultivation of men.

The rights of the parents over their children follow from the nature of marriage as necessary to the training of both parents and children. The right of testament and inheritance follows also from the nature of the family relation, and in order to make the right of property complete. One cannot own property after he is dead, but he can while living, and can dispose of it, the disposition to take effect at his demise. Children and partners in marriage have rights of inheritance from the unity of the family, from the mutual obligations of the parties, and in the case at least of the partners in a marriage, because the estate is the fruit of their joint labor, skill, and economy.

SECT. 211. (6) *The right of free expression.* No power can interfere with the thought of another so far as it is silent and within the breast; but full and efficient thought requires expression both in conduct and in words. This is essential also to society and its welfare, for moral and intellectual progress and for happiness. It is implied that the thought

be not evil, destructive to the proper ends of the individual or the society, or injurious to them. Expression has many needful forms, as by public speech in assemblies, through the Press, by writing letters or other communications. Like all other rights, this one may be abused in all its forms, and we are bound to keep free from abuses; that is, from infringing on the rights of others, while we claim and use our own right.

(7) *The rights of conscience and of opinion* are the same thing, and closely allied with the right of free expression, if indeed they need at all to be distinguished from it. So far as our moral and religious feelings and opinions are within the breast, they cannot be infringed upon; but they demand expression as their natural course and completion. They are expressed in religious worship, which is a prime right, as religion is the highest thing in us. This is what is commonly intended by the right of conscience. But they are also expressed in political and moral advocacy and action, in which all real religion must at length issue and embody itself. These rights will be esteemed and defended in proportion as men value truth and religion; that is, value their highest and most permanent interests. But men cannot be allowed under cover of religion or religious worship, or on pretence of moral advocacy, to accomplish that which is immoral, nor to interfere with the rights of others.

(8) *The right of reputation and freedom from insult.* Injury in this direction affects that which is especially dear to men, and the more dear in proportion to their advancement in civilization. To wound the body is painful, and interferes with the successful pursuit of the proper ends of life. But to wound the feelings gives equal pain, though of a different kind; and to injure a person's reputation or good

name may take from him his rightful position in the social and civil community, may close against him his legitimate field of industry and influence, — it may even cut off his whole livelihood, and destroy all his hopes and plans of usefulness in the world. Breaches of this right affect life as well as property, and sometimes raise dangerous, destructive, and lasting feuds in society.

SECT. 212. *The establishment and defence of rights cannot be left in the hands of the individual.* Every person is sure to be a partial judge in his own case both as to what rights he legitimately has, their proper limitations, and the facts in cases of transgression. The stronger would therefore, if left to themselves, be likely to enforce their own claims to the enslavement or destruction of the weak. Might would at length become the only acknowledged right. Neither could men in an unorganized capacity, though they might act on occasion as one body, give proper security to rights. They would often be hasty, and be swayed by passion, just as single individuals are; they would be unsteady, irregular, and without fixed principles in their action. A compact social organization which is supreme over all individuals and families, acting under fixed rules — that is, with established laws and constitution — and by the hands of regular officers, is necessary to give stability to rights, because thus only can a calm, temperate, deliberate, and strong judgment and action be secured.

The definition and defence of rights is one chief purpose of the State. A State has been well defined to be "a community of persons living within certain limits of territory, under a permanent organization, which aims to secure the prevalence of justice by self-imposed law."[1] The State

[1] Woolsey, International Law, part i. chap. i. sect. 36.

has been called a divine institution, and it is a necessity to man as a moral being, and would be necessary even if man were free from all evil passions or sinful disposition, because our moral life must be an ordered life in social relations. The State is necessary also to secure all our material interests by mutual helpfulness, and to carry us forward to a higher stage of civilization.

SECT. 213. The rights which have now been spoken of are called *natural rights, in distinction from political rights.* Natural rights belong to all persons as such; they are inseparable from the personality. But political rights are conferred by the organized society for social and public purposes; they may be given or refused or withdrawn as society judges best, — for example, the right to vote, or the right to hold office. But society may not act foolishly or wilfully in this; it has the prime obligation to judge wisely and deal fairly with every person for his and its own good and for the best attainment of all individual and social ends. But while these political rights are different in their nature and origin from the natural or moral rights, as those of person, property, and the like, if they are not so distributed as to secure and forward all these natural rights of every person in the highest degree, it is evident that the laws and constitution of the State need to be remodelled, and the moral forces operating in society will in time work the needed revolution either peacefully or violently. As the individual and the society advance in knowledge and moral cultivation, bringing improvements in the manner and means of living, such political changes are constantly demanded.

The whole doctrine of the State is founded in Ethics: politics and law are but branches of Ethics; the forms of national constitutions and the principles which should gov-

ern international relations in peace and war are questions of Ethics; and no person is fit to sit as judge upon the bench of justice, or to act as legal adviser, or to take part as a statesman in the foundation of States, or in legislation, or to direct or manage in international affairs, unless his mind is trained not only in legal and historical learning, but also filled with the high sense of duty and with a broad comprehension of moral law and moral ends.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF GOODS.

SECTION 214. We have seen (Sect. 174) that *from the idea of self as the subject of sensitiveness* or as endowed with susceptibility arises *the idea of good.* It is in this region that the worth or value of life and being lies to the person himself. There is no good to a machine, however good it may be; and it makes no difference how complicated the machine is, — even if it had intelligence and ethicality, if these were possible without sensitiveness, it would have no good. A man, or the whole human race, might be a spoke or a cog in the wheel of an infinite mechanism constructed to work out gratification or satisfaction for some infinite being beyond and above it all, and thus be good as an instrument or means to that worthy end; but the man would not thus have a good of his own, unless he were sensitive, or self-apprehensive of his own states as agreeable or disagreeable. But if our nature is active and sensitive, or self-apprehensive in feeling of its activity, throughout all its parts, so to speak, that is, in all its endowments, it must have as many kinds of good as there are forms of activity attended by sensitiveness; and the goods are real to us, even though we may be at the same time consciously or unconsciously contributing to an end and a good far beyond ourselves.

As we have found that there are various ends in our nature, rising one above another, each preparatory to one

above it, and that there is an end or ultimate kind of action and being for man as a moral creature, so there is a good or satisfaction essentially connected with the gaining of each of these ends, and the lower ends and goods are preparatory to the higher. The goods are our supporters and stimulants in the pursuit of the ends; they are necessary to refresh our exhausted powers, and they carry us on, with hope of future and higher good, in exertion for the gaining of greater and nobler ends. There is no insensitive mechanism anywhere in our conscious life; our nature is throughout active and responsive to action in feeling, and the latter element is as essential as the former. There must also be an end, and a good attendant on it (without which the end itself would be worthless, or be no end to us), for man as a moral being, — one final, supreme end and good for man as man. All these various kinds of good are equally necessary and lawful, in their place and degree, for the preservation and growth of the man.

Good, therefore, in its strict sense is an agreeable or satisfied state of the active and sensitive being as active and sensitive, and it is attendant on the gaining of all our various natural and proper ends. Evil is the opposite of good, — the disagreeable or dissatisfied state of the sensitive being in any of its kinds of sensitiveness. This kind of good and evil are ultimate and real (the words "good" and "evil" are here nouns substantive), as distinguished from things which are good or evil, as useful or harmful in bringing about ends, — that is, which are good or evil *for* something (the words "good" and "evil" are here nouns attributive). We are speaking in this chapter of ultimate goods only, such as are necessarily attendant on and resultant from the attainment of ends.

SECT. 215. *There are as many kinds of real or ultimate good* as there are forms of activity and sensitiveness in us, and all these will bear some relation to the final and supreme good of man as man, — a relation similar and parallel to that of subordinate ends to the supreme end.

(1) *There is a bodily sensitiveness* of various kinds and degrees, each with its own special good. Its states are called "sensations," and they are named more specifically from the parts affected. They may be grateful or agreeable in health and when the various wants of the body are properly met. These agreeable states constitute a physical good, some degree of which is necessary to life, and they may rise to a high and keen enjoyment in the pursuit of our chosen labors and recreations. In like manner there is a bodily pain or evil in disease, over-exertion, and want.

(2) *There is a mental or intellectual good*, a state of satisfaction when the desires prosper in seeking their ends, when the mental powers act freely in apprehending truth, facts, and relations, — especially in gaining new truth by investigation; when after successful inquiry the mind rests in conviction; when the memory yields up its acquisitions readily, and what we know is easily turned to the ends in view; when the imagination kindles with its constructive work, and brings forth forms and pictures in art or literature, or ideals of character and conduct, or poetic situations in life, or sees visions of philosophic truth and relations, or great laws of the world. It is a great pleasure to follow, even with plodding feet, the discoverer of truth, though we may, like children, have to be led by the hand and helped at every turn. The first elements of simple knowledge inspire and gratify the childish mind. All successful mental activity in acquiring, reproducing, and imparting knowledge is a lofty pleasure, a real

good in itself, always highly esteemed among enlightened persons. The fire and persistent energy of the investigator, the orator, the poet, the teacher, the philosopher, the inventor, come from the sensitive pleasure attendant on mental activity; and even the dullest mind is sometimes thrilled with satisfaction in moments of unwonted intellectual excitement.

All the desires yield satisfaction when they have their objects, — as society, the esteem of men, power to do and to control, a perception of real superiority to our former selves or to others, the possession of property in any form.

The failure to gain these objects leaves a sense of want and pain.

SECT. 216. (3) *There is an affectional good*, a high satisfaction, when the soul flows out in love, gratitude, generosity, and sympathy towards other sensitive creatures, even if it be only towards brute animals; although those towards whom our affections go out be in sorrow and trouble which we thus share with them, — although they may be even finally separated from us, so that no more kindly intercourse with them in this life is possible. The purest affections go out towards the departed; and it is one of the deepest satisfactions, though a melancholy one, to send out after them our tributes of love, gratitude, and sympathy for all that they were to us, and that we were permitted to be to them, in the days of our association.

The kindly affections flowing between members of the family, between friends and kin, between fellows in faith and hope, between co-workers and co-sufferers in any good cause, give us a large part of the joy of life; and higher still are we raised in enjoyment if we recognize the hourly blessings God confers, and the proper responses of love and

gratitude go out towards the great Benefactor of all. Every such affection justly bestowed is an enriching of the soul and an enlarging of the life, just as all good, properly gained and rightly enjoyed, refreshes the energies and quickens us for future activity and achievement.

If these feelings are baffled and repressed, finding no proper object, or if their objects prove at length unworthy or unresponsive, we have pain.

Resentment towards wrong, injury, wickedness, is often thought to be painful; but this is because the attention is absorbed in the wrong and in sympathy with those who suffer from it, or in sympathy with the evil-doer for his unhappy life and his present sufferings. But so far as any person has real stalwart and reliable virtue he will take satisfaction in abhorring and resenting wrong and every species of wickedness. It is a maudlin and sickly sentiment, if it be not even a sympathy with wickedness itself, which refuses to be indignant and to execute a righteous wrath.

(4) *There is an æsthetic good*, a satisfaction in the emotive nature attending the apprehension of the beautiful and sublime of whatever kind, whether as seen in nature, art, or conduct. There are some who seem to make æsthetic pleasure the great good and the great end of their lives. All classes and degrees of people are sensitive to the beautiful in some form or other, though they differ widely as to what is beautiful. The standard of beauty rises with the progress of cultivation and refinement, just as in the case of the ethical the standard rises with our moral improvement; but perhaps persons of lower culture have as great satisfaction as do those of higher refinement.

SECT. 217. (5) *There is a moral good and evil.* The soul is keenly sensitive to duty when facts and relations are

perceived. The loyal seeking and doing of duty gives satisfaction. An approving conscience is the highest of all satisfactions; and all those who have come to a just and realizing sense of the ethical nature and purpose of life prize it and seek it above all other goods. Duty omitted or discarded gives pain; the conscience is restless, dissatisfied, and reproachful. Remorse of conscience is the greatest pain and evil, which no other kind of good, however multiplied, can salve or heal. Both the good and the evil in conscience are keener and fuller as the moral nature is elevated and refined, and as the ethical is more and more distinctly seen and felt to be the great end and the predominant principle in the soul and in life. The supremacy of this kind of good and evil comes from this fact; namely, that the ethical is the central, organizing, unifying, and all-embracing element of our whole nature, and that it is our great end to develop it and grow up into full harmony with it in all our disposition and conduct.

(6) *There is a religious good*, not distinguished in kind from the ethical, but which grows out of the ethical in its highest relation and application. We have this religious good in living form when duty is done directly towards God, or when any duty, however humble, is done towards any creature with a reference to God, with the thought of its being his creature, or of the act as being one which he has appointed or required; when our souls render the responses of reverence, love, gratitude, and worship which are due from the creature to the pure and holy Creator; when we enter into communion of thought and feeling with the Most High with choice and purpose. This lifting the soul above the temporal, earthly, finite, and imperfect into that union with the infinite, the holy and eternal, which

by its very nature it struggles after, satisfies the highest aspirations, brings man into the purest association, and gives him the noblest good. This is our great and only support when the things of time and sense, which we loved and enjoyed, fail us, as they often do and must all do at last, and when we are overwhelmed by the burdens, the doubts and fears of this unsatisfying earthly life. It is a deep and awful pain when the soul cannot find that great support. Then despair and death are near at hand.

SECT. 218. *It is evident from what has now been said* that each of these several kinds of good is *lawful and necessary* in its place and degree for our proper action, sustenance, and growth in moral life. It does not follow that the whole thought and purpose of the man is to be directed to the gaining of these or any other personal gratifications. Such a purpose is sure to baffle and defeat itself, and is likely to result in the concentration of our energies on the pursuit of low and sordid goods, to the neglect of higher ends and their goods. Observation shows that men do not in fact secure their proper goods in due degree and proportion. The lower and coarser goods absorb the attention of the many, because some degree of them is a prime necessity, and they are so near and so appreciable by all. Even among the higher goods, which are in no respect sensual, we often see men turn away from the highest, as from the ethical and religious, to the æsthetical and the affectional, and still more perhaps to the intellectual. It is unnecessary to argue that this distorts and degrades the nature; it is in fact putting the lower in the place of the higher. But if each kind of good is sought and enjoyed in due subordination and with reference to the highest principles, then the proper and supreme good of the man will be attained.

Each good prepares the way for the one next above it and contributes to the healthful and vigorous development of the whole nature. Enjoyment will thus be higher and fuller, and action will have greater and more sustained energy.

SECT. 219. *What is the supreme good?* It must be that good which is most central to the whole being, which is fundamental and organic in normal development, and, therefore, most pervading and permanent. Physical good is essential to life, for beings with a physical nature; but when compared with the spiritual nature and spiritual good, it is seen to be of a low kind, unintellectual, unspiritual, and transient. If our physical part is to be laid aside, while the intellectual and moral person lives on, physical good can have no place in the supreme and permanent good of the immortal part, except as for a time it forms a basis or preparation for the cultivation of the higher and spiritual. While physical good, then, is really nothing in itself, it is a temporary means for a high end, and therefore not to be rejected or despised. And as all the lower principles may be elevated by being brought into connection with the higher and made subservient to them, so the lower good may be exalted in like manner. Physical good may thus be turned into a moral good, and be made to yield direct moral results, if it is received and used with an ethical and religious response to the Giver of all good, and employed not in mere secret and selfish enjoyment, but in doing good. Physical evil or pain is often a great moral blessing, working out a moral good, by recalling the person to the thought of the perishableness of all such material things, and showing the necessity of seeking a higher and lasting good.

The intellectual, affectional, and æsthetic goods belong to the immortal part, and must thus be elements in the perma-

nent and supreme good. As they are preparatory to the ethical good, they are subordinate to it; but as they are essential elements in the ethical, they are always joined with the ethical good. The ethical activity is noblest and purest when it is employed in the highest relations and about things viewed in their highest and most permanent relations. The good will be in proportion to the loftiness of the end and the purity of the action which yields it. The highest and most permanent relations of men and actions are their relations to God, or their relations to one another as God's creatures, since God is over all and through all and in all things. The rational, affectional, and ethical creature feels everywhere its dependence, and aspires after God in all its associations and outgoings; it struggles for communion and fellowship with him, and he will ever be its ultimate dependence and support, and its infinite ideal, beckoning it on to higher attainment and enjoyment. These are the religious aspects of our life.

If there is a Personal Author and Governor of all things, then natural good and evil of every kind are his appointment as parts or means of the government which he is carrying on for his own wise end, and they must be essential to its supreme moral end. These goods and evils, learned by experience to be necessary for life and action, become objective motives for action; and through the consideration required to gain the needful goods of life, — without which action could not be sustained and ends gained, — conduct is largely regulated. If all good and evil should be thus considered as divinely appointed consequences and attendants, — that is, as sanctions, — as well as directors and sustainers, of conduct, then our action and what we receive would be alike raised into the highest ethical and religious

relations; all our life would be ordered, our conduct regulated, our ends and goods sought, in subordination to the Divine Ruler of the world, according to the constitution and laws which he has established; and we should find our permanent good in the results of religious action, in obedience, and in rendering to God the service he requires both towards himself immediately and towards him through all his creatures, whom we should love and whose good we should seek both for his sake and for what he has made them to be. This is the supreme good of man, — the good which attends upon and flows from the true love and loyal service of God in himself and in his creatures.

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